Quantum computers are moving so quickly that they now threaten the cryptographic tools banks rely on every day. Shorts algorithm alone puts RSA and ECC at risk, and even Grovers speed-up shortens the lifespan of most symmetric keys. Faced with these dangers, the finance industry must switch to quantum-safe schemes without delay. This study reviews the newest post-quantum options that are being built for payments, lending, and other banking functions. Drawing on NISTs standardization work, live pilots at top banks, and head-to-head tests of lattice, code, multivariate, hash, and isogeny methods, we map out practical upgrade paths. Our analysis finds that lattice packages such as CRYSTALS-Kyber and Di lithium strike the best balance of performance and maturity today, while hybrid setups and crypto-agility keep systems future-proof. We therefore urge firms to roll out new algorithms in stages, work with regulators, and share lessons across the sector so they remain secure in a quantum world.
Quantum computers are moving so quickly that they now threaten the cryptographic tools banks rely on every day. Shorts algorithm alone puts RSA and ECC at risk, and even Grovers speed-up shortens the lifespan of most symmetric keys. Faced with these dangers, the finance industry must switch to quantum-safe schemes without delay. This study reviews the newest post-quantum options that are being built for payments, lending, and other banking functions. Drawing on NISTs standardization work, live pilots at top banks, and head-to-head tests of lattice, code, multivariate, hash, and isogeny methods, we map out practical upgrade paths. Our analysis finds that lattice packages such as CRYSTALS-Kyber and Di lithium strike the best balance of performance and maturity today, while hybrid setups and crypto-agility keep systems future-proof. We therefore urge firms to roll out new algorithms in stages, work with regulators, and share lessons across the sector so they remain secure in a quantum world.
Quantum computers are growing faster every year, and that progress puts today’s classical encryption at serious risk. Once these machines reach full power, staple protocols like RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography SSDs become tomorrow's digital lockpicks, threatening the secrecy of everyday online banking. In response, many researchers are rallying behind post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a fresh toolkit meant to shrug off quantum decoding tricks. This paper examines how prepared the banking world is for that shift, using a systematic review of literature, pilots, regulations, and benchmarks issued between 2018 and 2025. Results show firms are already alert, testing hybrid systems alongside NIST-approved lattice schemes such as CRYSTALS-Kyber and Dilithium on the road to safer financial transactions. Serious roadblocks linger, such as sluggish system speed, outdated code that cant easily swap algorithms, and a design process that ignores most users. On top of that, regulators and intergovernmental groups are stepping up to define what quantum-proofing looks like and when banks must do it. The paper therefore argues that hooking post-quantum cryptography into everyday banking is doable, and the industry cares about it, yet it still needs joint spending on new hardware, clear rules, and tutorials for customers. Suggested actions are to build crypto-agile platforms, roll out mixed classical-plus-quantum methods in the meantime, and get all players talking so that online and mobile payments stay safe, smooth, and ready for whatever the quantum future brings.
As quantum machines grow stronger, banks and insurers are already rethinking how they guard customer data, uphold privacy, and protect digital IDs. Well-worn tools like RSA and ECC now look shaky under a future quantum assault, pushing firms into a scramble for post-quantum defenses. This paper reviews the latest post-quantum landscape, weighing lattice, code, and multivariate, hash, and isogeny families side by side. Backed by fresh research, NIST standards, and real-world trials from major banks and cyber vendors, it flags both promise and hurdles in rolling out each option. Results show that lattice schemes, notably CRYSTALS-Kyber and Dilithium, stand out, while hybrid mixes and crypto-agility plans are still a must. The paper closes with a clear step-by-step map so that financial outfits can start pilots and gradually field quantum-ready cryptography.
Quantum computing presents computational powers previously thought unattainable. This brings severe threats to classical cryptographic methods, especially RSA and ECC. This paper addresses these risks through a detailed investigation of quantum-resistant algorithms, focusing on lattice- based (CRYSTALS-Kyber), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (McEliece) systems. Research questions guiding this study include: How vulnerable are traditional algorithms under quantum attack, and which quantum-resistant alternatives offer viable performance and security trade-offs? Through simulations, we analyzed key metrics like encryption speeds, key sizes, and efficiency under quantum threats. Additionally, we demonstrated vulnerabilities in RSA-2048 and ECC-256 under Shor’s algorithm, emphasizing the necessity for quantum-resistant cryptography. Our results highlighted CRYSTALS-Kyber as a balanced candidate, aligning with the NIST PQC Standardization, while Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is reviewed for high-sensitivity contexts. Given the forecasted advancements in quantum hardware, we propose a transitional approach using hybrid cryptographic systems to ensure immediate security and ease the shift to quantum-safe protocols. This study also explores industry applications, particularly in finance, healthcare, and IoT, recommending a phased adoption strategy utilizing hybrid cryptographic systems for a secure, gradual transition.
The advance of quantum computing poses significant risks to traditional cryptographic systems, including RSA and ECC, due to algorithms such as Shor's, prompting an urgent need for robust post-quantum cryptography (PQC) solutions. This paper presents a systematic review of PQC algorithms, encompassing lattice-based, code-based, multivariate polynomial, hash-based, and supersingular isogeny-based cryptography. By evaluating recent publications and NIST standardization efforts, we assess these approaches in terms of quantum resistance, computational efficiency, scalability, and implementation challenges. Lattice-based schemes, notably CRYSTALS-Kyber, excel in quantum-secure encryption and performance, whereas codebased systems like McEliece are hindered by large key sizes. Hash-based signatures, such as SPHINCS+, and isogeny-based protocols, including SIDH, provide promising alternatives but require further optimization to reduce computational overhead. Our analysis highlights the potential of hybrid PQC methods and lightweight hardware implementations for securing emerging domains like IoT, blockchain, and financial systems. The review serves as a foundational resource for researchers and practitioners, advocating the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptography to preserve data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity in the quantum era.
The conventional cryptographic systems that underpin the world's financial infrastructure are under grave threat as quantum computing spreads. The financial industry must immediately investigate quantum-safe alternatives, as widely used public-key algorithms such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are theoretically susceptible to Shor's quantum algorithm, while symmetric schemes face reduced security margins under Grover's algorithm. The Systematic Literature Review (SLR) presented in this paper was carried out in compliance with PRISMA 2020 guidelines. Web of Science, Scopus, and Google Scholar were searched using Boolean keywords to find articles published between 2013 and 2025. 53 high-quality studies were chosen from an original corpus of N = 1,654 publications utilizing the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT), systematic screening, and eligibility evaluation. Three main paradigms for quantum cryptography were found: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), which includes the NIST-standardised lattice-based algorithms CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium (NIST, 2022); Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which offers information-theoretic security through the BB84, E91, and CV-QKD protocols; and hybrid quantum-classical architectures that combine near-term deployment with long-term quantum resilience. The operational viability of quantum-secure financial communication has been confirmed through real-world deployments by JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, CaixaBank, and Danske Bank. Given the 'harvest now, decrypt later' (HNDL) threat paradigm, the evidence clearly shows that upgrading to quantum-safe cryptography is an essential operational necessity. Complementary approaches with different trade-offs in cost, scalability, and implementation maturity include QKD, PQC, and hybrid frameworks. To protect the integrity of international financial systems, financial regulators and institutions must coordinate faster adoption roadmaps aligned with NIST PQC standardisation timelines.
As quantum computing advances, current cryptographic protocols are increasingly vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly those based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) like RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). This paper presents a comprehensive review of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) as a solution to protect digital systems in the quantum era. We provide an in-depth analysis of various quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, including lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, isogeny-based, and multivariate approaches. The review highlights the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization process, highlighting key algorithms, such as CRYSTALS–Kyber, CRYSTALS–Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+, and discusses the strengths, vulnerabilities, and implementation challenges of the leading algorithms. In addition, we explore transition strategies for organizations, emphasizing hybrid cryptography to ensure backward compatibility during migration. This study offers key insights into the future of cryptographic standards and the critical steps necessary to prepare for the transition from classical to quantum-resistant systems.