This paper proposes an efficient lattice-based blind signature scheme built upon the BLISS framework. By incor porating bimodal Gaussian distributions and rejection sampling techniques, the scheme ensures secure output distributions and prevents information leakage during the signing process. It achieves blindness and one-more unforgeability with only two rounds of interaction, significantly improving efficiency compared to earlier multi-round lattice-based blind signature schemes. Performance analysis demonstrates that the scheme maintains relatively compact parameters, with a public key size of about 20KB, a private key size of 99KB, and a signature size of 120KB. These characteristics make it practical for post-quantum secure environments. Overall, the proposed scheme combines provable security, anonymity, and efficiency, and is well-suited for privacy preserving applications such as blockchain systems, electronic voting, and anonymous payments.
This paper proposes an efficient lattice-based blind signature scheme built upon the BLISS framework. By incor porating bimodal Gaussian distributions and rejection sampling techniques, the scheme ensures secure output distributions and prevents information leakage during the signing process. It achieves blindness and one-more unforgeability with only two rounds of interaction, significantly improving efficiency compared to earlier multi-round lattice-based blind signature schemes. Performance analysis demonstrates that the scheme maintains relatively compact parameters, with a public key size of about 20KB, a private key size of 99KB, and a signature size of 120KB. These characteristics make it practical for post-quantum secure environments. Overall, the proposed scheme combines provable security, anonymity, and efficiency, and is well-suited for privacy preserving applications such as blockchain systems, electronic voting, and anonymous payments.
At present, several post-quantum cryptosystems have been proposed, and lattice-based cryptography is the main candidate. Especially in the direction of digital signatures, there are now many practical lattice-based signature schemes. However, there exist few lattice-based signatures with special property such as blind signature. Blind signature was introduced by Chaum for creating untraceable payment system. Then, it is widely used in e-cash and voting, especially in the revolutionary digital cash system based on blockchain. In our paper, we present a method to construct a post-quantum blind signature based on lattice assumptions, and we proved that any existential forger against the security of the resulting scheme can solve theSISq,n,m,βproblem forβ=O(dn). Our main technique is the rejection sampling theory. The expected number of times needed to output a blind signature is at moste2under aborting, and our new scheme has much smaller signature size than those of all the previously proposed blind signature schemes over lattices.
In response to the issues of low security and computational efficiency in current lattice-based proxy blind signature systems, a novel identity-based proxy blind signature scheme utilizing lattices is proposed. This scheme integrates the user's identity information through matrix accumulation operations to serve as the verification public key, simplifying the identity validation process and strengthening both security and privacy measures. The user's private key as well as the proxy signing key are produced through the extended algorithm of the left sampling algorithm, while the rejection sampling algorithm is employed to produce the proxy blind signature. These enhance the space utilisation of keys and signatures. Moreover, the scheme's security is reducible to solving the small integer solution problem, thereby attaining resilience against one-more unforgeability under the adaptive chosen-message attacks within the random oracle model. Compared to other schemes, our scheme features smaller key and signature sizes, resulting in greater efficiency.
Blind signatures have been widely applied when privacy preserving is required, and the delegation of blind signature rights and a proxy blind signature (Proxy-BS) become necessary when the signer cannot sign. Existing Proxy-BS schemes are based on traditional cryptographically hard problems, and they cannot resist quantum attacks. Moreover, most current Proxy-BS schemes depend on public key infrastructure (PKI), which leads to high certificate storage and management overhead. To simplify key management and resist quantum attacks, we propose a post-quantum secure identity-based proxy blind signature (ID-Proxy-BS) scheme on a lattice using a matrix cascade technique and lattice cryptosystem. Under the random oracle model (ROM), the security of the proposed scheme is proved. Security shows that the proposed scheme assures security against quantum attacks and satisfies the correctness, blindness, and unforgeability. In addition, we apply the ID-Proxy-BS scheme on a lattice to e-voting and propose a quantum-resistant proxy e-voting system, which is resistant to quantum attacks and achieves the efficiency of e-voting.
This paper proposes a lattice based multi-mode blind signature framework that uniformly supports three operating modes: full blindness, partial blindness, and non-blindness. The design employs public matrices with trapdoors, combined with hash functions mapping into ℤ𝑞𝑛, short preimage sampling mechanisms, and an identity encryption component to ensure fairness and enable traceability in case of misuse. Based on this construction, the user generates a blinded request, the signer produces a short response bound to the encrypted identity, and the user performs an unblinding step to obtain the final signature. The paper also presents the system model, research methodology, security claims, and parameter discussions in the post-quantum setting. The main properties analyzed include correctness, blindness, partial blindness, existential unforgeability, one more unforgeability, fairness, and traceability under the SIS and one more SIS assumptions. The results indicate that the proposed approach provides a flexible solution for applications requiring a balance between anonymity, accountability, and post-quantum security.
In recent decades, log system management has been widely studied for data security management. System abnormalities or illegal operations can be found in time by analyzing the log and provide evidence for intrusions. In order to ensure the integrity of the log in the current system, many researchers have designed it based on blockchain. However, the emerging blockchain is facing significant security challenges with the increment of quantum computers. An attacker equipped with a quantum computer can extract the user's private key from the public key to generate a forged signature, destroy the structure of the blockchain, and threaten the security of the log system. Thus, blind signature on the lattice in post-quantum blockchain brings new security features for log systems. In our paper, to address these, firstly, we propose a novel log system based on post-quantum blockchain that can resist quantum computing attacks. Secondly, we utilize a post-quantum blind signature on the lattice to ensure both security and blindness of log system, which makes the privacy of log information to a large extent. Lastly, we enhance the security level of lattice-based blind signature under the random oracle model, and the signature size grows slowly compared with others. We also implement our protocol and conduct an extensive analysis to prove the ideas. The results show that our scheme signature size edges up subtly compared with others with the improvement of security level.
Blind signatures are a central tool for privacy-preserving protocols. They allow users to obtain signatures from a signer without the signer seeing the signed message. For instance, it enables electronic cash: signatures correspond to coins which can be issued by the bank in a privacy-preserving manner via blind signing. To mitigate the risk of key compromise, threshold blind signatures allow the distribution of the signing key amongst N parties. While recent works have focused on improving the security of this primitive in the classical setting, no construction is known to date in the post-quantum setting. We present the first construction of a threshold blind signature secure in the post-quantum setting, based on lattices. We prove its security under an interactive variant of the SIS assumption introduced in [Agrawal et al., CCS’22]. Our construction has a reasonable overhead of a factor of roughly 1.4 X to 2.5 X in signature size over comparable non-threshold blind signatures over lattices under heuristic but natural assumptions.