Recently, Sutradhar (2024) proposed a quantum cryptographic protocol for secure vehicular communication. The author claimed that the proposed protocol is unconditionally secure and can resist various well-known security attacks of outsiders or participants. However, in this comment article, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is vulnerable to an entangle-measure attack by a dishonest participant and an outsider, and a collusion attack by dishonest participants. In addition, theoretically it cannot guarantee the unconditional security because the hash function is not a perfect one-way function.
Recently, Sutradhar (2024) proposed a quantum cryptographic protocol for secure vehicular communication. The author claimed that the proposed protocol is unconditionally secure and can resist various well-known security attacks of outsiders or participants. However, in this comment article, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is vulnerable to an entangle-measure attack by a dishonest participant and an outsider, and a collusion attack by dishonest participants. In addition, theoretically it cannot guarantee the unconditional security because the hash function is not a perfect one-way function.
In foggy highways, the secure vehicular communication system can be very important in preventing traffic chaos, congestion, and accident; however, potential attackers may hack this system that can create many problems in controlling or managing the traffic. In this paper, we propose a quantum cryptographic protocol for secure vehicular communication for foggy highways, which is unconditionally secure against outside and participant attacks. The outside attacks include intercept, intercept-resend, entangle-measure, man-in-the-middle, collective, Trojan horse, and coherent attacks; whereas, the participant attacks include the collusion, forgery, and collision attacks. In this protocol, the traffic control system broadcasts the information regularly so that the vehicles can take appropriate action and avoid traffic chaos, congestion, and accidents. This protocol can be used on busy and foggy highways such as the interstate-75 highway in the United States, M4 motorway in England, Tohoku Expressway in Japan, and Yamuna Expressway in India to prevent vehicle collisions. Quantum cryptographic protocol for secure vehicular communication is important because they provide a highly secure method of communication that is immune to eavesdropping and interception. The motivation for developing the quantum cryptographic protocol for secure vehicular communication comes from the growing need for secure communication in the digital age.
A secure vehicular communication system is crucial for preventing vehicle collisions on foggy highways; however, unconditionally powerful attackers can be the reason for vehicle chaos and accidents. Quantum cryptographic protocols offer a solution by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics to provide inherently secure vehicular communication. The existing protocols cannot prevent quantum computer attacks. These protocols also require more computation costs. In this paper, we proposed a quantum protocol for vehicular communication based on Nash equilibrium, which can prevent quantum computer attacks. We use the Nash equilibrium to resist the collusion attack. In this protocol, we considered quantum attacks and computation costs as the performance parameters. The computation cost of this protocol isO(1)as the TCS only needs to perform a one-time computation for sharing the secret signal. In our protocol, the share of secret signals is regularly transmitted to the vehicles, and vehicles jointly compute the secret signals to avoid vehicle chaos and accidents. The proposed protocol can be deployed on foggy highways to avoid vehicle chaos and accidents.
The rise of autonomous vehicles (AVs) has led to an increased reliance on vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication networks to ensure real-time information sharing, situational awareness, and cooperative decision-making. However, the integration of quantum computing into cybersecurity threatens the cryptographic foundations upon which current V2V communication protocols rely. As quantum computers grow closer to practical implementation, traditional public-key encryption schemes—such as RSA and ECC—are rendered vulnerable to attacks from quantum algorithms like Shor’s and Grover’s. This review explores the necessity of adopting quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols to secure V2V communication frameworks. The study critically examines post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate polynomial, and isogeny-based schemes, with a focus on their applicability to latency-sensitive and resource-constrained vehicular environments. Furthermore, the paper evaluates the performance, scalability, and implementation challenges of integrating these cryptographic primitives into real-time autonomous systems. Case studies of pilot implementations and emerging research are reviewed to highlight the practicality of these protocols in vehicular edge computing and 5G-enabled automotive networks. The paper concludes by proposing a forward-looking roadmap for standardization and integration of quantum-resilient cryptography in intelligent transportation systems (ITS), ensuring long-term data integrity, authentication, and privacy across V2V infrastructures.
The need for secrecy and security is essential in communication. Secret sharing is a conventional protocol to distribute a secret message to a group of parties, who cannot access it individually but need to cooperate in order to decode it. While several variants of this protocol have been investigated, including realizations using quantum systems, the security of quantum secret sharing schemes against eavesdroppers and dishonest participants remained unproven. Here we establish an unconditional security proof for continuous variable entanglement-based quantum secret sharing schemes, in the limit of asymptotic keys and for an arbitrary number of players, by utilizing ideas from the recently developed one-sided device-independent approach to quantum key distribution. We demonstrate the practical feasibility of our scheme, which can be implemented by Gaussian states and homodyne measurements, with no need for ideal single-photon sources or quantum memories. Our results establish quantum secret sharing as a viable and practically relevant primitive for quantum communication technologies.
Quantum-based cryptographic protocols are often said to enjoy security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics. However, even carefully designed quantum-based cryptographic schemes may be susceptible to subtle attacks that are outside the original design. As an example, we give attacks against a recently proposed ``secure communication using mesoscopic coherent states'', which employs mesoscopic states, rather than single-photon states. Our attacks can be used either as a known-plaintext attack or in the case where the plaintext has not been randomized. One of our attacks requires beamsplitters and the replacement of a lossy channel by a lossless one. It is successful provided that the original loss in the channel is so big that Eve can obtain 2k copies of what Bob receives, where k is the length of the seed key pre-shared by Alice and Bob. In addition, substantial improvements over such an exhaustive key search attack can be made, whenever a key is reused. Furthermore, we remark that, under the same assumption of a known or non-random plaintext, Grover's exhaustive key search attack can be applied directly to "secure communication using mesoscopic coherent states", whenever the channel loss is more than 50 percent. Therefore, as far as information-theoretic security is concerned, optically amplified signals necessarily degrade the security of the proposed scheme, when the plaintext is known or non-random. Our attacks apply even if the mesoscopic scheme is used only for key generation with a subsequent use of the key for one-time-pad encryption. Studying those attacks can help us to better define the risk models and parameter spaces in which quantum-based cryptographic schemes can operate securely. Finally, we remark that our attacks do not affect standard protocols such as Bennett-Brassard BB84 protocol or Bennett B92 protocol, which rely on single-photon signals.