The continuous development of quantum computing necessitates the development of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. In response to this demand, the National Institute of Standards and Technology selected standardized algorithms including Crystals-Dilithium, Falcon, and Sphincs+ for digital signatures. This paper provides a comparative evaluation of these algorithms across key metrics. The results indicate varying strengths and weaknesses for each algorithm, underscoring the importance of context-specific deployments. Our findings indicate that Dilithium offers advantages in low-power scenarios, Falcon excels in signature verification speed, and Sphincs+ provides robust security at the cost of computational efficiency. These results underscore the importance of context-specific deployments in specific and resource-constrained technological applications, like IoT, smart cards, blockchain, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication.
The continuous development of quantum computing necessitates the development of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. In response to this demand, the National Institute of Standards and Technology selected standardized algorithms including Crystals-Dilithium, Falcon, and Sphincs+ for digital signatures. This paper provides a comparative evaluation of these algorithms across key metrics. The results indicate varying strengths and weaknesses for each algorithm, underscoring the importance of context-specific deployments. Our findings indicate that Dilithium offers advantages in low-power scenarios, Falcon excels in signature verification speed, and Sphincs+ provides robust security at the cost of computational efficiency. These results underscore the importance of context-specific deployments in specific and resource-constrained technological applications, like IoT, smart cards, blockchain, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication.
The continuous development of quantum computing requires the development of cryptographic algorithms resistant to quantum cryptanalysis. Therefore, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is holding a competition to standardize algorithms in the post-quantum period, including Crystals-Dilithium, Falcon, and Sphincs+ for digital signatures. In order to determine the ways of development and ways to improve the existing methods of cryptographic protection and electronic digital signature (EDS), an urgent task arose to assess the effectiveness (stability and computational complexity) of existing EDS algorithms. In this paper, a comparative evaluation of EDS algorithms was carried out by key indicators. Research results show the disadvantages and advantages of each algorithm, taking into account the importance of context-specific use. The conclusions indicate that Dilithium has the lowest load on the system's computing resources, Falcon stands out for its signature verification speed, and Sphincs+ provides reliable security. The capabilities of existing cryptographic transformation algorithms based on elliptic curves do not meet the growing need of authentication algorithms resistance to quantum cryptanalysis, and the use of modern candidates for the post-quantum cryptography standard does not allow for a short-term transition to the usage of new cryptographic algorithms in information systems. The paper also points out the impossibility of simultaneous transition to potentially quantum cryptanalysis-resistant algorithms in existing information systems. The direction of further research is the development of new cryptoalgorithms and methods that will ensure the integrity and confidentiality of information during its transmission over unprotected channels in the transition period to the widespread use and implementation of post-quantum cryptography standards.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has recently concluded the third round of its Post Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process, selecting four finalist algorithms for standardization: CRYSTALS Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+. These algorithms are designed to withstand attacks from both classical and quantum computers, ensuring the long-term security of digital communications. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative analysis of the security margins and practical deployment readiness of these finalist algorithms. CRYSTALS-Kyber, a key encapsulation mechanism based on the hardness of the Module Learning With Errors problem, offers strong security and efficient performance. CRYSTALS-Dilithium, a digital signature algorithm based on module lattices, provides robust security guarantees and relatively straightforward implementation. FALCON, a lattice-based digital signature algorithm utilizing the Fast Fourier Transform, offers compact signatures and fast verification but faces implementation challenges due to its reliance on floating-point arithmetic. SPHINCS+, a hash-based signature scheme, stands out as a conservative choice with security based solely on the well-established security of hash functions. The analysis reveals that while each algorithm has its strengths, they also face unique challenges in terms of side-channel vulnerabilities, formal security proofs, and performance trade-offs. The practical deployment of these algorithms requires careful consideration of specific security requirements, performance needs, and resource constraints. Ongoing research efforts aim to enhance the algorithms' resistance against advanced attacks, optimize their performance across diverse platforms, and develop standardized and secure hybrid cryptographic systems. The transition to post-quantum cryptography will involve challenges such as interoperability with legacy systems, the need for clear standards and regulatory guidance, and the costs associated with software and hardware updates. Continued engagement with the cryptographic community and monitoring of the evolving security landscape will be crucial for ensuring a secure and effective migration to post-quantum cryptography.
The advent of quantum computing presents a significant threat to the security of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, necessitating the adoption of new cryptographic mechanisms resilient to quantum-based attacks. This need is particularly critical for applications that rely exclusively on public-key cryptography, such as digital signatures. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the performance of various post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, focusing specifically on NIST-standardized digital signature algorithms—SPHINCS+ and Dilithium—and their practical implementations. The study evaluates these algorithms across different programming languages to identify optimal environments for diverse applications. Comparative analyses with the widely used RSA algorithm reveal that the computational cost of adopting post-quantum cryptographic systems is relatively low. Notably, some post-quantum algorithms demonstrate performance advantages over classical RSA in specific scenarios.
Abstract The advent of quantum computing necessitates the integration of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) into high-speed optical networks to safeguard against emerging threats. This study rigorously evaluates NIST-standardized PQC digital signature algorithms – CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+ – in wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) systems, addressing the critical interplay between cryptographic robustness, file size dynamics, and optical network performance. Through comprehensive OptiSystem simulations, we analyze transmission fidelity (BER, Q-factor), power efficiency, and channel spacing impacts across single- and multi-channel WDM architectures. Key findings reveal that compact lattice-based schemes like FALCON-512 achieve high Q-factor at optimum power (−2) dBm for small files (≤45 bits), making them ideal for latency-sensitive applications such as real-time financial transactions. Conversely, large files (>200 bits) demand adaptive power allocation (−12 dBm–−10 dBm) and hybrid error correction (LDPC + FEC) when using SPHINCS + , despite its 41 kB signature overhead. Optimal channel spacing (0.8 nm for metro networks, 1.6 nm for long-haul links) balances spectral efficiency and resilience to distortions. The results underscore the necessity of context-aware cryptographic frameworks: FALCON-512 excels in low-power, high-security metro-scale deployments (50–100 km), while SPHINCS + suits archival data with high throughput tolerance. This work provides actionable insights for designing quantum-safe optical networks, harmonizing PQC standards with the evolving demands of high-capacity, low-latency infrastructure.
Quantum computing challenges the mathematical problems anchoring the security of the classical public key algorithms. For quantum-resistant public key algorithms, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has undergone a multi-year standardization process and selected the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) public key digital signatures of Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. Finding common ground to compare these algorithms can be difficult because of their design differences, including the fundamental math problems (lattice-based vs. hash-based). We use a visualization model to show the key/signature size vs. security trade-offs for all PQC algorithms. Our performance analyses compare the algorithms’ computational loads in the execution time. Building on the individual algorithms’ analyses, we analyze the communication costs and implementation overheads when integrated with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). Our results show that the lattice-based algorithms of Dilithium and Falcon induce lower computational overheads than the hash-based algorithms of SPHINCS+. In addition, the lattice-based PQC can outperform the classical algorithm with comparable security strength; for example, Dilithium 2 and Falcon 512 outperform RSA 4096 in the TLS handshake time duration.
Background. The work examines the development and promotion of post-quantum standards, as well as the analysis and improvement of existing algorithms, on the basis of which the functioning of standards in the field of electronic digital signature can be based. One of the main reasons was also the migration of classical cryptography to post-quantum cryptography. The robot is aligning three popular post-quantum standards: CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+. As a result of the investigation, the most optimal standards were selected before implementation of classical electronic signature schemes. The article is dedicated to the development and promotion of post-quantum standards in the field of electronic digital signature. It is also necessary to analyze and level up existing algorithms, on the basis of which the functioning of such standards can be based. The research is considered relevant due to the growing interest in quantum technologies and the need for secure electronic communications in the upcoming quantum world. Мethods. Мigrating classical cryptography to post-quantum cryptography. However, power is important, because the power of quantum computers can be affected by certain cryptographic algorithms. An analysis of the feasibility of transitioning to new standards and their existing security capabilities is also carried out. In addition, three popular post-quantum standards are being updated: CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+. This allows us to determine the most optimal and reliable standard for implementation of classical electronic signature schemes. The authors of the work carry out the selection of the optimal standard, ensuring the safety and security of its authorities. Results. Сontains important results from the study of post-quantum standards for electronic digital signatures, which may be useful for developers of cryptographic software and information security engineers. The power supply to the influences and changes in the advanced post-quantum standards, such as the complexity of implementation, the flexibility of infrastructure and power standardization, are thoroughly examined. The prospects for the future development of post quantum cryptography and its influx into modern electronic signature systems have also been highlighted. This will help readers to take away the more common sense and context of the importance and potential contributions in this area. Conclusions. Falcon and CRYSTALS-Dilithium have a high signing fluidity and a larger key size, making them practical for rich stagnation. SPHINCS+, regardless of its viscosity, has less fluidity and requires a larger key size. The choice between CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+ will depend on the specific drying needs, as well as compromises between fluidity, key size and viscosity. This demonstrates the high speed of subscription, and this is one of its key advantages. It is intended for use in quick operations, for example, on servers and industrial systems.