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arXiv:1309.0132

Rovelli' s relational quantum mechanics, monism and quantum becoming

Mauro Dorato

Published Aug 31, 2013• 10 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this paper I present and defend Rovelli's relation quantum mechanics from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its philosophical implications vis a vis rival interpretations. In particular I ask whether RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to both a duality of evolutions and of ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicness of the classical world, which in the limit must be recovered from the former). I then concentrate on the pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I note interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming (in flat spacetimes).Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least as far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1309.0132

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In this paper I present and defend Rovelli's relation quantum mechanics from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its philosophical implications vis a vis rival interpretations. In particular I ask whether RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to both a duality of evolutions and of ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicness of the classical world, which in the limit must be recovered from the former). I then concentrate on the pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I note interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming (in flat spacetimes).Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least as far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.
In the first section I present in some details Rovelli’s RMQ. In the second I defend it from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its philosophical implications vis à vis some rival but closely related interpretations. In particular I ask whether RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to a duality of both temporal evolutions and ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicness of the classical world, which in the limit must be recovered from the former world). In the fourth section I concentrate on the pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I note some interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming (in flat spacetimes). Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least insofar far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.
In this chapter Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (RQM) is defended from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its distinctive philosophical implications. In particular, the chapter considers whether RQM presupposes a duality of evolutions and of ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicality of the classical world). It then concentrates on the pluralistic, anti-monistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a quantum state to the entire universe. Finally interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming are noted. Given the difficulties with the cosmic form of becoming required by priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least as far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.
Abstract The following paper explores the metaphysical significance of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). For this, I will first outline Rovelli’s philosophical framework, and then offer a reconstruction of Rovelli’s seminal argument in favour of RQM. I will then explore some healthy lines of philosophical work that may be undertaken to strengthen RQM. First, I will frame RQM in the debate between realist and antirealist readings of QM and defend the general claim that RQM is compatible with realism. Then, I discuss the main ontological interpretations of RQM, which I classify as “dispositional”, “transcendental” and “structural”, and argue that all of them remain committed to substantialist assumptions that limit the radicality of Rovelli’s proposal. Finally, I analyse recent developments on RQM’s ontology and suggest that preserving its ontological originality requires an assessment on the concept of “pattern”.
Abstract There have been a number of recent attempts to identify the best metaphysical framework for capturing Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). All such accounts commit to some form of fundamentalia, whether they be traditional objects, physical relations, events or ‘flashes’, or the cosmos as a fundamental whole. However, Rovelli’s own recommendation is that ‘a natural philosophical home for RQM is an anti-foundationalist perspective' (Rovelli in Philos Trans R Soc 376:10, 2018). This gives us some prima facie reason to explore options beyond these foundationalist frameworks, and take seriously a picture that lacks fundamentalia. I construct an argument from elimination in favour of an anti-foundationalist interpretation of RQM. The argument notes that priority monism and priority pluralism are exhaustive foundationalist options, and then shows that there are reasons to reject their union with RQM. I finish by recommending metaphysical coherentism as a promising anti-foundationalist alternative, which captures the key characteristics of RQM through accepting symmetrical dependence, whilst avoiding challenges by jettisoning any commitment to fundamental entities.
Abstract In this paper, we evaluate some proposals that have been put forward to clarify the ontological consequences of relational quantum mechanics. We first focus on priority monism and ontic structural realism and argue that these views are not suitable for providing an ontological interpretation of the theory. Then, we discuss an alternative interpretation that we regard as more promising, based on so-called ‘metaphysical coherentism’, which we also connect to the idea of an event-based, or ‘flash’, ontology.
Everett’s Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics and Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics are two eminently interesting and impactful presentations of what the world of quantum mechanics is like. Beginning with a depiction of the theories and their physical implications I conclude with a comparison of their respective picture of reality. I propose here that by letting philosophical deliberations be guided by the very statements from within the theories, one arrives at a structural realist picture of what our world is like.