ABSTRACT Quantum computing poses a looming threat to the cryptographic primitives that secure today's satellite communications. In response, post‐quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged to protect data against future quantum‐enabled adversaries. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of lattice‐based PQC methods for secure satellite communication in the post‐quantum era. We examine the performance and security of leading lattice‐based schemes—including encryption/key‐establishment algorithms like CRYSTALS‐Kyber and NTRU, and digital signature schemes like CRYSTALS‐Dilithium and FALCON—in the context of satellite systems. Real‐world benchmark data from peer‐reviewed sources are used to evaluate computational efficiency, bandwidth overhead, memory footprint, and energy consumption of these schemes on resource‐constrained satellite hardware. We compare lattice‐based approaches with classical RSA/ECC and alternative post‐quantum techniques (hash‐based signatures, code‐based encryption), highlighting the favorable trade‐offs that have led to lattice‐based algorithms becoming primary candidates for standardization. Security analysis is presented to explain the hardness assumptions (e.g., Learning With Errors and NTRU problems) that underpin lattice cryptography, and to assess known cryptanalytic results, resistance to quantum attacks, and remaining security margins. We also discuss practical considerations for deploying lattice‐based cryptography on satellites, including integration into existing communication protocols, potential need for hardware acceleration, and strategies for cryptographic agility in long‐lived space assets. The results show that lattice‐based PQC can be feasibly implemented in satellites with acceptable performance impact, providing strong security against quantum threats and a viable path to future‐proof the confidentiality and authenticity of satellite communications.
ABSTRACT Quantum computing poses a looming threat to the cryptographic primitives that secure today's satellite communications. In response, post‐quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged to protect data against future quantum‐enabled adversaries. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of lattice‐based PQC methods for secure satellite communication in the post‐quantum era. We examine the performance and security of leading lattice‐based schemes—including encryption/key‐establishment algorithms like CRYSTALS‐Kyber and NTRU, and digital signature schemes like CRYSTALS‐Dilithium and FALCON—in the context of satellite systems. Real‐world benchmark data from peer‐reviewed sources are used to evaluate computational efficiency, bandwidth overhead, memory footprint, and energy consumption of these schemes on resource‐constrained satellite hardware. We compare lattice‐based approaches with classical RSA/ECC and alternative post‐quantum techniques (hash‐based signatures, code‐based encryption), highlighting the favorable trade‐offs that have led to lattice‐based algorithms becoming primary candidates for standardization. Security analysis is presented to explain the hardness assumptions (e.g., Learning With Errors and NTRU problems) that underpin lattice cryptography, and to assess known cryptanalytic results, resistance to quantum attacks, and remaining security margins. We also discuss practical considerations for deploying lattice‐based cryptography on satellites, including integration into existing communication protocols, potential need for hardware acceleration, and strategies for cryptographic agility in long‐lived space assets. The results show that lattice‐based PQC can be feasibly implemented in satellites with acceptable performance impact, providing strong security against quantum threats and a viable path to future‐proof the confidentiality and authenticity of satellite communications.
The emergence of quantum computing poses a serious threat to traditional communication systems, endangering the security of digital communications and critical infrastructure. Although existing cryptographic algorithms (such as RSA and ECC) rely on the inefficiency of computing large numbers or solving logarithm inequality problems, quantum algorithms (especially Shor's algorithm) can solve these problems efficiently. To mitigate this threat, the field of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged and focuses on developing cryptographic systems that are resilient to quantum attacks. The main techniques in PQC include lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, and multivariate polynomial cryptography. Lattice-based cryptography is the leading contender, providing high security and supporting good properties such as fully homomorphic encryption, but facing issues related to size and computational efficiency. Hash-based encryption enables strong digital signatures but has limitations. Code-based encryption based on error-correcting codes provides proof of security but requires small size. Multivariate polynomial cryptography has good performance but has drawbacks in some applications. While standardization efforts led by organizations such as NIST continue, PQC is at the forefront of protecting the digital future from the impact of quantum computing, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of information in the post-quantum era.
Quantum computing is rapidly advancing and threatens the cryptographic systems that secure digital communications. Classical cryptosystems, such as RSA and ECC, rely on mathematical problems that are difficult for classical computers but can be solved easily by quantum algorithms, such as Shor’s. This challenge underscores the pressing need for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to safeguard data against both classical and quantum threats. This study provides a comprehensive review of PQC Approaches in securing data against quantum threats by analyzing reviewed journals, conference proceedings, book chapters, and websites. Several researchers reviewed relevant literature published between 2019 and 2026 using the ACM Digital Library, Wiley Online Library, Taylor & Francis, Springer, ScienceDirect, MDPI, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, and Google Scholar. The review evaluates lattice-based, code-based, Hash-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based schemes across security strength, performance, interoperability, and deployment feasibility in heterogeneous environments, including cloud platforms and Internet of Things devices. The findings indicate that lattice-based schemes, particularly CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, currently offer the most balanced trade-off between efficiency and quantum resistance, while Hash-based schemes such as SPHINCS+ prioritize conservative security at notable performance cost. Code-based approaches, including McEliece, demonstrate strong long-term security but remain constrained by large key sizes. The review highlights implementation, energy, migration, and governance barriers that must be addressed before adoption. The review concludes by emphasizing that transitioning to PQC requires a collaborative effort from academia, industry, and government. Future research should focus on integrating lightweight PQC in IoT, 5G/6G, and cloud environments, as well as developing hybrid models that combine classical and quantum-safe systems. Addressing these issues is crucial for establishing secure data protection in the quantum era.
The advent of quantum computing poses significant challenges to traditional cryptographic systems, threatening the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of digital communications. This paper investigates the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms into mobile communication systems to address these challenges. The study focuses on evaluating key PQC algorithms shortlisted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+, within the context of 5G and future mobile network architectures. The research encompasses the design and implementation of an experimental framework involving mobile devices, servers, and cloud-based infrastructure to simulate real-world communication scenarios. Performance metrics such as key generation time, signature generation, encryption and decryption speed, and resource consumption were analyzed across various devices to identify algorithms suitable for mobile environments. The findings reveal that lattice-based algorithms, such as Kyber and Dilithium, offer a promising balance between security and efficiency, making them ideal for resource-constrained devices. In contrast, hash-based algorithms like SPHINCS+ exhibit higher computational demands, limiting their practicality in certain applications. This work highlights the importance of algorithm selection and hardware optimization in ensuring secure and efficient communications in the quantum era. By integrating theoretical advancements in PQC with practical applications, this research lays the foundation for quantum-resistant security in mobile networks, ensuring secure and future-ready digital communications.
The advance of quantum computing poses significant risks to traditional cryptographic systems, including RSA and ECC, due to algorithms such as Shor's, prompting an urgent need for robust post-quantum cryptography (PQC) solutions. This paper presents a systematic review of PQC algorithms, encompassing lattice-based, code-based, multivariate polynomial, hash-based, and supersingular isogeny-based cryptography. By evaluating recent publications and NIST standardization efforts, we assess these approaches in terms of quantum resistance, computational efficiency, scalability, and implementation challenges. Lattice-based schemes, notably CRYSTALS-Kyber, excel in quantum-secure encryption and performance, whereas codebased systems like McEliece are hindered by large key sizes. Hash-based signatures, such as SPHINCS+, and isogeny-based protocols, including SIDH, provide promising alternatives but require further optimization to reduce computational overhead. Our analysis highlights the potential of hybrid PQC methods and lightweight hardware implementations for securing emerging domains like IoT, blockchain, and financial systems. The review serves as a foundational resource for researchers and practitioners, advocating the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptography to preserve data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity in the quantum era.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant existential threat to current public-key cryptographic standards, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which underpin global digital security. Shor's algorithm, if implemented on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, can efficiently break these foundational schemes, rendering vast amounts of encrypted data vulnerable. This paper investigates lattice-based cryptography as a robust and promising candidate for post-quantum security. We provide a comprehensive analysis of its theoretical underpinnings, focusing on hard problems like the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and Learning With Errors (LWE), which are believed to be intractable even for quantum adversaries. Through a detailed literature review and methodological exposition, we examine the construction principles of prominent lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and digital signature schemes, such as Kyber and Dilithium, highlighting their inherent security properties and performance characteristics. Our results demonstrate that lattice-based schemes offer competitive efficiency, compact key sizes, and strong security guarantees against both classical and quantum attacks, positioning them as essential building blocks for the post-RSA cryptographic landscape. The discussion elaborates on the practical implications, standardization efforts by NIST, and the challenges associated with the transition to quantum-resilient cryptographic infrastructure. We conclude that lattice-based cryptography is a cornerstone of quantum resilience, critical for securing future digital communications and data integrity.
With the constantly changing world of computers nowadays, the introduction of quantum computing has posed immense threats to the security of old and previous encryption algorithms. Post-Quantum Cryptography or PQC refers to a new generation of algorithms specifically created to resist the intense quantum computer attacks and offer secure and long-lasting protection to digital communications. As the potential of quantum technology becomes increasingly evident, the pursuit of secure, future-proof cryptographic solutions has never been more critical. This systematic review explores different PQC solutions for their strengths, weaknesses, and challenges of implementation. provides a comprehensive analysis of key studies on quantum-resistant algorithms, migration strategies and examines cryptographic security measures to present a complete picture of the latest advancements in quantum-safe cryptography. In this systematic paper, different PQC algorithms such as lattice, hash, code, multivariate and isogeny are reviewed along with their advantages and disadvantages. It also discusses how such findings will affect the security of real world communication, digital signatures, as well as blockchain security. This ensures how important it is to establish standardized PQC protocols for overall data security. This paper concludes with what future research directions and practical considerations relate to the adoption of PQC in critical infrastructures.