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Oxford University Press eBooks

Bayesianism

Emily Adlam

Published Jun 12, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This chapter will discusses Bayesian confirmation in the context of the Everett interpretation and Quantum Bayesianism. I argue that the epistemic problems arising in both programs are related to an overly narrow understanding of scientific epistemology based entirely on Bayesian confirmation theory. I argue that when the holistic, coherentist nature of scientific epistemology is taken into account, it is clear that although Bayesian updating is an appropriate method in periods of ordinary science, other approaches are necessary in situations where our empirical results appear to be inconsistent with the foundational beliefs we have used for emprical confirmation, and the measurement problem is an example of such a situation.

DOI
10.1093/9780197808887.003.0008

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Abstract This chapter will discusses Bayesian confirmation in the context of the Everett interpretation and Quantum Bayesianism. I argue that the epistemic problems arising in both programs are related to an overly narrow understanding of scientific epistemology based entirely on Bayesian confirmation theory. I argue that when the holistic, coherentist nature of scientific epistemology is taken into account, it is clear that although Bayesian updating is an appropriate method in periods of ordinary science, other approaches are necessary in situations where our empirical results appear to be inconsistent with the foundational beliefs we have used for emprical confirmation, and the measurement problem is an example of such a situation.
Abstract This chapter discusses the measurement problem in the context of modern epistemology of science, setting out an epistemological framework which will be used throughout the book. I suggest that the literature on the measurement problem typically assumes that quantum mechanics is confirmed by the empirical evidence regardless of interpretation, and I argue that this ultimately founders for reasons similar to logical positivism. I then invoke recent work in the epistemology of measurement by van Fraassen, Chang and Tal to argue that we cannot make sense of scientific epistemology without a satisfactory understanding of what is going on during the process of measurement. Finally, I propose an approach to the epistemology of science inspired by Chang’s progressive coherentism, and argue that this is the right way of thinking about epistemic situations in which our understanding of the operation of our measuring devices depends crucially on the very physics we are trying to find out about.
Abstract This book aims to reconceptualize the quantum measurement problem as a problem of epistemology, and to explore the epistemic problems faced by a number of popular interpretations of quantum mechanics. It argues that a number of well-known solutions to the measurement problem, including the many-worlds interpretation and the observer-relative interpretations, face potentially fatal epistemic problems. It also delves into the relationship between physics and epistemology, using the measurement problem to motivate an account of scneitifc epistemology which highlights the role of coherence in justifying the use we make of measurements and observations in the scientific process.
After an initial discussion of the general aims of scientific theories, the quantum measurement problem is presented. Non-Everettian solutions to the problem are briefly discussed; the aim of the discussion is to show that these solutions require significant change either to our philosophical approach to science or to quantum theory itself. In this context, the Everett interpretation is introduced and motivated as the result of simply applying our normal approach to scientific theories to the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics and following where it leads. The chapter ends with a introductory discussion of potential problems, and with references to subsequent chapters where they are discussed more fully.
Abstract Much of the evidence for quantum mechanics is statistical in nature. Relative frequency data summarizing the results of repeated experiments is compared to probabilities calculated from the theory; close agreement between the observed relative frequencies and calculated probabilities is taken as evidence in favour of the theory. The Everett interpretation, if it is to be a candidate for serious consideration, must be capable of doing justice to this sort of reasoning. Since, on the Everett interpretation, all outcomes with non-zero amplitude are actualized on different branches, it is not obvious that sense can be made of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments, and this poses a prima facie problem for statistical inference. It is incumbent on the Everettian either to make sense of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments in the Everett interpretation, or to find a substitute on which the usual statistical analysis of experimental results continues to count as evidence for quantum mechanics, and, since it is the very evidence for quantum mechanics that is at stake, this must be done in a way that does not presuppose the correctness of Everettian quantum mechanics. This requires an account of theory confirmation that applies to branching-universe theories but does not presuppose the correctness of any such theory. This chapter supplies and defends such an account. The account has the consequence that statistical evidence can confirm a branching-universe theory such as Everettian quantum mechanics in the same way in which it can confirm a non-branching probabilistic theory.
This work presents a historical-epistemological analysis of the foundations of quantum mechanics. From a philosophical point of view, the relationships between quantum mechanics and scientific realism are highlighted, as well as the influence of the neo-positivist philosophy of the first decades of the 20th century. The great significance of measurement in the context of quantum mechanics is underlined, as an essential element in providing a coherent description of reality moving from the microcosm to the macrocosm, as well as the role that the measurement apparatus and the consciousness of the observer assume during the act of measurement, the ontological problem, the problem of the objectification of the wave function and the problem of the definition of discernibility. This is followed by an overview of the most important alternative proposals to the standard interpretation (Copenhagen interpretation), with particular reference to hidden variable theories, and other alternatives to standard quantum mechanics that profoundly modify the vision of reality, such as the Everett’s many-worlds theory, the QBism, the unified holistic approach.