The conventional cryptographic systems that underpin the world's financial infrastructure are under grave threat as quantum computing spreads. The financial industry must immediately investigate quantum-safe alternatives, as widely used public-key algorithms such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are theoretically susceptible to Shor's quantum algorithm, while symmetric schemes face reduced security margins under Grover's algorithm. The Systematic Literature Review (SLR) presented in this paper was carried out in compliance with PRISMA 2020 guidelines. Web of Science, Scopus, and Google Scholar were searched using Boolean keywords to find articles published between 2013 and 2025. 53 high-quality studies were chosen from an original corpus of N = 1,654 publications utilizing the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT), systematic screening, and eligibility evaluation. Three main paradigms for quantum cryptography were found: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), which includes the NIST-standardised lattice-based algorithms CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium (NIST, 2022); Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which offers information-theoretic security through the BB84, E91, and CV-QKD protocols; and hybrid quantum-classical architectures that combine near-term deployment with long-term quantum resilience. The operational viability of quantum-secure financial communication has been confirmed through real-world deployments by JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, CaixaBank, and Danske Bank. Given the 'harvest now, decrypt later' (HNDL) threat paradigm, the evidence clearly shows that upgrading to quantum-safe cryptography is an essential operational necessity. Complementary approaches with different trade-offs in cost, scalability, and implementation maturity include QKD, PQC, and hybrid frameworks. To protect the integrity of international financial systems, financial regulators and institutions must coordinate faster adoption roadmaps aligned with NIST PQC standardisation timelines.
The conventional cryptographic systems that underpin the world's financial infrastructure are under grave threat as quantum computing spreads. The financial industry must immediately investigate quantum-safe alternatives, as widely used public-key algorithms such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are theoretically susceptible to Shor's quantum algorithm, while symmetric schemes face reduced security margins under Grover's algorithm. The Systematic Literature Review (SLR) presented in this paper was carried out in compliance with PRISMA 2020 guidelines. Web of Science, Scopus, and Google Scholar were searched using Boolean keywords to find articles published between 2013 and 2025. 53 high-quality studies were chosen from an original corpus of N = 1,654 publications utilizing the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT), systematic screening, and eligibility evaluation. Three main paradigms for quantum cryptography were found: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), which includes the NIST-standardised lattice-based algorithms CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium (NIST, 2022); Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which offers information-theoretic security through the BB84, E91, and CV-QKD protocols; and hybrid quantum-classical architectures that combine near-term deployment with long-term quantum resilience. The operational viability of quantum-secure financial communication has been confirmed through real-world deployments by JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, CaixaBank, and Danske Bank. Given the 'harvest now, decrypt later' (HNDL) threat paradigm, the evidence clearly shows that upgrading to quantum-safe cryptography is an essential operational necessity. Complementary approaches with different trade-offs in cost, scalability, and implementation maturity include QKD, PQC, and hybrid frameworks. To protect the integrity of international financial systems, financial regulators and institutions must coordinate faster adoption roadmaps aligned with NIST PQC standardisation timelines.
Abstract Quantum computing exploits superposition and entanglement to process information in an exponentially large state space, enabling algorithms such as Shor’s to factor large integers efficiently and thereby undermining RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. Quantum cryptography, here encompassing post quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms and quantum key distribution (QKD), is a leading candidate for protecting data against quantum capable adversaries. PQC designs classical schemes conjectured to be secure against both quantum and classical attacks, whereas QKD uses quantum mechanics to detect eavesdropping and establish information theoretically secure keys. Existing literature and limitations. Recent surveys summarise PQC families and the standardisation process led by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and reviews outline QKD protocols and their challenges. However, most prior work either addresses narrow subtopics or does not systematically synthesise empirical evidence across technical and application domains. As a result, there is still limited integrated understanding of key issues, technologies, mathematical foun dations, algorithms, programming tools and real world deployments. Objective and contributions of this review. This study systematically analyses 61 peer reviewed journal articles published within the last five years that focus on quantum cryptography. Using Covidence to manage study identification, selection, quality assessment, data extraction and narrative synthesis, it (a) characterises current issues and challenges; (b) surveys recent technological advancements and implementations; (c) evaluates algorithmic approaches and their effectiveness; (d) examines the underlying mathematical models; (e) maps the programming languages and tools used to implement quantum schemes; and (f) synthesises evidence on practical applications and future research directions. The review integrates findings on PQC and QKD, highlights gaps in the current evidence base, and offers practitioners, scholars and policymakers guidance for developing quantum secure communication systems. Keywords Quantum cryptography, Post quantum cryptography, Quantum key distribution, Systematic literature review, Quantum secure communication
Recent strides in quantum computing have posed a challenge to conventional classical cryptographic algorithms like RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).With the progression of quantum computing, there is a possibility of vulnerability to traditional cryptography in the future, leading to significant concerns from the perspective of the security of the banking industry.In this survey, we will review the adoption of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), focusing on specific schemes like CRYSTALS-Kyber or CRYSTALS-Dilithium, together with an approach involving hybrid cryptosystems, ensuring seamless implementation.In addition, several challenges related to computational costs, difficulties of integration, and the growing significance of flexible deployment of cryptography will be considered.In summary, the objective of the research is to help financial institutions and scholars determine efficient quantum-safe security systems that offer protection for banking APIs.
This preprint presents a systematic review of how quantum computing impacts the security of classical cryptography and what mitigation strategies are available. The review synthesises key survey papers, standards reports and transition guidelines on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum-safe security published between 2015 and 2025. First, the paper summarises the impact of Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms on widely deployed public-key schemes, symmetric ciphers and hash functions, highlighting in particular the existential break of RSA, Diffie–Hellman and elliptic-curve cryptography, and the reduced security margins for symmetric and hash-based constructions. It then examines major quantum-resilient responses, including lattice-, code-, multivariate- and hash-based PQC, quantum key distribution (QKD), hybrid classical–PQC schemes and crypto-agile architectures. Building on Mosca’s x, y, z risk-timing model, the review discusses cross-cutting themes such as harvest-now-decrypt-later threats and sector-specific implications for government and defence, finance and blockchain, healthcare, cloud providers and critical infrastructure. It identifies several research gaps, including the lack of quantitative migration-cost data, limited coverage of small and resource-constrained organisations, and few system-scale evaluations comparing PQC-only, hybrid and QKD-based designs. The paper concludes by arguing that planning and investment in quantum-resilient cryptography need to start now, before migration time and data shelf-life push critical systems into the risky regime.
Quantum computing threatens the classical cryptographic systems underpinning financial infrastructure, exposing payment platforms, interbank networks, and digital services to Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) risks. This study systematically reviews quantum threats and post-quantum cryptographic readiness in the financial sector to assess preparedness, identify implementation challenges, and synthesize migration pathways aligned with emerging standards. A PRISMA-guided review of 17 peer-reviewed studies published between 2020 and 2025 was conducted, examining quantum threat models, post-quantum cryptographic schemes, quantum key distribution architectures, and sector-specific deployment barriers. The review finds that lattice-based schemes, especially CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, are the leading candidates for financial adoption, while hybrid cryptographic approaches offer the most feasible transition strategy. However, the current evidence base is predominantly simulation-driven, with limited real-world deployment and validation. The study provides a sector-specific synthesis of quantum threats, post-quantum readiness, and migration pathways in financial systems, and advances an integrated readiness and migration framework based on cross-study thematic analysis.
Many traditional encryption techniques commonly used in financial systems face serious threats from the rapid development of quantum computing. Quantum attacks based on Shor's and Grover's algorithm are effective against the RSA, and ECC methods that secure online banking, digital payments, and interbank communications. To mitigate on this increasing risk, this paper suggests hybrid cryptographic architecture based on symmetric encryption, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), and quantum key distribution (QKD) for secure financial transactions. The Quantum-resistant security significance comes because the financial models produce massive data sets for fraud detection and predictive risk. Not only does it offer the previously unreachable computational capabilities, but also utilizes the potentials of large-scale financial data analytics to make the decision-making process fast and well informed, and in this light, the present research recommends a hybrid cryptographic approach with an integrated security framework for the financial sector that combines symmetric encryption, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), and quantum key distribution (QKD). The proposed structure relies on (1) the quantum-resistance of PQC for resilience and authentication, (2) the information-theoretic security of QKD for key establishment, and (3) the efficacy of symmetric cryptography for protecting high-throughput transactions. The framework covers the short-term practical limitations and long-term quantum risks based on the combined use of quantum and conventional security primitives. This paper points out the role and transformation of digital financial ecosystem in the quantum era by elaborating challenges, opportunities and future of quantum cryptography in the banking industry.
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging threat that large-scale quantum computing poses to classical public-key cryptographic systems, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which form the backbone of contemporary digital security infrastructures. In response to this threat, the study aims to analyze post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a viable long-term solution capable of resisting both classical and quantum adversaries. The paper further seeks to assess the urgency of PQC adoption in light of the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat model and to evaluate the practical readiness of quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms currently under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Materials and Methods: This study employs a qualitative and analytical research methodology grounded in an extensive review of authoritative sources, including NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization documents, recent academic literature, industry white papers, and policy reports from organizations such as RAND Corporation and Cloudflare. The analysis systematically surveys major families of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms namely lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes and evaluates them based on security assumptions, computational efficiency, implementation complexity, and standardization maturity. Findings: The analysis indicates that Lattice-based cryptographic schemes demonstrate the highest maturity and practical readiness, evidenced by their selection in NIST’s PQC process. Code- and hash-based methods provide strong security but face key size and performance challenges. The lack of scalable quantum computers does not reduce urgency, as data harvesting persists. Artificial intelligence emerges as a key enabler for accelerating PQC adoption. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The paper recommends a proactive, phased post-quantum migration using hybrid cryptographic architectures. Organizations should conduct inventories, benchmarking, and pilot deployments aligned with NIST standards. AI-driven tools are advised to improve key management and reduce complexity. Continued interdisciplinary research and policy support are encouraged to ensure a secure, scalable transition to quantum-resistant security systems.