We argue that a phenomenological analysis of consciousness similar to that of Husserl shows that the effects of phenomenal qualities shape our perception of the world. It also shows the way the physical and mathematical sciences operate, allowing us to accurately describe the observed regularities in terms of communicable mathematical laws. The latter say nothing about the intrinsic features of things. They only refer to the observed regularities in their behaviors, providing rigorous descriptions of how the universe works, to which any viable ontology must conform. Classical mechanistic determinism limits everything that can occur to what happens in an instant and leaves no room for novelty or any intrinsic aspect that is not epiphenomenal. The situation changes with quantum probabilistic determinism if one takes seriously the ontology that arises from its axioms of objects, systems in certain states, and the events they produce in other objects. As Bertrand Russell pointed out almost a century ago, an ontology of events with an internal phenomenal aspect, now known as panprotopsychism, is better suited to explaining the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. The central observation of this paper is that many objections to panpsychism and panprotopsychism, which are usually called the combination problem, arise from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics about supervenience. These are inappropriate at the quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states arise. The analysis imposes conditions on the possible implementations of quantum cognition mechanisms in the brain.
We argue that a phenomenological analysis of consciousness similar to that of Husserl shows that the effects of phenomenal qualities shape our perception of the world. It also shows the way the physical and mathematical sciences operate, allowing us to accurately describe the observed regularities in terms of communicable mathematical laws. The latter say nothing about the intrinsic features of things. They only refer to the observed regularities in their behaviors, providing rigorous descriptions of how the universe works, to which any viable ontology must conform. Classical mechanistic determinism limits everything that can occur to what happens in an instant and leaves no room for novelty or any intrinsic aspect that is not epiphenomenal. The situation changes with quantum probabilistic determinism if one takes seriously the ontology that arises from its axioms of objects, systems in certain states, and the events they produce in other objects. As Bertrand Russell pointed out almost a century ago, an ontology of events with an internal phenomenal aspect, now known as panprotopsychism, is better suited to explaining the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. The central observation of this paper is that many objections to panpsychism and panprotopsychism, which are usually called the combination problem, arise from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics about supervenience. These are inappropriate at the quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states arise. The analysis imposes conditions on the possible implementations of quantum cognition mechanisms in the brain.
We will argue that a phenomenological analysis of consciousness, similar to that of Husserl, shows that the effects of phenomenal qualities shape our perception of the world. It also shows the way the physical and mathematical sciences operate, allowing us to accurately describe the observed regularities in terms of communicable mathematical laws. The latter say nothing about the intrinsic features of things. They only refer to the observed regularities in their behaviors, providing rigorous descriptions of how the universe works, to which any viable ontology must conform. Classical mechanistic determinism limits everything that can occur to what happens in an instant and leaves no room for novelty or any intrinsic aspect that is not epiphenomenal. The situation changes with quantum probabilistic determinism if one takes seriously the ontology that arises from its axioms of objects, systems in certain states, and the events they produce in other objects. As Bertrand Russell pointed out almost a century ago, an ontology of events, with an internal phenomenal aspect, now known as panprotopsychism, is better suited to explaining the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. The central observation of this paper is that many objections to panpsychism and panprotopsychism, which are usually called the combination problem, arise from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics about supervenience. These are inappropriate at the quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states arise. The analysis imposes conditions on the possible implementations of quantum cognition mechanisms in the brain.
In a previous paper, we have shown that an ontology of quantum mechanics in terms of states and events with internal phenomenal aspects, that is, a form of pan-protopsychism, is well suited to explaining consciousness. We have proved there that the palette and grain combination problems of panpsychism and pan-protopsychism arise from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics about supervenience that are inappropriate at the quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states arise. In this article, we address what is probably the first and most important combination problem of panpsychism: the subject-summing problem originally posed by William James. Due to the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics and its causal openness, this ontology also seems to be suitable for the analysis of the remaining aspects of the structure combination problem that treat about how the structuration capacity of consciousness evolved from primitive animals to humans.
Given the multiplicity of interpretations of quantum mechanics that give rise to very different ontologies, it is worth asking whether it is possible to find criteria with some empirical basis that make some interpretations preferable to others. If empirical evidence were found for the existence of quantum systems in the brain such as those necessary to adopt a form of panpsychism that resolves the problems of combination of subjects, qualities, and structures recognized since the time of William James, their underlying ontologies would be favored by allowing us to account for our conscious experiences. Quantum panprotopsychism has proven particularly well-suited to addressing the combination problems of panpsychism. It is based on an ontology of states and events with clearly identified physical and phenomenal counterparts and would therefore be recognizable if these physical elements were part of brain function.. Such an ontology could provide criteria for preferring certain quantum interpretations over others. Here we will analyze the interpretations that would be favored or challenged by the ontology resulting from this form of panprotopsychism.
In previous papers, we demonstrated that an ontology of quantum mechanics, described in terms of states and events with internal phenomenal aspects (a form of panprotopsychism), is well suited to explain consciousness. We showed that the combination problems of qualities, structures and subjects in panpsychism and panprotopsychism stem from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics regarding supervenience, which are not applicable at the quantum level. Within this view, consciousness arises in entangled quantum systems coupled to the neural network of the brain. In entangled systems, the properties of individual parts disappear, giving rise to an exponential number of emergent properties and states. Here, we analyze self-consciousness as the capacity to view oneself as a subject of experience. The causal openness of quantum systems provides self-conscious beings the ability to make independent choices and decisions, reflecting a sense of self-governance and autonomy. In this context, the issue of personal identity takes a new form free from the problems of the simple view or the reductive approaches.
The article analyzes the effectiveness of quantum theories of mental experience in relation to two ontological problems - the problem of the existence of consciousness in the material world and the problem of the interaction of consciousness and body. A critical analysis of the quantum theories of consciousness by Penrose-Hameroff, M. Tegmark, G. Stapp, M. Fischer and M.B. Mensky shows that they fail to fully explain how complex physical systems generate mental experience without violating the principle of causal closure of the physical world and the principle of epistemological completeness of physics. Quantum mechanics provides specific processes that are the physical basis of the psyche, but do not explain the phenomenal aspect of subjective reality. Nevertheless, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle gives an understanding of how the interaction of consciousness and body within the scientific picture of the world can be carried out without violating the law of energy conservation. It is shown that the quantum theories of consciousness currently being developed have a predominantly panprotopsychic character, which faces a problem due to the fact that the protomental property of physical systems must be expressed quantitatively and correspond to the value included in the physical equations. As a result, it is concluded that in order to develop quantum theories of consciousness more effectively, it is necessary to give an emergent character, not jumping from the quantum level to the psychic, but explaining the mechanism of the emergence of systemic properties during the sequential transition between different ontological regions of existence, including physical, chemical, biological, neurophysiological and psychic.
Herein we are not interested in merely using dynamical systems theory, graph theory, information theory, etc., to model the relationship between brain dynamics and networks, and various states and degrees of conscious processes. We are interested in the question of how phenomenal conscious experience and fundamental physics are most deeply related. Any attempt to mathematically and formally model conscious experience and its relationship to physics must begin with some metaphysical assumption in mind about the nature of conscious experience, the nature of matter and the nature of the relationship between them. These days the most prominent metaphysical fixed points are strong emergence or some variant of panpsychism. In this paper we will detail another distinct metaphysical starting point known as neutral monism. In particular, we will focus on a variant of the neutral monism of William James and Bertrand Russell. Rather than starting with physics as fundamental, as both strong emergence and panpsychism do in their own way, our goal is to suggest how one might derive fundamental physics from neutral monism. Thus, starting with two axioms grounded in our characterization of neutral monism, we will sketch out a derivation of and explanation for some key features of relativity and quantum mechanics that suggest a unity between those two theories that is generally unappreciated. Our mode of explanation throughout will be of the principle as opposed to constructive variety in something like Einstein's sense of those terms. We will argue throughout that a bias towards property dualism and a bias toward reductive dynamical and constructive explanation lead to the hard problem and the explanatory gap in consciousness studies, and lead to serious unresolved problems in fundamental physics, such as the measurement problem and the mystery of entanglement in quantum mechanics and lack of progress in producing an empirically well-grounded theory of quantum gravity. We hope to show that given our take on neutral monism and all that follows from it, the aforementioned problems can be satisfactorily resolved leaving us with a far more intuitive and commonsense model of the relationship between conscious experience and physics.