Abstract The advent of quantum computing necessitates the integration of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) into high-speed optical networks to safeguard against emerging threats. This study rigorously evaluates NIST-standardized PQC digital signature algorithms – CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+ – in wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) systems, addressing the critical interplay between cryptographic robustness, file size dynamics, and optical network performance. Through comprehensive OptiSystem simulations, we analyze transmission fidelity (BER, Q-factor), power efficiency, and channel spacing impacts across single- and multi-channel WDM architectures. Key findings reveal that compact lattice-based schemes like FALCON-512 achieve high Q-factor at optimum power (−2) dBm for small files (≤45 bits), making them ideal for latency-sensitive applications such as real-time financial transactions. Conversely, large files (>200 bits) demand adaptive power allocation (−12 dBm–−10 dBm) and hybrid error correction (LDPC + FEC) when using SPHINCS + , despite its 41 kB signature overhead. Optimal channel spacing (0.8 nm for metro networks, 1.6 nm for long-haul links) balances spectral efficiency and resilience to distortions. The results underscore the necessity of context-aware cryptographic frameworks: FALCON-512 excels in low-power, high-security metro-scale deployments (50–100 km), while SPHINCS + suits archival data with high throughput tolerance. This work provides actionable insights for designing quantum-safe optical networks, harmonizing PQC standards with the evolving demands of high-capacity, low-latency infrastructure.
Abstract The advent of quantum computing necessitates the integration of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) into high-speed optical networks to safeguard against emerging threats. This study rigorously evaluates NIST-standardized PQC digital signature algorithms – CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+ – in wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) systems, addressing the critical interplay between cryptographic robustness, file size dynamics, and optical network performance. Through comprehensive OptiSystem simulations, we analyze transmission fidelity (BER, Q-factor), power efficiency, and channel spacing impacts across single- and multi-channel WDM architectures. Key findings reveal that compact lattice-based schemes like FALCON-512 achieve high Q-factor at optimum power (−2) dBm for small files (≤45 bits), making them ideal for latency-sensitive applications such as real-time financial transactions. Conversely, large files (>200 bits) demand adaptive power allocation (−12 dBm–−10 dBm) and hybrid error correction (LDPC + FEC) when using SPHINCS + , despite its 41 kB signature overhead. Optimal channel spacing (0.8 nm for metro networks, 1.6 nm for long-haul links) balances spectral efficiency and resilience to distortions. The results underscore the necessity of context-aware cryptographic frameworks: FALCON-512 excels in low-power, high-security metro-scale deployments (50–100 km), while SPHINCS + suits archival data with high throughput tolerance. This work provides actionable insights for designing quantum-safe optical networks, harmonizing PQC standards with the evolving demands of high-capacity, low-latency infrastructure.
The integration of post-quantum digital signature (PQDS) algorithms into coherent wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) optical networks introduces a non-negligible cryptographic overhead that fundamentally alters physical-layer performance characteristics. Unlike conventional studies that treat security and transmission independently, this work provides a cross-layer evaluation of PQDS-induced payload expansion and its direct impact on coherent optical system behavior under realistic, DSP-aligned conditions. A structured and reproducible evaluation framework is proposed to systematically analyze this interaction across multiple transmission scenarios, ranging from a single-channel QPSK baseline to a 16-channel WDM system employing both QPSK and 16QAM modulation formats. Key system parameters—including launch power, local oscillator power, bit rate, and fiber length—are jointly optimized, while performance is rigorously assessed in terms of bit error rate (BER), Q-factor, and maximum transmission reach. The results demonstrate a clear performance degradation trend driven by both spectral efficiency scaling and cryptographic payload expansion. The single-channel QPSK system achieves a maximum reach of 203 km, which decreases to 194 km in the 16-channel WDM QPSK configuration due to inter-channel interference and nonlinear effects. In contrast, the 16-channel WDM 16QAM system exhibits a significantly reduced reach of 103 km, reflecting its heightened sensitivity to noise, chromatic dispersion, and fiber nonlinearities. Furthermore, increased payload size associated with PQDS schemes is shown to exacerbate transmission impairments by extending frame duration and intensifying inter-channel interactions. These findings identify PQDS-induced overhead as a critical system-level constraint that directly governs transmission efficiency, scalability, and performance limits. The study highlights the necessity of cross-layer co-design strategies, where cryptographic mechanisms and physical-layer parameters are jointly optimized to enable efficient, reliable, and quantum-safe coherent optical communication systems.
Background: The rapid advancement of quantum computing threatens the cryptographic foundations of e-Government infrastructure, particularly classical public-key algorithms susceptible to Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) offers a viable pathway for securing digital signature systems against emerging quantum adversaries. Objective: This study conducts a system-level comparative evaluation of three NIST-standardized PQC digital signature schemes CRYSTALS-Dilithium2, Falcon-512, and SPHINCS+-128s to assess their suitability for secure e-Government document signing workflows. Methods: A simulation-based system-level evaluation is employed, wherein timing values are estimated from official NIST PQC parameter specifications and open-source benchmarks (PQClean, OQS), rather than measured from native cryptographic library executions. Experiments were conducted over 100 iterations, reporting mean ± standard deviation for key generation, signing, and verification times, alongside signature sizes and a RESTful API prototype demonstration. Results: Falcon-512 demonstrates the lowest estimated signing latency approximately five to six times faster than Dilithium2 and over fifty times faster than SPHINCS+-128s with the smallest signature size (666 bytes versus 2,420 and 7,856 bytes respectively). Dilithium2 provides a balanced trade-off between computational efficiency and signature robustness, while SPHINCS+-128s, despite its computational overhead, offers the strongest long-term security guarantees through its stateless hash-based construction. The RESTful API prototype confirms successful multi-scheme integration feasibility. Conclusion: This study recommends Falcon-512 for real-time mobile services, Dilithium2 for centralized server-side authentication, and SPHINCS+-128s for long-term archival security, providing evidence-based guidance for PQC adoption in national e-Government systems aligned with SPBE frameworks and NIST standards.
As quantum computing advances, modern cryptographic standards face an existential threat, necessitating a transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has selected CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium as standardized PQC algorithms for secure key exchange and digital signatures, respectively. This study conducts a comprehensive performance analysis of these algorithms by benchmarking execution times across cryptographic operations such as key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, signing, and verification. Additionally, the impact of AVX2 optimizations is evaluated to assess hardware acceleration benefits. Our findings demonstrate that Kyber and Dilithium achieve efficient execution times, outperforming classical cryptographic schemes such as RSA and ECDSA at equivalent security levels. Beyond technical performance, the real-world deployment of PQC introduces challenges in telecommunications networks, where large-scale infrastructure upgrades, interoperability with legacy systems, and regulatory constraints must be addressed. This paper examines the feasibility of PQC adoption in telecom environments, highlighting key transition challenges, security risks, and implementation strategies. Through industry case studies, we illustrate how telecom operators are integrating PQC into 5G authentication, subscriber identity protection, and secure communications. Our analysis provides insights into the computational trade-offs, deployment considerations, and standardization efforts shaping the future of quantum-safe cryptographic infrastructure.
The continuous development of quantum computing necessitates the development of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. In response to this demand, the National Institute of Standards and Technology selected standardized algorithms including Crystals-Dilithium, Falcon, and Sphincs+ for digital signatures. This paper provides a comparative evaluation of these algorithms across key metrics. The results indicate varying strengths and weaknesses for each algorithm, underscoring the importance of context-specific deployments. Our findings indicate that Dilithium offers advantages in low-power scenarios, Falcon excels in signature verification speed, and Sphincs+ provides robust security at the cost of computational efficiency. These results underscore the importance of context-specific deployments in specific and resource-constrained technological applications, like IoT, smart cards, blockchain, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication.
The rise of quantum computing threatens traditional cryptographic systems, driving the urgent adoption of PQC algorithms for securing IoT and edge computing environments. However, selecting an optimal PQC scheme remains challenging due to trade-offs between security strength, computational efficiency, and scalability in real-world deployments. While algorithms like CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and SPHINCS+ offer quantum resilience. These suffer from processing overhead, high energy consumption, and limited adaptability, hindering their seamless integration into latency-sensitive and resource-constrained IoT networks. In this study, we conduct a comprehensive and systematic performance evaluation of these PQC algorithms within the context of IoT-based cryptographic scheduling workflows, assessing critical efficiency parameters such as encryption/decryption time, execution speed, system latency, energy efficiency, and scalability under varying processing loads and batch sizes. Our analysis reveals that CRYSTALS-Kyber consistently outperforms its counterparts, demonstrating superior computational efficiency, minimal processing delays, and lower power consumption while maintaining high-security resilience against quantum adversaries. Additionally, we propose a dynamic cryptographic scheduling approach, optimizing the balance between security levels and computational resource allocation, ensuring efficient cryptographic task management in large-scale IoT networks. This research provides a foundation for the practical deployment and standardization of PQC in next-generation cryptographic architectures, enabling the seamless transition from classical to quantum-secure cryptographic frameworks. The insights gained from this study are pivotal for advancing cryptographic scheduling models, enhancing security efficiency in real-time IoT operations, and driving the global adoption of PQC algorithms for future-proof digital security infrastructures.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computing presents an imminent threat to contemporary public-key cryptosystems, with quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm capable of efficiently breaking RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). This vulnerability has catalyzed accelerated standardization efforts for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and global security stakeholders. While theoretical security analysis of these quantum-resistant algorithms has advanced considerably, comprehensive real-world performance benchmarks spanning diverse computing environments—from high-performance cloud infrastructure to severely resource-constrained IoT devices—remain insufficient for informed deployment planning. This paper presents the most extensive cross-platform empirical evaluation to date of NIST-selected PQC algorithms, including CRYSTALS-Kyber and NTRU for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), alongside BIKE as a code-based alternative, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon for digital signatures. Our systematic benchmarking framework measures computational latency, memory utilization, key sizes, and protocol overhead across multiple security levels (NIST Levels 1, 3, and 5) in three distinct hardware environments and various network conditions. Results demonstrate that contemporary server architectures can implement these algorithms with negligible performance impact (<5% additional latency), making immediate adoption feasible for cloud services. In contrast, resource-constrained devices experience more significant overhead, with computational demands varying by up to 12× between algorithms at equivalent security levels, highlighting the importance of algorithm selection for edge deployments. Beyond standalone algorithm performance, we analyze integration challenges within existing security protocols, revealing that naive implementation of PQC in TLS 1.3 can increase handshake size by up to 7× compared to classical approaches. To address this, we propose and evaluate three optimization strategies that reduce bandwidth requirements by 40–60% without compromising security guarantees. Our investigation further encompasses memory-constrained implementation techniques, side-channel resistance measures, and hybrid classical-quantum approaches for transitional deployments. Based on these comprehensive findings, we present a risk-based migration framework and algorithm selection guidelines tailored to specific use cases, including financial transactions, secure firmware updates, vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, and IoT fleet management. This practical roadmap enables organizations to strategically prioritize systems for quantum-resistant upgrades based on data sensitivity, resource constraints, and technical feasibility. Our results conclusively demonstrate that PQC is deployment-ready for most applications, provided that implementations are carefully optimized for the specific performance characteristics and security requirements of target environments. We also identify several remaining research challenges for the community, including further optimization for ultra-constrained devices, standardization of hybrid schemes, and hardware acceleration opportunities.