Abstract To address the issue of low efficiency caused by the repeated use of quantum attack resistant static identity authentication methods in a satellite integrated smart grid, this paper proposes a quantum attack resistant continuous identity authentication protocol. First, in the initial authentication stage, in order to reduce computational complexity, the key encryption mechanism in the CRYSTALS‐Kyber algorithm was improved and combined with the NTRU message recovery digital signature scheme to construct a lattice based explicit AKE (Kyber NTRU. AKE), which achieved mutual authentication and negotiated shared tokens. Second, in the continuous authentication stage, incorporating quantum attack resistant tokens into the current algorithm to improve authentication efficiency. The formal analysis results indicate that compared to the weakly forward secure Kyber.AKE in the CRYSTALS‐Kyber algorithm, Kyber‐NTRU.AKE achieves complete forward secrecy, while the non‐formal analysis results demonstrate the security of the continuous authentication phase. Through theoretical analysis and efficiency comparison with Cyber.AKE, the analysis shows that the Cyber‐NTRU.AKE has higher computational and communication efficiency than Cyber.AKE.
Abstract To address the issue of low efficiency caused by the repeated use of quantum attack resistant static identity authentication methods in a satellite integrated smart grid, this paper proposes a quantum attack resistant continuous identity authentication protocol. First, in the initial authentication stage, in order to reduce computational complexity, the key encryption mechanism in the CRYSTALS‐Kyber algorithm was improved and combined with the NTRU message recovery digital signature scheme to construct a lattice based explicit AKE (Kyber NTRU. AKE), which achieved mutual authentication and negotiated shared tokens. Second, in the continuous authentication stage, incorporating quantum attack resistant tokens into the current algorithm to improve authentication efficiency. The formal analysis results indicate that compared to the weakly forward secure Kyber.AKE in the CRYSTALS‐Kyber algorithm, Kyber‐NTRU.AKE achieves complete forward secrecy, while the non‐formal analysis results demonstrate the security of the continuous authentication phase. Through theoretical analysis and efficiency comparison with Cyber.AKE, the analysis shows that the Cyber‐NTRU.AKE has higher computational and communication efficiency than Cyber.AKE.
ABSTRACT Quantum computing poses a looming threat to the cryptographic primitives that secure today's satellite communications. In response, post‐quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged to protect data against future quantum‐enabled adversaries. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of lattice‐based PQC methods for secure satellite communication in the post‐quantum era. We examine the performance and security of leading lattice‐based schemes—including encryption/key‐establishment algorithms like CRYSTALS‐Kyber and NTRU, and digital signature schemes like CRYSTALS‐Dilithium and FALCON—in the context of satellite systems. Real‐world benchmark data from peer‐reviewed sources are used to evaluate computational efficiency, bandwidth overhead, memory footprint, and energy consumption of these schemes on resource‐constrained satellite hardware. We compare lattice‐based approaches with classical RSA/ECC and alternative post‐quantum techniques (hash‐based signatures, code‐based encryption), highlighting the favorable trade‐offs that have led to lattice‐based algorithms becoming primary candidates for standardization. Security analysis is presented to explain the hardness assumptions (e.g., Learning With Errors and NTRU problems) that underpin lattice cryptography, and to assess known cryptanalytic results, resistance to quantum attacks, and remaining security margins. We also discuss practical considerations for deploying lattice‐based cryptography on satellites, including integration into existing communication protocols, potential need for hardware acceleration, and strategies for cryptographic agility in long‐lived space assets. The results show that lattice‐based PQC can be feasibly implemented in satellites with acceptable performance impact, providing strong security against quantum threats and a viable path to future‐proof the confidentiality and authenticity of satellite communications.
The key management faces significant challenges in terms of efficiency, scalability, and quantum resistance in smart grid environments. This paper addresses these challenges by proposing a novel mutual authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol for the Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) era. The protocol integrates quantum and classical information streams, enabling secure key agreement without third-party reliance. For the first time, quantum-based mutual identity authentication is applied to smart grid security, with a comprehensive analysis of resilience against various attacks, including man-in-the-middle, quantum computation, relay, impersonation, and DoS. Experimental results show that the scheme achieves a communication cost of 0.9 KB for 2 rounds, outperforming quantum-resistant schemes (2.5 KB) and performing similarly to classical schemes (1.2 KB). The scheme requires 2 quantum preparations and 1 measurement, offering higher efficiency compared to quantum-resistant methods. Compared to QKD and computational hardness-based models, our approach provides superior key management efficiency, practical implementation in non-fault-tolerant quantum systems, and enhanced security protection. Rigorous analysis and validation using IBM’s quantum-enabled environments demonstrate the robustness of the protocol in addressing modern smart grid security challenges.
The increasing integration of smart grids within the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem requires the implementation of robust security measures due to vulnerabilities brought about by pervasive connectivity. Previous smart grid security protocols are based on classical cryptographic algorithms, which are susceptible to significant threats from emerging quantum computers. Consequently, the adoption of quantum-resistant solutions is imperative for the long-term security of smart grids. This article presents a novel protocol for authentication and secret key establishment in smart grids, utilizing post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Our proposed protocol employs the FALCON digital signature algorithm for integrity verification and the CRYSTALS-Kyber key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) for secret key establishment, providing robust protection against quantum attacks. Our optimized implementation of the proposed protocol on a graphics processing unit (GPU) targets grid security module (GSM)/gateway-side deployments and demonstrates scalability under large numbers of concurrent authentication requests. Experimental validation demonstrates the proposed protocol’s ability to effectively manage numerous concurrent authentication requests, ensuring secure and efficient communication within smart grid networks.
Abstract Authenticated key exchange protocol is widely applied in the Internet services. Lattice‐based key exchange protocols turn out to be quantum‐resistant and hence have attracted tremendous attention. A lattice‐based explicit authenticated key exchange protocol is constructed by combining an IND‐CPA key encapsulation mechanism with a strong EUF‐CMA digital signature under the message‐recovery mode. Concrete parameter specifications are suggested under the 102 and 218 bits post‐quantum security, respectively. Compared with the implicit authenticated key exchange derived directly from the key encapsulation mechanism, our proposals reduce the communication costs by 21.7% and 25.7%, respectively, under the same post‐quantum security level. Rough analysis shows that the proposals also obtain some advantages over previous constructions in term of computational efficiency. Moreover, our scheme achieves perfect forward secrecy while the original scheme only satisfies weak forward secrecy.
Summary Satellite's communication system is used to communicate under significant distance and circumstances where the other communication systems are not comfortable. Since all the data are exchanged over a public channel, so the security of the data is an essential component for the communicating parties. Both key exchange and authentication are two cryptographic tools to establish a secure communication between two parties. Currently, various kinds of authentication protocols are available to establish a secure network, but all of them depend on number–theoretical (discrete logarithm problem/factorization assumption) hard assumptions. Due to Shor's and Grover's computing algorithm number theoretic assumptions are breakable by quantum computers. Although Kumar and Garg have proposed a quantum attack‐resistant protocol for satellite communication, it cannot resist stolen smart card attack. We have analyzed that how Kumar and Garg is vulnerable to the stolen smart card attack using differential power analysis attack described in He et al and Chen and Chen. We have also analyzed the modified version of signal leakage attack and sometimes called improved signal leakage attack on Kumar and Garg's protocol. We have tried to construct a secure and efficient authentication protocol for satellites communication that is secure against quantum computing. This is more efficient as it requires only three messages of exchange. This paper includes security proof and performance of the proposed authentication and key agreement protocol.
The smart grid (SG) embodies the future of power systems, featuring self-healing mechanisms, adaptability, and sustainability. Nevertheless, its interconnected and widely distributed architecture presents substantial cybersecurity challenges, rendering it susceptible to cyber attacks that may cause outages, infrastructure failures, and data breaches, including the exposure of personal information. Public-key cryptography (PKC) has historically been utilized to ensure confidentiality, authenticate devices, and maintain data integrity. However, the rise of quantum computing poses a serious threat to the viability of these PKC algorithms, particularly with the potential implementation of algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose an innovative security protocol for post-quantum communication within SG applications, engineered to resist both classical and quantum threats. Our comparative study reveals that this protocol delivers enhanced security and improved functionality while maintaining low communication and computational costs compared to existing methods. We further demonstrate its practicality through real-time testbed experiments and implementations on a Raspberry Pi, supported by an extensive security assessment using the Scyther automated validation tool. A detailed comparison with Kyber in terms of computational efficiency, storage requirements, and implementation overhead to support our lightweight claim. Finally, a network simulation conducted using Network Simulator 3 (NS3) further demonstrates the performance of the proposed scheme, highlighting its scalability and reliability.