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A Fair Deal for Everettians

David Papineau

Abstract Those who criticize the Everett interpretation on the grounds that it makes no sense of probability apply a double-standard, for no other physical theory of probability does any better in explaining probability or in deriving its link with decision theory. In fact, others do worse, for in any one world theory it is a mystery as to why, given that only a single outcome of a chance process occurs, we should nevertheless act so as to maximize expected utilities, which involves all possible outcomes of a chance process. This difficulty does not apply to the Everett interpretation, in which all outcomes happen.Abstract Those who criticize the Everett interpretation on the grounds that it makes no sense of probability apply a double-standard, for no other physical theory of probability does any better in explaining probability or in deriving its link with decision theory. In fact, others do worse, for in any one world theory it is a mystery as to why, given that only a single outcome of a chance process occurs, we should nevertheless act so as to maximize expected utilities, which involves all possible outcomes of a chance process. This difficulty does not apply to the Everett interpretation, in which all outcomes happen.

Jun 24, 201032 citations

The Everett Interpretation

Emily Adlam

Abstract This chapter discusses what would need to be done to address the epistemic difficulties associated with the Everett interpretation, then considers a number of putative solutions to the Everettian probability problem and assesses whether these approaches succeed in solving the epistemic aspects of that problem. The discussion covers naïve branch counting and Saunders’ sophisticated branch counting; Vaidman’s ‘measure of existence’ approach; the Deutsch-Wallce decision-theoretic approach; and the Sebens-Carroll and Vaidman-McQueen self-locating uncertainty approaches.Abstract This chapter discusses what would need to be done to address the epistemic difficulties associated with the Everett interpretation, then considers a number of putative solutions to the Everettian probability problem and assesses whether these approaches succeed in solving the epistemic aspects of that problem. The discussion covers naïve branch counting and Saunders’ sophisticated branch counting; Vaidman’s ‘measure of existence’ approach; the Deutsch-Wallce decision-theoretic approach; and the Sebens-Carroll and Vaidman-McQueen self-locating uncertainty approaches.

Jun 12, 20250 citations

Some Solutions

Emily Adlam

Abstract This chapter offers a brief introduction to three putative solutions to the measurement problem: the Everett (many-worlds) interpretation, the observer-relative interpretations, and the consistent histories approach. I describe the epistemic problems faced by these three solutions, and then argue that in these interpretations the consequences of the measurement problem for scientific epistemology go beyond quantum mechanics itself, so all our scientific knowledge is potentially at risk.

Jun 12, 20250 citations

First Interlude

David Wallace

This interlude considers, in dialog form, various objections and responses to the Everett interpretation, and in particular to the view developed in chapters 1–3 of of this book. (Problems of probability are not considered.)

Oxford University Press eBooksMay 24, 20120 citations

The Determinate-Experience Problem

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Abstract This chapter begins by discussing the problems encountered in interpreting Everett's assumption of the same appearances in pure wave mechanics as predicted by the standard collapse theory. The significant gaps at critical points in his exposition and the contradicting evidence of what he wanted, explain the many mutually incompatible reconstructions of Everett that apologists and critics have devised. This chapter also provides the author's interpretation of the various theories discussed in this book.Abstract This chapter begins by discussing the problems encountered in interpreting Everett's assumption of the same appearances in pure wave mechanics as predicted by the standard collapse theory. The significant gaps at critical points in his exposition and the contradicting evidence of what he wanted, explain the many mutually incompatible reconstructions of Everett that apologists and critics have devised. This chapter also provides the author's interpretation of the various theories discussed in this book.

Aug 16, 20010 citations

The Case for the Everett Multiverse

David Wallace

I give a non-technical presentation of the argument that quantum mechanics, in the form in which it is currently used, needs to be understood in many-worlds (Everettian) terms; the alternatives that have been discussed are at present not able to reproduce the full empirical content of the theory. This is a draft of a chapter for the forthcoming \emph{Blackwell Companion to Philosophy and the Multiverse (Klaas Kraay and Daniel Rubio, eds.) }

quant-pharXiv:2608.07706Aug 11, 20260 citations

No Worse Off

Abstract

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No Worse Off

Abstract

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