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Some Solutions

Emily Adlam

Published Jun 12, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This chapter offers a brief introduction to three putative solutions to the measurement problem: the Everett (many-worlds) interpretation, the observer-relative interpretations, and the consistent histories approach. I describe the epistemic problems faced by these three solutions, and then argue that in these interpretations the consequences of the measurement problem for scientific epistemology go beyond quantum mechanics itself, so all our scientific knowledge is potentially at risk.

DOI
10.1093/9780197808887.003.0003

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