Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

SPIE Quantum Technologies for Defence and Security

Quantum certified encryption via optical quantum computers

Niccolò Somaschi, Shane Mansfield

Published Nov 15, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1117/12.3038039

Related papers

Key Encryption Through Quantum Optics

Madison Durrance, Zach Galberd, Abbey Savage +2 more

•Jan 1, 2017•0 citations

Certified Everlasting Functional Encryption

Taiga Hiroka, Tomoyuki Morimae, Ryo Nishimaki +1 more

Computational security in cryptography has a risk that computational assumptions underlying the security are broken in the future. One solution is to construct information-theoretically-secure protocols, but many cryptographic primitives are known to be impossible (or unlikely) to have information-theoretical security even in the quantum world. A nice compromise (intrinsic to quantum) is certified everlasting security, which roughly means the following. A receiver with possession of quantum encrypted data can issue a certificate that shows that the receiver has deleted the encrypted data. If the certificate is valid, the security is guaranteed even if the receiver becomes computationally unbounded. Although several cryptographic primitives, such as commitments and zero-knowledge, have been made certified everlasting secure, there are many other important primitives that are not known to be certified everlasting secure. In this paper, we introduce certified everlasting FE. In this primitive, the receiver with the ciphertext of a message m and the functional decryption key of a function f can obtain f(m) and nothing else. The security holds even if the adversary becomes computationally unbounded after issuing a valid certificate. We, first, construct certified everlasting FE for P/poly circuits where only a single key query is allowed for the adversary. We, then, extend it to q-bounded one for NC1 circuits where q-bounded means that q key queries are allowed for the adversary with an a priori bounded polynomial q. For the construction of certified everlasting FE, we introduce and construct certified everlasting versions of secret-key encryption, public-key encryption, receiver non-committing encryption, and a garbling scheme, which are of independent interest.

arXiv:2207.13878•Jul 28, 2022•2 citations

Quantum Encryption in Data Communications

Ilga Krūza

•Jan 1, 2011•0 citations

Hybrid Encryption with Certified Deletion in Preprocessing Model

Kunal Dey, Reihaneh Safavi–Naini

Certified deletion allows Alice to outsource data to Bob and, at a later time, obtain a verifiable guarantee that the file has been irreversibly deleted at her request. This functionality, while impossible using classical information alone, can be achieved using quantum information. Existing approaches rely either on one-time pad (OTP) encryption or on computational hardness assumptions that may be vulnerable to future advances in classical or quantum computing. In this work, we introduce and formalize hybrid encryption with certified deletion in the preprocessing model (pHE-CD) and propose two constructions. Each construction composes an information-theoretic key encapsulation mechanism (iKEM) with a data encapsulation mechanism that provides certified deletion (DEM-CD) security, offering different security guarantees depending on the properties of DEM-CD. When DEM-CD is one-time information-theoretically secure, the composition provides information-theoretic security for both encryption and certified deletion. When DEM-CD is computationally secure, the composed construction provides computationally secure (post-quantum) encryption and everlasting certified deletion, where confidentiality is computational until the deletion certificate is successfully verified. After successful verification, confidentiality becomes unconditional. That is, successful verification of the deletion certificate guarantees that the data has been removed information-theoretically from the adversary's view. Both pHE-CD constructions support the encryption of arbitrarily long messages. Construction 2 is key-efficient and uses a DEM-CD built from quantum coding and AES, providing quantum-safe security for encryption. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results and directions for future research.

arXiv:2601.10542•IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jun 1, 2026•1 citation

Symmetric Encryption on a Quantum Computer

David Garvin, Oleksiy Kondratyev, Alexander Lipton +1 more

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 28, 2025•0 citations

Blind Quantum Computation With Certified Deletion for Quantum Inputs

Junyu Quan, Yuxun Wang, Qin Li +1 more

Blind quantum computation (BQC) enables clients with limited quantum capabilities to protect the privacy of inputs, outputs and algorithms during the computation process. However, if a client’s private information is exposed to a server after the computation, the server can deduce the client’s output or even input. Quantum encryption with certified deletion (QECD) offers a potential solution by enabling the data owner to generate a deletion certificate, making the original plaintext inaccessible, provided the certificate is valid. Nevertheless, current QECD can only handle classical data and cannot be applied to BQC with quantum inputs. This paper first introduces the concept of certified deletion for quantum states and then proposes a single-client BQC protocol with certified deletion, where the client can use the classical certificate generated by the server to confirm whether her quantum inputs have been deleted after computation.We also give a specific example and simulate it using Qiskit to show its feasibility. In addition, the proposed protocol can also be extended to a multi-client environment in which honest clients request certified deletion if any client disconnects or behaves maliciously, thereby terminating the protocol and protecting their privacy.

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security•Dec 17, 2025•1 citation
Computational security in cryptography has a risk that computational assumptions underlying the security are broken in the future. One solution is to construct information-theoretically-secure protocols, but many cryptographic primitives are known to be impossible (or unlikely) to have information-theoretical security even in the quantum world. A nice compromise (intrinsic to quantum) is certified everlasting security, which roughly means the following. A receiver with possession of quantum encrypted data can issue a certificate that shows that the receiver has deleted the encrypted data. If the certificate is valid, the security is guaranteed even if the receiver becomes computationally unbounded. Although several cryptographic primitives, such as commitments and zero-knowledge, have been made certified everlasting secure, there are many other important primitives that are not known to be certified everlasting secure. In this paper, we introduce certified everlasting FE. In this primitive, the receiver with the ciphertext of a message m and the functional decryption key of a function f can obtain f(m) and nothing else. The security holds even if the adversary becomes computationally unbounded after issuing a valid certificate. We, first, construct certified everlasting FE for P/poly circuits where only a single key query is allowed for the adversary. We, then, extend it to q-bounded one for NC1 circuits where q-bounded means that q key queries are allowed for the adversary with an a priori bounded polynomial q. For the construction of certified everlasting FE, we introduce and construct certified everlasting versions of secret-key encryption, public-key encryption, receiver non-committing encryption, and a garbling scheme, which are of independent interest.
Certified deletion allows Alice to outsource data to Bob and, at a later time, obtain a verifiable guarantee that the file has been irreversibly deleted at her request. This functionality, while impossible using classical information alone, can be achieved using quantum information. Existing approaches rely either on one-time pad (OTP) encryption or on computational hardness assumptions that may be vulnerable to future advances in classical or quantum computing. In this work, we introduce and formalize hybrid encryption with certified deletion in the preprocessing model (pHE-CD) and propose two constructions. Each construction composes an information-theoretic key encapsulation mechanism (iKEM) with a data encapsulation mechanism that provides certified deletion (DEM-CD) security, offering different security guarantees depending on the properties of DEM-CD. When DEM-CD is one-time information-theoretically secure, the composition provides information-theoretic security for both encryption and certified deletion. When DEM-CD is computationally secure, the composed construction provides computationally secure (post-quantum) encryption and everlasting certified deletion, where confidentiality is computational until the deletion certificate is successfully verified. After successful verification, confidentiality becomes unconditional. That is, successful verification of the deletion certificate guarantees that the data has been removed information-theoretically from the adversary's view. Both pHE-CD constructions support the encryption of arbitrarily long messages. Construction 2 is key-efficient and uses a DEM-CD built from quantum coding and AES, providing quantum-safe security for encryption. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results and directions for future research.
Blind quantum computation (BQC) enables clients with limited quantum capabilities to protect the privacy of inputs, outputs and algorithms during the computation process. However, if a client’s private information is exposed to a server after the computation, the server can deduce the client’s output or even input. Quantum encryption with certified deletion (QECD) offers a potential solution by enabling the data owner to generate a deletion certificate, making the original plaintext inaccessible, provided the certificate is valid. Nevertheless, current QECD can only handle classical data and cannot be applied to BQC with quantum inputs. This paper first introduces the concept of certified deletion for quantum states and then proposes a single-client BQC protocol with certified deletion, where the client can use the classical certificate generated by the server to confirm whether her quantum inputs have been deleted after computation.We also give a specific example and simulate it using Qiskit to show its feasibility. In addition, the proposed protocol can also be extended to a multi-client environment in which honest clients request certified deletion if any client disconnects or behaves maliciously, thereby terminating the protocol and protecting their privacy.