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Mind and Matter

Observers, Relational Quantum Mechanics, and Buddhist Philosophy

John Realpe-Gómez

Published Jul 20, 2024• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Recent research suggests that in quantum physics facts are relative. One of the main interpretations of quantum mechanics that agrees with this view is Rovelli's relational quantum mechanics (RQM). Basically, Rovelli considers that what underlies quantum physics is a network of relations – things do not have intrinsic existence, everything is related to something else. Rovelli also advocates for a relational understanding of the mind. However, for Rovelli the network of relations associated to quantum physics and the network of relations associated to the mind do not seem to be related in any relevant sense. Here we discuss Rovelli's recent attempt to relate RQM to the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy. We also discuss the Prāsangika-Madhyamaka subschool, considered by some to be the subtlest interpretation of the Madhyamaka school. This subschool suggests that the mind should indeed play a relevant role in the network of relations that Rovelli associates to quantum physics. We discuss how we might reconcile the Prāsangika-Madhyamaka subschool with Rovelli's recent take on RQM. We also introduce some conjectures as to how quantum mechanics might emerge from a Prāsangika-Madhyamaka perspective.

DOI
10.53765/mm2024.95

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Recent research suggests that in quantum physics facts are relative. One of the main interpretations of quantum mechanics that agrees with this view is Rovelli's relational quantum mechanics (RQM). Basically, Rovelli considers that what underlies quantum physics is a network of relations – things do not have intrinsic existence, everything is related to something else. Rovelli also advocates for a relational understanding of the mind. However, for Rovelli the network of relations associated to quantum physics and the network of relations associated to the mind do not seem to be related in any relevant sense. Here we discuss Rovelli's recent attempt to relate RQM to the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy. We also discuss the Prāsangika-Madhyamaka subschool, considered by some to be the subtlest interpretation of the Madhyamaka school. This subschool suggests that the mind should indeed play a relevant role in the network of relations that Rovelli associates to quantum physics. We discuss how we might reconcile the Prāsangika-Madhyamaka subschool with Rovelli's recent take on RQM. We also introduce some conjectures as to how quantum mechanics might emerge from a Prāsangika-Madhyamaka perspective.
Rovelli’s RQM is first characterized by contrast with both Everett’s and Bohr’s interpretations of quantum mechanics. Then, it is shown that a basic difficulty arises from the choice of formulating RQM in a naturalistic framework. Even though, according to Rovelli’s interpretation, statements about the world only make sense relative to certain naturalized observers described by means of quantum mechanics, this very meta-statement seems to make sense relative to a sort of super-observer which does not partake of the naturalized status of ordinary observers. The difficulty is solved by substituting functional reference frames for physical (or naturalized) observers throughout. Instead of being relative to physical observers, statements about the state vector of physical systems are here relative to well-defined projects of probabilistic prediction which may be embodied by several physical observers.
Abstract The following paper explores the metaphysical significance of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). For this, I will first outline Rovelli’s philosophical framework, and then offer a reconstruction of Rovelli’s seminal argument in favour of RQM. I will then explore some healthy lines of philosophical work that may be undertaken to strengthen RQM. First, I will frame RQM in the debate between realist and antirealist readings of QM and defend the general claim that RQM is compatible with realism. Then, I discuss the main ontological interpretations of RQM, which I classify as “dispositional”, “transcendental” and “structural”, and argue that all of them remain committed to substantialist assumptions that limit the radicality of Rovelli’s proposal. Finally, I analyse recent developments on RQM’s ontology and suggest that preserving its ontological originality requires an assessment on the concept of “pattern”.
A problem facing quantum mechanics is that there are a number of views or interpretations available that purport to 'explain' quantum mechanics. In this paper I discuss and analyze the view of relational quantum mechanics by Carlo Rovelli in the context of theoretical underdetermination. I will show that even though Rovelli offers a view that consolidates some of the aspects of competing theories it still falls short of breaking out of the theoretical underdetermination. The criteria that I have used to consider a theory successful in this context is one that increases the predictive output of quantum theory. Lacking an increase of predictive output then we can consider how a view helps solve the paradoxes in quantum mechanics or makes the paradoxes meaningless. I will conclude that relational quantum mechanics does not attempt to increase the predictive output and has limited success in resolving the EPR paradox. What Rovelli's view of quantum mechanics offers is a non-trivial and interesting re-interpretation of the main issues of quantum mechanics that does leave the door open for further study.
Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interesting alternative to the standard responses to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. But it suffers from a distinctive kind of epistemic solipsism: an observer can’t in principle know anything beyond their immediate present experience. This makes RQM self-undermining: it takes away the evidence we have for believing in quantum mechanics in the first place. Recently, Adlam and Rovelli have proposed a solution to this problem in the form of a new postulate they call cross-perspective links. Here I argue that this postulate does indeed solve the skeptical problem, but it also removes those aspects of RQM that make it distinctively relational. Nevertheless, the result of equipping RQM with cross-perspective links is an interesting interpretation in its own right.
In this paper I present and defend Rovelli's relation quantum mechanics from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its philosophical implications vis a vis rival interpretations. In particular I ask whether RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to both a duality of evolutions and of ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicness of the classical world, which in the limit must be recovered from the former). I then concentrate on the pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I note interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming (in flat spacetimes).Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least as far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.
In a recent paper, Rovelli responds to our critical assessment of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). His main argument is that our assessment lacks merit, because we fail to understand, or cope with, the premises of his theory; instead, he argues, we judge his proposal, blinded by the preconceptions inherent to ``our camp''. Here, we explicitly show that our assessment judges RQM on its own terms, together with the basic requirements of precision, clarity, logical soundness and empirical suitability. Under those circumstances, we prove false Rovelli's claim that RQM provides a satisfactory, realistic, non-solipsistic description of the world. Moreover, his reply serves us to further exhibit the serious problems of the RQM proposal, as well as the failures of its author to understanding the basic conceptual difficulties of quantum theory.