The 5G network is a key driver of digital transformation and the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The services offered by the 5G platform are synergistic and scalable, allowing for significantly increased data rates across different radio access technologies (RATs). 5G technology allows companies to connect more devices with faster information exchange, which leads to increased potential vulnerabilities and significantly expanded threat and attack vectors. Security and privacy issues, such as network spoofing and lack of privacy in previous RAN generations, have been closely studied by security experts. To address these issues, the 3GPP standardization bodies have defined the AKA authentication and key management protocol and procedures. These include mutual authentication between user devices and the network, signal integrity and confidentiality, and derivation of cryptographic keys to protect U-plane and C-plane data. However, there are significant vulnerabilities in the 5G network APIs, in particular regarding weak protection of user personal data and the possibility of unauthorized access to IoT devices. These vulnerabilities are critical for remote control systems. The 5G-AKA protocol has been found to have shortcomings and it is generally believed that AKA does not provide adequate protection of personal data from active attackers. It is noted that AKA needs to be endowed with essential security features that are currently missing. The paper considers the implementation of quantum-protected encryption for the development of authentication protocols and key distribution in networks. The paper presents a key encapsulation algorithm based on the LINE cryptosystem with logarithmic signatures for the development of authentication and key coordination protocols in 5G networks. The use of LINE directional encryption offers advantages in scalability and heterogeneity, optimizing the computational and operational costs of the network.
The 5G network is a key driver of digital transformation and the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The services offered by the 5G platform are synergistic and scalable, allowing for significantly increased data rates across different radio access technologies (RATs). 5G technology allows companies to connect more devices with faster information exchange, which leads to increased potential vulnerabilities and significantly expanded threat and attack vectors. Security and privacy issues, such as network spoofing and lack of privacy in previous RAN generations, have been closely studied by security experts. To address these issues, the 3GPP standardization bodies have defined the AKA authentication and key management protocol and procedures. These include mutual authentication between user devices and the network, signal integrity and confidentiality, and derivation of cryptographic keys to protect U-plane and C-plane data. However, there are significant vulnerabilities in the 5G network APIs, in particular regarding weak protection of user personal data and the possibility of unauthorized access to IoT devices. These vulnerabilities are critical for remote control systems. The 5G-AKA protocol has been found to have shortcomings and it is generally believed that AKA does not provide adequate protection of personal data from active attackers. It is noted that AKA needs to be endowed with essential security features that are currently missing. The paper considers the implementation of quantum-protected encryption for the development of authentication protocols and key distribution in networks. The paper presents a key encapsulation algorithm based on the LINE cryptosystem with logarithmic signatures for the development of authentication and key coordination protocols in 5G networks. The use of LINE directional encryption offers advantages in scalability and heterogeneity, optimizing the computational and operational costs of the network.
The authentication process in fifth-generation networks between the user equipment and the network relies on secure communication protocols, with the 5G authentication and key agreement (5G-AKA) being a prominent one. However, this protocol still has shortcomings, as identified in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)release, which poses vulnerabilities. Notably, a primary concern is the insufficient protection of user privacy. This deficiency allows attackers to potentially exploit weaknesses in encryption, signing, and update mechanisms, leading to the tracking of a user's identity, location, and activities. Furthermore, the5G-AKA protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, in which malicious actors can assume the identity of service providers or networks, leading to the interruption of communication between users and servers. Additionally, the protocol lacks robustness in guaranteeing mutual authentication, enabling attackers to forge authentication messages and manipulate user data. In this paper, we propose a key generation method based on the concept of post-quantum cryptography to provide robust resistance to attacks. Furthermore, we propose a key exchange method that authenticates the user's equipment and home network through the application of Kyber, where both parties possess pre-established static public keys. The proposal provides identity protection, non-traceability, mutual authentication, and confidentiality. We implement this protocol to test 5G-AKA's vulnerabilities and analyse its effectiveness against specific attacks. The experiment used Minnet simulation and Ryu controllers to implement 5G-AKA with standard-specified characteristics.
Fifth-generation (5G) mobile networks support services such as smart healthcare, connected vehicles, smart homes, and the Internet of Things. Because these services exchange important personal and operational data, secure user authentication is essential. The standard 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) protocol helps verify users and establish communication keys, but research has identified concerns including user traceability, attacks by a malicious serving network, and limited protection against future quantum-computing threats. This paper explains these issues in simple terms and reviews two approaches discussed in the selected research article: a hybrid method combining Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), and a fully post-quantum method based on KEM. The source study reports that both approaches aim to improve authentication security, while the hybrid option uses fewer computational resources. This paper is a literature-based explanation of the published study; it does not claim a new protocol or independent experimental results
5G serves as a catalyst for transformative digital innovation by enabling convergence with various services in our daily lives. The success of this paradigm shift undeniably hinges on robust security measures, with primary authentication— securing access to the 5G network—being paramount. Two protocols, 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) and the Extensible Authentication Protocol for Authentication and Key Agreement Prime (EAP-AKA’), have been standardized for this purpose, with the former designed for 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) devices and the latter for non-3GPP devices. However, recent studies have exposed vulnerabilities in the 5G-AKA protocol, rendering it susceptible to security breaches, including linkability attacks. Furthermore, the advent of quantum computing poses significant quantum threats, underscoring the urgent need for the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptographic mechanisms. Although post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is being standardized, the lack of real-world deployment limits its proven robustness. In contrast, conventional cryptographic schemes have demonstrated reliability over decades of practical application. To address this gap, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has initiated the standardization of hybrid PQC algorithms (HPQC), combining classical and quantum-resistant techniques. Consequently, ensuring forward secrecy and resilience to quantum threats in the 5G-AKA protocol is critical. To address these security challenges, we propose the 5G-AKA-HPQC protocol. Our protocol is designed to maintain compatibility with existing standards while enhancing security by combining keys negotiated via the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) with those derived from a PQC-Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). To rigorously and comprehensively validate the security of 5G-AKA-HPQC, we employ formal verification tools such as SVO Logic and ProVerif. The results confirm the protocol’s security and correctness. Furthermore, performance evaluations highlight the computational and communication overheads inherent to 5G-AKA-HPQC. With only average of 56.5 millisecond(+112.32%) on a total authentication time, proposed protocol provides its advantages. Also, on a environment of multiple UE registration, compared to single UE registration, the difference of increased rate of average authentication time is only 0.01%. The negligible difference 0.01% indicates that the addition of PQC does not lead to increased overhead in multi-UE registration environments, demonstrating its scalability and practical feasibility. In conclusion, our research provides significant insights into the design of secure, quantum-safe authentication protocols and lays the groundwork for the future standardization of secure authentication and key agreement protocols for mobile telecommunications.
The 5G-AKA protocol includes several vulnerabilities related to security and privacy.This paper proposes improving the standard 5G-AKA protocol by enhancing security and privacy, such as optimal forward secrecy, resilience against linkability attacks, and protection against malicious SN networks.The proposed protocol, called KyberPQ-AKA, includes two stages of development.In the first stage, a Crystals-Kyber KEM-based method creates keys and safely exchanges them within the AKA protocol environment.In the second stage, the lightweight encryption algorithm ASCON replaces traditional encryption in the protocol to work on devices with limited resources.Moreover, key encapsulation (KEM) mechanisms improve the protection of user identity and complete privacy.KyberPQ-AKA makes it easier to adapt to a quantum-secure environment and provides additional security and authentication benefits by switching from the AES encryption algorithm to the lightweight ASCON algorithm.KEM Crystals-Kyber postquantum, a criterion NIST recently chose, and KEM candidates for the fourth round after quantum from NIST used in the suggested protocol.The results on connection and calculation costs indicate that the KyberPQ-AKA protocol is practical and superior to standard 5G-AKA.We also proved the security of KyberPQ-5G using the ProVerif tool and by applying the protocol using Mininet with RYU Controller to test the protocol.The results proved this in comparison with the standard 5G-AKA protocol.
Advancements in 5G are largely driven by its adoption across a variety of applications, including smart homes, smart healthcare, autonomous vehicles, transportation, and Industry 5.0. However, this widespread usage raises significant security and privacy concerns, particularly regarding authentication. To secure 5G communications, 3GPP has standardised the 5G-Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) protocol. Despite this, state-of-the-art research has revealed that 5G-AKA suffers from several vulnerabilities. In response, numerous alternative authentication schemes have been proposed. Nevertheless, many of these protocols continue to be susceptible to classical security threats, such as malicious serving network (SN) attacks, ephemeral secret leakage, traceability, anonymity violations, and, most critically, a lack of Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). Additionally, recent advancements in quantum computing pose a substantial risk to the security of 5G-AKA and its variants, rendering them insecure in the post-quantum era. Although a few post-quantum cryptography-based protocols have been introduced, studies show that they are either computationally expensive or still vulnerable to quantum attacks. In order to tackle these challenges, we propose two versions of a novel authentication protocol that not only provide comprehensive security guarantees but are also computationally efficient. Version 1 utilises a hybrid cryptographic approach (AES + KEM) and achieves the lowest computational cost—even lower than Version 2, which relies solely on KEM. Both versions offer the same level of security, but Version 1 is significantly more efficient in terms of resource usage. We have validated our proposed protocols using the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model and the Scyther tool. Furthermore, we evaluated their performance against existing protocols under both known and unknown attack scenarios. The results show that our protocols incur lower computational, communication, and energy overhead, as well as strong resilience against unknown attacks, outperforming several existing authentication schemes. Furthermore, we implement a testbed to demonstrate the real-time applicability of both proposed versions.
The evolution of 6G networks necessitates robust authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to counter emerging security challenges, particularly the threat posed by quantum computing. Existing 5G-AKA protocols remain vulnerable to user tracking, replay attacks, and false base station impersonation, while Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA-based key exchanges face imminent obsolescence due to quantum attacks. This study examines the vulnerabilities of 5G-AKA and explores hybrid post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a transitional security solution for 6G networks. We evaluate NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, focusing on their computational overhead, key size efficiency, and adaptability to heterogeneous network environments, including IoT and ultra-low latency applications. A comparative analysis of hybrid cryptographic schemes demonstrates that lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece) PQC techniques provide varying trade-offs between security, efficiency, and deployment feasibility. Furthermore, we propose a quantum-resistant 6G-AKA framework, integrating hybrid PQC, AI-driven trust mechanisms, and decentralized authentication to ensure scalability and interoperability. Experimental benchmarks highlight potential performance constraints, including latency in PQC-based key exchange and resource limitations in edge computing. Addressing these challenges requires the optimization of lightweight PQC implementations, formal security validation, and global standardization efforts. Our findings provide a roadmap for the secure transition to 6G authentication protocols, ensuring resilience against both classical and quantum threats.