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Optics and Photonics News

Satellite-Based QKD

Imran Khan, Bettina Heim, Andreas Neuzner, Christoph Marquardt

Published Jan 30, 2018• 51 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A global network of spacecraft and ground stations, distributing secret encryption keys by meansof quantum technology, could meet emerging and long-term threats to data security.
DOI
10.1364/opn.29.2.000026

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Satellite-based Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is emerging as a cornerstone technology for secure global communication networks, extending quantum-safe key exchange beyond the limitations of terrestrial fiber systems. Achieving scalable and robust space-to-ground QKD links requires careful optimization of optical terminals, channel conditions, and protocol-specific parameters.In this work, we present a system-level analysis of design priorities for satellite QKD networks, using realistic atmospheric conditions modeled with MODTRAN 6 and a simulation tool designed and developed in-house. For discrete-variable (DV) QKD, we analyze how the secret key rate (SKR) varies with satellite altitude for two telescope aperture sizes under representative rural and urban ground station scenarios. Results show that DV-QKD enables secure key distribution over distances compatible with LEO and MEO satellite links when using moderately sized ground telescopes (600mm and 800mm apertures). For continuous-variable (CV) QKD with Gaussian modulation, SKR is analyzed as a function of satellite altitude under the most favorable link conditions identified in the DV-QKD study (800 mm ground aperture and rural environment), indicating that CV-QKD is feasible for secure key exchange with low-altitude LEO satellites, as long as the excess noise remains within low (yet experimentally achievable) levels (≈ 0.045 SNR). Additionally, we establish upper bounds on tolerable excess noise via heatmap analysis, defining the operational regime for secure CV-QKD.These findings provide quantitative guidance for designing scalable, interoperable, and cost-efficient space-to-ground QKD infrastructures, supporting the development of robust global quantum communication networks.
Quantum key distribution (QKD), the technology to generate distant secure keys for later usage in secure communication, has become a mature topic since the 1980s. While terrestrial QKD over fiber networks is suitable for short-distance urban networks, QKD via satellites promises to gap the distance requirement on a global scale that limits terrestrial QKD. Satellite QKD requires the exchange of quantum states between a satellite and multiple ground stations. The goal is then to facilitate shared secret keys between the ground stations, which can then be relayed to users near the ground stations. The satellite usually carries the quantum sources as its payload and sends them to the ground station via a downlink. The QKD protocol is heavily influenced by the choice of the quantum source, with typically one of two types: approximate single photon source (such as a weak laser) or an entangled source. Similarly, the ground station must be equipped to receive, measure and process the quantum signals sent by the satellite. Although there are also reverse schemes, where the satellite acts as the receiver and the ground station as the sender, these schemes are less explored due to higher noise in the uplink and less engineering experience. As with any system containing a high heterogeneity, many different implementation schemes lead to a variety of optimized use cases based on different criteria. Satellite QKD carries the further complication that it must be adapted to international standards. In this paper we present different satellite and ground station architectures that lean on the developments in the projects EAGLE-1, QUBE, QuNET, RoGloQuaN, addressing different protocols, sources, satellite sizes and telescope sizes. We also discuss the need for agility and configuration of components in a heterogeneous environment.