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Conclusion

Emily Adlam

Published Jun 12, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This chapter summarizes some of the lessons for scientific epistemology that can be drawn from the exploration of the measurement problem throughout the book, and expresses optimism about the possibility of using epistemic constraints as a way to break out of the long-standing impasse over the measurement problem.
DOI
10.1093/9780197808887.003.0014

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Introduction

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The basic thesis of this book is that there is no quantum measurement problem. I do not mean by this that the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise because we fail to recognize ‘that quantum theory does not describe physical reality’ (Fuchs and Peres 2000a). Quantum theory describes reality just fine, like any other scientific theory worth taking seriously: describing (and explaining) reality is what the scientific enterprise is about. Nor do I mean that we have found solutions to the problem, ways to modify or supplement quantum mechanics so that the paradoxes are removed. I don’t actually think that we have found any very satisfactory solutions in this sense (at least not in the relativistic domain) but that isn’t my theme: even if we did have these modifications, they would be ways of changing from quantum physics, which supposedly does have a measurement problem, to some other theory, which supposedly doesn’t.

Oxford University Press eBooks•May 24, 2012•3 citations
Abstract This chapter discusses our options for solving the measurement problem in a way which avoids the epistemic difficulties discussed in previous chapters but also works for quantum field theory. I offer a forward-looking summary of outstanding problems and suggests some routes for further research. Finally, I comment on further epistemic problems that may arise in quantum gravity and consider whether epistemic considerations could help understand how to formulate a theory of quantum gravity.
Abstract This book aims to reconceptualize the quantum measurement problem as a problem of epistemology, and to explore the epistemic problems faced by a number of popular interpretations of quantum mechanics. It argues that a number of well-known solutions to the measurement problem, including the many-worlds interpretation and the observer-relative interpretations, face potentially fatal epistemic problems. It also delves into the relationship between physics and epistemology, using the measurement problem to motivate an account of scneitifc epistemology which highlights the role of coherence in justifying the use we make of measurements and observations in the scientific process.
Bohr is said to have remarked that anybody who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it. No physicist, however, challenges its practical usefulness in predicting experimental results and providing an explanatory framework for an enormous range of study. Nevertheless, more thoughtful physicists have been astonished and disturbed by what is implied when attempts are made to interpret its meaning. As a result a variety of ingenious, and sometimes bizarre, schemes have been devised since its inception in order to make these implications more acceptable to the scientific mind. Some of these schemes have resulted in proposals which appear stranger than the problems they have been designed to resolve. After some sixty years there is no consensus of opinion upon the solution of the epistemological problems posed. Indeed the debate keeps on resurfacing in the scientific literature and continues to generate library shelves of books. Some progress, however, has been made and the late John Bell himself and the experimental work of Alain Aspect have demonstrated that some epistemological positions cannot be sustained.
The basic thesis of this book is that there is no quantum measurement problem. I do not mean by this that the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise because we fail to recognize ‘that quantum theory does not describe physical reality’ (Fuchs and Peres 2000a). Quantum theory describes reality just fine, like any other scientific theory worth taking seriously: describing (and explaining) reality is what the scientific enterprise is about. Nor do I mean that we have found solutions to the problem, ways to modify or supplement quantum mechanics so that the paradoxes are removed. I don’t actually think that we have found any very satisfactory solutions in this sense (at least not in the relativistic domain) but that isn’t my theme: even if we did have these modifications, they would be ways of changing from quantum physics, which supposedly does have a measurement problem, to some other theory, which supposedly doesn’t.