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IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Location-Based Secure Transmission for Wiretap Channels

Chenxi Liu, Nan Yang, Jinhong Yuan, Robert Malaney

Published May 6, 2015• 48 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Location information has been shown to be useful for a wide variety of applications in wireless networks, while its role in physical layer security has so far drawn little attention. In this work, we propose a new location-based secure transmission scheme for wiretap channels, where the accurate locations of the sources, destinations and any other authorized transceivers are known, but only an estimate of the eavesdropper's location is available. We outline how such an estimate of the eavesdropper's location can still allow for quantitative assessment of key security metrics. To provide focus, we describe how optimization of the effective secrecy throughput of a relay wiretap channel is obtained in our scheme, and investigate in detail the impact of the location uncertainty on the system performance. The work reported here provides insights into the design of new location-based physical layer security schemes in which the only information available on an eavesdropper is a noisy estimate of her location.

DOI
10.1109/jsac.2015.2430211

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This letter studies the problem of maintaining information freshness under passive eavesdropping attacks. The classical three-node wiretap channel model is considered, in which a source aims to send its latest status wirelessly to its intended destination, while protecting the message from being overheard by an eavesdropper. Considering that conventional channel capacity-based secrecy metrics are no longer adequate to measure the information timeliness in status update systems, we define two new age of information-based metrics to characterize the secrecy performance of the considered system. We further propose, analyze, and optimize a randomized stationary transmission policy implemented at the source for further enhancing the secrecy performance. Simulation results are provided to validate our analysis and optimization.

arXiv:2002.07340•Feb 18, 2020•14 citations
Location information has been shown to be useful for a wide variety of applications in wireless networks, while its role in physical layer security has so far drawn little attention. In this work, we propose a new location-based secure transmission scheme for wiretap channels, where the accurate locations of the sources, destinations and any other authorized transceivers are known, but only an estimate of the eavesdropper's location is available. We outline how such an estimate of the eavesdropper's location can still allow for quantitative assessment of key security metrics. To provide focus, we describe how optimization of the effective secrecy throughput of a relay wiretap channel is obtained in our scheme, and investigate in detail the impact of the location uncertainty on the system performance. The work reported here provides insights into the design of new location-based physical layer security schemes in which the only information available on an eavesdropper is a noisy estimate of her location.
We propose a new location-based beamforming (LBB) scheme for wiretap channels, where a multi-antenna source communicates with a single-antenna legitimate receiver in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. We assume that all channels are in a Rician fading environment, the channel state information from the legitimate receiver is perfectly known at the source, and that the only information on the eavesdropper available at the source is her location. We first describe how the optimal beamforming vector that minimizes the secrecy outage probability of the system is obtained, illustrating its dependence on the eavesdropper’s location. We then derive an easy-to-compute expression for the secrecy outage probability when our proposed LBB scheme is adopted. We also consider the positive impact a friendly jammer can have on our beamforming solution, showing how the path to optimality remains the same. Finally, we investigate the impact of location uncertainty on the secrecy outage probability, showing how our solution can still allow for secrecy even when the source only has a noisy estimate of the eavesdropper’s location. This paper demonstrates how a multi-antenna array, operating in the most general channel conditions and most likely system setup, can be configured rapidly in the field so as to deliver an optimal physical layer security solution.
We propose a new optimal location-based beamforming (LBB) scheme for the wiretap channel, where both the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel are subject to Rician fading. In our LBB scheme, the two key inputs are the location of the legitimate receiver and the location of the potential eavesdropper. Notably, our scheme does not require any channel state information of the main channel or the eavesdropper's channel being available at the transmitter. This makes our scheme easy to deploy in a host of application settings in which the location inputs are known. Our beamforming solution assumes a multiple-antenna transmitter and a multiple-antenna eavesdropper, and its aim is to maximize the physical layer security of the channel. To obtain our solution, we first derive the secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme in an easy-to-evaluate expression that is valid for arbitrary real values of the Rician K-factors of the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel. Using this expression, we then determine the location-based beamformer solution that minimizes the secrecy outage probability. To assess the usefulness of our new scheme, and to quantify the value of the location information to physical layer security, we compare our scheme to other schemes, some of which do not utilize any location information. Our new beamformer solution provides optimal physical layer security for a wide range of location-based applications.
In this work we investigate, for the first time, the secrecy performance of a single-input single-output single antenna eavesdropper two-way relay wiretap channel, in which only statistical channel state information from the eavesdropper is available at the sources. We propose a secure adaptive transmission scheme for this two-way relay wiretap channel in which the sum effective secrecy throughput is utilized as the performance metric. Given our adopted system model, we determine the wiretap code rate parameters for the two sources which maximize this performance metric. In addition, we explore the relationship between the sum effective secrecy throughput and the transmit powers at the sources, demonstrating how the sum effective secrecy for the adopted system is maximized at certain transmit powers. Given the practical system model we investigate, the results reported here are important for the deployment of physical layer security in two-way relay wiretap channels.
We propose a secure transmission scheme for a relay wiretap channel, where a source communicates with a destination via a decode-and- forward relay in the presence of spatially random- distributed eavesdroppers. We assume that the source is equipped with multiple antennas, whereas the relay, the destination, and the eavesdroppers are equipped with a single antenna each. In the proposed scheme, in addition to information signals, the source transmits artificial noise signals in order to confuse the eavesdroppers. With the target of maximizing the secrecy throughput of the relay wiretap channel, we derive a closed-form expression for the transmission outage probability and an easy-to-compute expression for the secrecy outage probability. Using these expressions, we determine the optimal power allocation factor and wiretap code rates that guarantee the maximum secrecy throughput, while satisfying a secrecy outage probability constraint. Furthermore, we examine the impact of source antenna number on the secrecy throughput, showing that adding extra transmit antennas at the source brings about a significant increase in the secrecy throughput.
The current research on physical layer security is far from implementations in practical networks, arguably due to impractical assumptions in the literature and the limited applicability of physical layer security. Aiming to reduce the gap between theory and practice, this thesis focuses on wireless physical layer security towards practical assumptions and requirements. In the first half of the thesis, we reduce the dependence of physical layer security on impractical assumptions. The secrecy enhancements and analysis based on impractical assumptions cannot lead to any true guarantee of secrecy in practical networks. The current study of physical layer security was often based on the idealized assumption of perfect channel knowledge on both legitimate users and eavesdroppers. We study the impact of channel estimation errors on secure transmission designs. We investigate the practical scenarios where both the transmitter and the receiver have imperfect channel state information (CSI). Our results show how the optimal transmission design and the achievable throughput vary with the amount of knowledge on the eavesdropper's channel. Apart from the assumption of perfect CSI, the analysis of physical layer security often ideally assumed the number of eavesdropper antennas to be known. We develop an innovative approach to study secure communication systems without knowing the number of eavesdropper antennas by introducing the concept of spatial constraint into physical layer security. That is, the eavesdropper is assumed to have a limited spatial region to place (possibly an infinite number of) antennas. We show that a non-zero secrecy rate is achievable with the help of a friendly jammer, even if the eavesdropper places an infinite number of antennas in its spatial region. In the second half of the thesis, we improve the applicability of physical layer security. The current physical layer security techniques to achieve confidential broadcasting were limited to application in single-cell systems. The primary challenge to achieve confidential broadcasting in the multi-cell network is to deal with not only the inter-cell but also the intra-cell information leakage and interference. To tackle this challenge, we design linear precoders performing confidential broadcasting in multi-cell networks. We optimize the precoder designs to maximize the secrecy sum rate with based on the large-system analysis. Finally, we improve the applicability of physical layer security from a fundamental aspect. The analysis of physical layer security based on the existing secrecy metric was often not applicable in practical networks. We propose new metrics for evaluating the secrecy of transmissions over fading channels to address the practical limitations of using existing secrecy metrics for such evaluations. The first metric establishes a link between the concept of secrecy outage and the eavesdropper's ability to decode confidential messages. The second metric provides an error-probability-based secrecy metric which is often used for the practical implementation of secure wireless systems. The third metric characterizes how much or how fast the confidential information is leaked to the eavesdropper. We show that the proposed secrecy metrics enable one to appropriately design secure communication systems with different views on how secrecy is measured.
This letter studies the problem of maintaining information freshness under passive eavesdropping attacks. The classical three-node wiretap channel model is considered, in which a source aims to send its latest status wirelessly to its intended destination, while protecting the message from being overheard by an eavesdropper. Considering that conventional channel capacity-based secrecy metrics are no longer adequate to measure the information timeliness in status update systems, we define two new age of information-based metrics to characterize the secrecy performance of the considered system. We further propose, analyze, and optimize a randomized stationary transmission policy implemented at the source for further enhancing the secrecy performance. Simulation results are provided to validate our analysis and optimization.