Abstract One standard interpretation of quantum physics describes our world as manifesting ontological indeterminacy. In this paper, we argue that theists are well placed to account for this indeterminacy should that account of quantum physics win out over competing alternatives. We criticize the three most promising theories of ontic indeterminacy in how they account for quantum indeterminacy. We present another form of indeterminacy: the indeterminacy of fiction. We propose an often-underappreciated corollary of standard theism, namely, Theistic Dependence (TD). We contend that the theist, equipped with TD, can render quantum indeterminacy as comprehensible as the very tame indeterminacy in fiction. This, we argue, provides the theist with an advantage over the atheist.
Abstract One standard interpretation of quantum physics describes our world as manifesting ontological indeterminacy. In this paper, we argue that theists are well placed to account for this indeterminacy should that account of quantum physics win out over competing alternatives. We criticize the three most promising theories of ontic indeterminacy in how they account for quantum indeterminacy. We present another form of indeterminacy: the indeterminacy of fiction. We propose an often-underappreciated corollary of standard theism, namely, Theistic Dependence (TD). We contend that the theist, equipped with TD, can render quantum indeterminacy as comprehensible as the very tame indeterminacy in fiction. This, we argue, provides the theist with an advantage over the atheist.
Abstract Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy , which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.
Abstract This chapter, the theoretical nucleus of this monograph, synthesizes insights from Chinese Madhyamaka and Wilson’s determinable-based account to construct the central framework of the theory of ontic indeterminacy. It clarifies foundational matters concerning the kinds of entity that bear indeterminacy and the reasons for adopting the theory’s standard formulation for instances of worldly indeterminacy. The chapter then elaborates on an object-level characterization of what it means for a thing to be ontically indeterminate by explaining the complementary ideas of conclusive indeterminability and provisional determinability. This characterization is further supported by its consonance with a quandary constraint on theories of indeterminacy. Finally, the chapter responds to potential objections to clarify and support the proposed framework while challenging a form of reductionism that views macroscopic indeterminacy as superficial.
Abstract It is often claimed that quantum mechanics entails that there is indeterminacy in the world, in the sense that physical systems can lack a precise value for a property. Indeed, a radical form of indeterminacy, in which systems have almost none of the properties we normally attribute to them, can be shown to follow from a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics—the bare theory. However, the bare theory is shown to be incoherent. Still, a more limited form of indeterminacy can be located in spontaneous collapse, hidden variables, and many-worlds theories. This indeterminacy is unlike that which arises classically, having nothing to do with ordinary forms of vagueness or the composition of large objects out of smaller parts. Indeterminacy in quantum mechanics can perhaps be avoided, but there seems little reason to do so.
Abstract It has been argued that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is the best hunting ground for genuine examples of metaphysical indeterminacy. Approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can be divided into two families: meta-level and object-level accounts. It has been shown (Darby in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88(2):27–245, 2010. 10.1080/00048400903097786 ; Skow in Philosophical Quarterly 60(241):851–858, 2010) that the most popular version of the meta-level accounts, namely the metaphysical supervaluationism proposed by Barnes and Williams (Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 103–148, 2011), fails to deal with quantum indeterminacy. Such a fact has been taken by many as a challenge to adapt supervaluationism to quantum cases. In this paper, I will focus on the very last of these attempts, i.e. the situation semantics account proposed by Darby and Pickup (Synthese 1–26, 2019). After having shown where quantum indeterminacy arises and having surveyed the assumptions endorsed by the participants of the debate, I turn to Darby and Pickup’s proposal. I argue that, despite the machinery introduced, their account still fails to account for quantum indeterminacy. After considering some possible counterarguments, I suggest in the conclusion that one can plausibly extend the argument to those meta-level approaches that treat quantum indeterminacy as worldly indecision.
It has frequently been suggested that quantum mechanics may provide a genuine case of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy. However, discussions of quantum theory in the vagueness literature are often cur- sory and, as I shall argue, have in some respects been mis- guided. Hitherto much of the debate over ontic vagueness and quantum theory has centered on the indeterminate construal of ontic vagueness, and whether the quantum phenomenon of entanglement produces particles whose identity is indeterminate. I argue that this way of framing the debate is mistaken. A more thorough ex- amination of quantum theory and the phenomenon of entanglement reveals that quantum mechanics is best in- terpreted as supporting what I call the property construal of ontic vagueness, where vague properties are understood in terms of determinable properties without the corresponding determinates.