Current cryptographic solutions used in information technologies today like Transport Layer Security utilize algorithms with underlying computationally difficult problems to solve. With the ongoing research and development of quantum computers, these same computationally difficult problems become solvable within reasonable (polynomial) time. The emergence of large-scale quantum computers would put the integrity and confidentiality of today’s data in jeopardy. It then becomes urgent to develop, implement, and test a new suite of cyber security measures against attacks from a quantum computer. This thesis explores, understands, and evaluates this new category of cryptosystems as well as the many tradeoffs among them. All the algorithms submitted to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for standardization can be categorized into three major categories, each relating to the new underlying hard problem: namely error code correcting, algebraic lattices (including ring learning with errors), and super singular isogenies. These new mathematical hard problems have shown to be resistant to the same type of quantum attack. Utilizing hardware clock cycle registers such as RDTSC on x86 architecture and CCNT on ARM architectures, the work sets up the benchmarks of the four Round 3 NIST algorithms in two environments: cloud computing and embedded system. In addition, security levels of each algorithm is analyzed with varying key sizes to highlight tradeoffs. Results show a significant decrease in performance on embedded systems, revealing the aspects of each algorithm such as key pair generation that should be reduced due to performance. As expected, there are many tradeoffs and advantages for certain applications in each algorithm. Saber and Kyber are exceedingly fast but have larger ciphertext size for transmission over a wire. McEliece key size and key generation are the largest drawbacks but having the smallest ciphertext size and only slightly decreased performance allow a use case where key reuse is prioritized. NTRU finds a middle ground in these tradeoffs, being better than McEliece performance wise and better than Kyber and Saber in ciphertext size allows for a use case of highly varied environments, which need to value speed and ciphertext size equally. Going forward, the benchmarking system developed could be applied to digital signature, another vital aspect to a cryptosystem.
Current cryptographic solutions used in information technologies today like Transport Layer Security utilize algorithms with underlying computationally difficult problems to solve. With the ongoing research and development of quantum computers, these same computationally difficult problems become solvable within reasonable (polynomial) time. The emergence of large-scale quantum computers would put the integrity and confidentiality of today’s data in jeopardy. It then becomes urgent to develop, implement, and test a new suite of cyber security measures against attacks from a quantum computer. This thesis explores, understands, and evaluates this new category of cryptosystems as well as the many tradeoffs among them. All the algorithms submitted to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for standardization can be categorized into three major categories, each relating to the new underlying hard problem: namely error code correcting, algebraic lattices (including ring learning with errors), and super singular isogenies. These new mathematical hard problems have shown to be resistant to the same type of quantum attack. Utilizing hardware clock cycle registers such as RDTSC on x86 architecture and CCNT on ARM architectures, the work sets up the benchmarks of the four Round 3 NIST algorithms in two environments: cloud computing and embedded system. In addition, security levels of each algorithm is analyzed with varying key sizes to highlight tradeoffs. Results show a significant decrease in performance on embedded systems, revealing the aspects of each algorithm such as key pair generation that should be reduced due to performance. As expected, there are many tradeoffs and advantages for certain applications in each algorithm. Saber and Kyber are exceedingly fast but have larger ciphertext size for transmission over a wire. McEliece key size and key generation are the largest drawbacks but having the smallest ciphertext size and only slightly decreased performance allow a use case where key reuse is prioritized. NTRU finds a middle ground in these tradeoffs, being better than McEliece performance wise and better than Kyber and Saber in ciphertext size allows for a use case of highly varied environments, which need to value speed and ciphertext size equally. Going forward, the benchmarking system developed could be applied to digital signature, another vital aspect to a cryptosystem.
Current cryptographic solutions used in information technologies today like Transport Layer Security utilize algorithms with underlying computationally difficult problems to solve. With the ongoing research and development of quantum computers, these same computationally difficult problems become solvable within reasonable (polynomial) time. The emergence of large-scale quantum computers would put the integrity and confidentiality of today’s data in jeopardy. It then becomes urgent to develop, implement, and test a new suite of cybersecurity measures against attacks from a quantum computer. This paper explores, understands, and evaluates this new category of cryptosystems as well as the many tradeoffs among them. All the algorithms submitted to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for standardization can be categorized into three major categories, each relating to the new underlying hard problem: namely error code correcting, algebraic lattices (including ring learning with errors), and supersingular isogenies. These new mathematical hard problems have shown to be resistant to the same type of quantum attack. Utilizing hardware clock cycle registers, the work sets up the benchmarks of the four Round 3 NIST algorithms in two environments: cloud computing and embedded system. As expected, there are many tradeoffs and advantages in each algorithm for applications. Saber and Kyber are exceedingly fast but have larger ciphertext size for transmission over a wire. McEliece key size and key generation are the largest drawbacks but having the smallest ciphertext size and only slightly decreased performance allow a use case where key reuse is prioritized. NTRU finds a middle ground in these tradeoffs, being better than McEliece performance wise and better than Kyber and Saber in ciphertext size allows for a use case of highly varied environments, which need to value speed and ciphertext size equally. Going forward, the benchmarking system developed could be applied to digital signature, another vital aspect to a cryptosystem.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computing presents an imminent threat to contemporary public-key cryptosystems, with quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm capable of efficiently breaking RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). This vulnerability has catalyzed accelerated standardization efforts for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and global security stakeholders. While theoretical security analysis of these quantum-resistant algorithms has advanced considerably, comprehensive real-world performance benchmarks spanning diverse computing environments—from high-performance cloud infrastructure to severely resource-constrained IoT devices—remain insufficient for informed deployment planning. This paper presents the most extensive cross-platform empirical evaluation to date of NIST-selected PQC algorithms, including CRYSTALS-Kyber and NTRU for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), alongside BIKE as a code-based alternative, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon for digital signatures. Our systematic benchmarking framework measures computational latency, memory utilization, key sizes, and protocol overhead across multiple security levels (NIST Levels 1, 3, and 5) in three distinct hardware environments and various network conditions. Results demonstrate that contemporary server architectures can implement these algorithms with negligible performance impact (<5% additional latency), making immediate adoption feasible for cloud services. In contrast, resource-constrained devices experience more significant overhead, with computational demands varying by up to 12× between algorithms at equivalent security levels, highlighting the importance of algorithm selection for edge deployments. Beyond standalone algorithm performance, we analyze integration challenges within existing security protocols, revealing that naive implementation of PQC in TLS 1.3 can increase handshake size by up to 7× compared to classical approaches. To address this, we propose and evaluate three optimization strategies that reduce bandwidth requirements by 40–60% without compromising security guarantees. Our investigation further encompasses memory-constrained implementation techniques, side-channel resistance measures, and hybrid classical-quantum approaches for transitional deployments. Based on these comprehensive findings, we present a risk-based migration framework and algorithm selection guidelines tailored to specific use cases, including financial transactions, secure firmware updates, vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, and IoT fleet management. This practical roadmap enables organizations to strategically prioritize systems for quantum-resistant upgrades based on data sensitivity, resource constraints, and technical feasibility. Our results conclusively demonstrate that PQC is deployment-ready for most applications, provided that implementations are carefully optimized for the specific performance characteristics and security requirements of target environments. We also identify several remaining research challenges for the community, including further optimization for ultra-constrained devices, standardization of hybrid schemes, and hardware acceleration opportunities.
The emergence of quantum computing is a serious threat to the principles of modern crypto-logical mathematics. The classical public-key cryptography, including Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman are very safe against classical adversaries yet become susceptible to quantum algorithms, including the Shor algorithm, which can easily solve the underlying mathematical problems. This weakness is jeopardizing confidentiality and integrity of the world-wide systems of communication, money transactions, and essential structures, and requires the immediate creation of safe alternatives. The current literature on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has covered various classes of algorithm, such as lattice-based, code-based, multivariate schemes, and isogeny-based schemes. Although lattice-based approaches like Nth Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring Unit (NTRU) and FrodoKEM can be highly theoretically resistant, they can be computationally and memory-intensive. Cryptosystems based on code such as Classic McEliece are secure but not practicable because they have huge public key sizes. Multivariate schemes like Rainbow, and isogeny-based schemes like Super singular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) have been attacked recently by cryptanalytic attacks, and broken completely. Such restrictions open the necessity to find more efficient and secure quantum-resistant solutions.This research study postulates a hybrid post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) system that combines CRYSTALS-Kyber for encryption with CRYSTALS-Dilithium for digital signatures both of which are approved through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization program. The model will be such that it ensures quantum resistance but at the same time it will be scalable, efficient and compatible with the existing infrastructures. The test outcomes indicate that the hybrid PQC model is 35-45 percent faster to encrypt and decrypt, signature performance is enhanced by up to 40 percent, and the throughput is 20 times higher (98.7 Mbps) than the same base PQC scheme including Nth Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring Unit (NTRU), McEliece and Rainbow. These enhancements affirm that the suggested model provides a viable trade-off between the security, speed, and efficiency in terms of key size, which makes it a viable and a sound base to ensure secure communication in the quantum age.
The rapid advancement of quantum technology brings significant trouble to the public key encryption standards used presently. Traditional cryptographic algorithms rely on the complexity of a specific number of theoretical problems, but the computational capabilities of large-scale quantum computers would swiftly compromise these specific mathematics-based cryptographic algorithms. These quantum technology-based computers consist of millions of qubits which can enable them to damage nearly all modern public-key cryptographic systems. This security issue is particularly concerning Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which typically have limited resources and are thus more susceptible to emerging threats from quantum computing. To address this concern, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has started the process of standardizing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). In this paper, a detailed taxonomy of lightweight PQC algorithms are presented. The performance analysis of NIST Round 3 finalist (CRYSTALS-Kyber, SABER, NTRU and NTRU Encrypt) is done on a real Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) environment. The performance of these algorithms is analyzed with respect to the ten essential metrics such as throughput, latency, power consumption, energy consumption, memory usage, clock cycles, etc., for different payloads. The experimental results for each performance metrics is plotted individually for better analysis. The experimental result show that the SABER cipher outperforms other post-quantum ciphers.
Aim: The imminent advent of large-scale quantum computers within the next years is expected to highly affect the security of several cryptosystems that are now considered secure; this mainly holds for classical, long-established, public key cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. Apparently, any security protocol that relies on such ciphers, including the transport layer security (TLS) protocol which constitutes a somewhat de facto standard for the security on the web, will not be considered secure in the post-quantum era. To alleviate the security risks stemming from quantum computing, several proposals have been submitted to the relevant procedure initiated by NIST towards evaluating and standardizing one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. This paper focuses on embedding post-quantum secure cryptographic algorithms into the TLS protocol to analyze its performance. More precisely, the paper aims to analyze whether this transition to post-quantum secure algorithms will have a significant impact on the user experience due to the possible increase of client--server communication times. Methods: Having as the starting point several important works in the field, several experiments were carried out, using combinations of cloud and local virtual machines per case and considering all the post-quantum cryptographic algorithm finalists for key exchange from the third round of the ongoing NIST process, for various cryptographic as well as network parameters. Results: Our results exhibit that, for key exchange in TLS, the best performance among the post-quantum secure ciphers is achieved by the Saber and CRYSTAL-Kyber variants for all security levels, regardless of the underlying computing power. The performance is comparable to that of the corresponding one achieved by a classical elliptic curve algorithm for key exchange for both RTT and packet loss ratio — i.e., the network parameters seem to have the same effect on post-quantum secure algorithms as in the case of a conventional elliptic curve algorithm. However, the effect of the network parameters on the performance is more crucial than the effect of the underlying chosen ciphers. Conclusion: According to the experiments, we conclude that there exist very promising algorithms that could be utilized in TLS in the near future, which may behave even better than the conventional elliptic curve algorithms for key exchange. It should also be pointed out that NIST announced on 5 July 2022 (i.e., after the completion of our research experiments) that, for general encryption used when we access secure websites, the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm has been selected, having as one of its advantages the speed of operation. Hence, the results of our paper are fully in line with the progress of the NIST process. Taking into account that the NIST process is still ongoing (now in its fourth round) with the aim to select more algorithms, as well as that some algorithms may be standardized outside NIST, it becomes evident that our results provide very useful insights on performance aspects of the post-quantum secure algorithms.
The development of quantum computing technology is progressing very quickly, which poses a great threat to classical cryptographic algorithms like RSA and ECC, as they are based on mathematical problems that can be easily solved using quantum computing technology. To overcome the threat of quantum computing technology, the need for PQC algorithms like CRYSTALS Kyber, CRYSTALS Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+, which are standardized or recommended by NIST, has become essential in the era of cybersecurity. The feasibility of these algorithms in real time applications is the main focus of this thesis. A mixed approach is adopted for this purpose. Benchmark experiments were performed using the Open Quantum Safe library and PQC enabled OpenSSL for key generation, encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification, and TLS handshakes. Simulated environment and cloud environment were used for this purpose. Moreover, case studies were also conducted for cloud computing, financial sector, and IoT applications. Additionally, threat modeling is also performed for assessing the migration risks, i.e., “harvest now decrypt later.” The results indicate that the lattice-based methods, like Kyber and Dilithium, offer a robust trade off in terms of performance and security, albeit with increased key and signature sizes compared to classical methods. Hash based methods, like SPHINCS+, offer robust security, albeit with significant performance and size overheads, indicating that they are best used in specific circumstances. Hybrid approaches, using classical as well as quantum methods, were indicated as viable in the transition from classical to quantum methods, especially in circumstances that require backward compatibility. The paper concludes that NIST standardized PQC algorithms are technically viable for contemporary applications, especially in cloud computing and high-performance computing. However, for large-scale implementation, proper engineering and monitoring of developments in crypt analysis need to be performed. Future research should be directed towards implementation optimization, migration frameworks, and further studies in real-world implementations, especially for resource-constrained IoT and legacy system applications.