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Journal of Physics Conference Series

Physical Layer Security of Fiber-optic Wiretap Channel with Forward Error Correction Coding

Rongwo Xu, Jianhua Ji, Zhenhong Wang, Yufeng Song, Ke Wang, Ming Xu

Published Sep 1, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, by using effective leakage value, we quantitatively assess the security performance of the fiber-optic wiretap channel with forward error correction coding. As the eavesdropper is far from the transmitter, effective leakage value initially decreases slowly and then will vary rapidly. As the eavesdropper is close to the transmitter, effective leakage value of (7,4) block code is larger than that of the (7,3) block code. However, when the eavesdropping distance is far, the system security performances of both are almost the same. Furthermore, effective leakage value using OTDR is analyzed and discussed.

DOI
10.1088/1742-6596/2829/1/012010

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Abstract In this paper, by using effective leakage value, we quantitatively assess the security performance of the fiber-optic wiretap channel with forward error correction coding. As the eavesdropper is far from the transmitter, effective leakage value initially decreases slowly and then will vary rapidly. As the eavesdropper is close to the transmitter, effective leakage value of (7,4) block code is larger than that of the (7,3) block code. However, when the eavesdropping distance is far, the system security performances of both are almost the same. Furthermore, effective leakage value using OTDR is analyzed and discussed.
Secrecy capacity is usually employed as the performance metric of the physical layer security in fiber-optic wiretap channels. However, secrecy capacity can only qualitatively evaluate the physical layer security, and it cannot quantitatively evaluate the physical layer security of an imperfect security system. Furthermore, secrecy capacity cannot quantitatively evaluate the amount of information leakage to the eavesdropper. Based on the channel model of an optical CDMA network using wiretap code, the information leakage rate is analyzed to evaluate the physical layer security. The numerical results show that the information leakage rate can quantitatively evaluate the physical layer security of an optical CDMA wiretap channel, and it is related to transmission distance, eavesdropping position, confidential information rate and optical code.
Based on information-theoretic security, physical-layer security in an optical code division multiple access (OCDMA) system is analyzed. For the first time, the security leakage factor is employed to evaluate the physical-layer security level, and the safe receiving distance is used to measure the security transmission range. By establishing the wiretap channel model of a coherent OCDMA system, the influences of the extraction location, the extraction ratio, the number of active users, and the length of the code on the physical-layer security are analyzed quantitatively. The physical-layer security and reliability of the coherent OCDMA system are evaluated under the premise of satisfying the legitimate user’s bit error rate and the security leakage factor. The simulation results show that the number of users must be in a certain interval in order to meet the legitimate user’s reliability and security. Furthermore, the security performance of the coherent OCDMA-based wiretap channel can be improved by increasing the code length.
In fiber-optic communication networks, research on data security at lower layers of the protocol stack and in particular at the physical layer by means of information-theoretic concepts is only in the beginning. Nevertheless, it has recently attracted quite some attention as it holds the promise of providing unconditional, perfect security without the need for secret key exchanges. In this paper, we analyze some important constraints that such concepts put on a potential implementation of physical-layer security. We review the fundamentals of physical-layer security on the basis of the commonly used AWGN wiretap channel model. For such channel model we summarize the security metrics which are typically used in information theory and in particular recall that, for secure communication over the AWGN channel, the legitimate receiver needs an SNR advantage over the eavesdropper. Next, we relate the information theoretic metrics to physically measurable quantities in optical communications engineering, namely optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) and bit-error ratio (BER), and translate the information-theoretic wiretap scenario to a simple real-world point-to-point optical transmission link in which part of the light is wiretapped using a bend coupler. We investigate the achievable OSNR advantage under realistic assumptions for fiber loss, tap ratio, and noise budget and find that secure transmission is limited to a distance of a few tens of kilometers in this case. The maximum secure transmission distance decreases with an increasing tap ratio chosen by the eavesdropper. This can be only counteracted by monitoring the link loss towards the legitimate receiver which would force the eavesdropper to choose small tap ratios in order to remain undetected. In an outlook towards further research directions we identify information-theoretic approaches which could potentially allow to realize physical-layer security in more generalized scenarios or over longer distances.
Underwater wireless optical communication (UWOC) possesses significant advantages, such as high bandwidth, low latency, and low power consumption, making it a key technology for building information networks in marine environments. However, due to the scattering effect of seawater, some photons carrying information inevitably scatter out of their predetermined paths, leading to the possibility for information leakage. Therefore, we propose a physical-layer security analysis model for UWOC systems based on the wiretap channel model. The model evaluates the security of the communication system by calculating the capacity difference between the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel in the UWOC system. Specifically, the model first constructs the three-dimensional intensity distribution of scattered photons in the underwater channel via Monte Carlo simulations and experimental measurements. Then, it calculates the capacities of both the legitimate and eavesdropping channels based on the decoding results. Finally, the three-dimensional distribution of secrecy capacity is derived to assess the security of the communication system. In this work this model is used to analyze the security of the UWOC system in clear seawater environments. The results show that the secrecy capacity of the system is zero within a certain range near the transmission path, demonstrating that scattered photons can cause information leakage. We recommend that, in practical applications, monitoring the non-signal transmission area near the transmitter is essential to ensure communication security. This research provides a solution for analyzing the quantitative security of UWOC, which can strongly support the design of UWOC systems and encoding/decoding schemes.
This work discusses the bounds for the wiretap channel (WTC) in the finite blocklength regime, characterizing the behavior of the performance trade-off between information delivery to the legitimate receiver and information leakage to the eavesdropper as a function of blocklength. Since the error probability at the legitimate receiver is the same as that of a conventional point-to-point channel, the characterization of the former builds on the finite blocklength analysis for that case. The information leakage bound relies on the analysis of the corresponding leakage density. This paper extends these concepts by incorporating the use of the Berry-Esseen theorem in assessing the convergence rates of leakage and secrecy metrics to their asymptotic values, which provides a refined analytical tool to evaluate the performance of secrecy systems under finite blocklength constraints. Furthermore, this approach facilitates a quantification of the trade-offs involved, integrating concepts such as the aggregate leakage rate and empirical average leakage, thus enabling a more comprehensive understanding of how system parameters affect the overall secrecy performance. This allows for a more detailed exploration of the dependencies between blocklength, secrecy, and reliability trade-offs required to balance effective communication against security imperatives. These analyses also highlight the critical balance necessary between ensuring low probability of error for the legitimate receiver while maintaining stringent secrecy requirements against an eavesdropper. Furthermore, the study introduces metrics such as aggregate leakage rate and empirical average leakage, providing new insights into how these factors interplay to influence the overall performance of secure communication systems.
Location information has been shown to be useful for a wide variety of applications in wireless networks, while its role in physical layer security has so far drawn little attention. In this work, we propose a new location-based secure transmission scheme for wiretap channels, where the accurate locations of the sources, destinations and any other authorized transceivers are known, but only an estimate of the eavesdropper's location is available. We outline how such an estimate of the eavesdropper's location can still allow for quantitative assessment of key security metrics. To provide focus, we describe how optimization of the effective secrecy throughput of a relay wiretap channel is obtained in our scheme, and investigate in detail the impact of the location uncertainty on the system performance. The work reported here provides insights into the design of new location-based physical layer security schemes in which the only information available on an eavesdropper is a noisy estimate of her location.