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Quantum 2.0 Conference and Exhibition

QKD Secret Key Scaling with Ground Station Aperture Size and Satellite Overpass

Ravindra Pratap Singh, T. Roger, Chithrabhanu Perumangatt, Mirko Sanzaro, Robert I. Woodward, A. J. Shields

Published Jan 1, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The secret key generation results for different telescope sizes and maximum satellite elevation within an overpass are generated using a satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution emulator which can support cost-effective satellite-QKD network deployment.
DOI
10.1364/quantum.2024.qth3a.38

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