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International journal for housing science and its applications.

Security Analysis and Algorithm Design of Chameleon Signature Scheme Based on Lattice Cryptography under Quantum Attacks

Published Aug 15, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.70517/ijhsa463543

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Traditional digital signatures are often publicly verifiable, and in certain applications with privacy preservation requirements, the signer does not want the sensitive information it signed to be redelivered by a dishonest verifier.Aiming at the problem that traditional chameleon signatures (CS) cannot resist quantum computer attacks, this paper proposes a lattice-based authentication CS scheme.Based on the analysis of the lattice difficulty problem and the security vulnerability of the CS scheme, it is pointed out that it does not satisfy the third-party unforgeability and the signer rejectability, and a new lattice-based identity CS scheme is established, which is verified under the stochastic predicate machine model, and the storage and transmission efficiency of the scheme is analyzed.The results show that the newly designed identity-based CS scheme on the lattice can effectively resist quantum computer attacks, can sign messages of arbitrary length, and possesses more lightweight storage and transmission efficiency.The optimized chameleon signature scheme has better security and also provides a new solution for digital signatures to resist quantum computer attacks.
With the development of quantum computation, quantum computers will break the almost classical cryptography. It is imminent to design post-quantum cryptography algorithm that could resist quantum adversaries. Lattice-based problem has been verified that could resist quantum attacks. Our goal is to design a signature and try to prove it is secure in the quantum random oracle model. Our new signature scheme is redesigned based on the signature proposed by Lyu, but that scheme only proved secure in the random oracle model. The difference between the two signature is that we introduce the middle-product operation. So our signature is based on middle-product LWE hard assumption, which enjoys a security proof from PL WE. Then we combine the secure chameleon hash function and our new scheme, prove that our new combined signature is still secure in the quantum random oracle model.
Hash functions play a fundamental role in cryptography, offering one-way and collision-resistant properties essential for digital security. Chameleon hashing, an extension of traditional hash functions, allows controlled collision generation using a private trapdoor, enabling various cryptographic applications such as online/offline digital signatures and commitment schemes. However, existing identity-based chameleon hash (IBCH) functions largely rely on number-theoretic assumptions, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks. To address this issue, we propose a novel IBCH function built upon post-quantum lattice-based cryptography. Specifically, our construction leverages the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem to achieve quantum-resistant security guarantees. The proposed scheme enables identitybased key management, allowing users to generate hash values using public identity information while preserving the trapdoorcontrolled collision property. We rigorously analyze the security of our scheme, demonstrating its resistance against quantum adversaries under standard lattice assumptions. Furthermore, we compare our construction with existing functions in terms of computational efficiency and security, showing that our approach provides a feasible and secure alternative for post-quantum applications.