The Problem of Truth in Quantum Mechanics

Vassilios Karakostas, Elias Zafiris

Roland Omn�s

Newton C. A. da Costa, Otávio Bueno

Claudio Garola

Claudio Garola, Sandro Sozzo

The old Bohr–Einstein debate about the completeness of quantum mechanics (QM) was held on an ontological ground. The completeness problem becomes more tractable, however, if it is preliminarily discussed from a semantic viewpoint. Indeed every physical theory adopts, explicitly or not, a truth theory for its observative language, in terms of which the notions of semantic objectivity and semantic completeness of the physical theory can be introduced and inquired. In particular, standard QM adopts a verificationist theory of truth that implies its semantic nonobjectivity; moreover, we show in this paper that standard QM is semantically complete, which matches Bohr’s thesis. On the other hand, one of the authors has provided a Semantic Realism (or SR) interpretation of QM that adopts a Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence for the observative language of QM (which was previously mantained to be impossible); according to this interpretation QM is semantically objective, yet incomplete, which matches EPR’s thesis. Thus, standard QM and the SR interpretation of QM come to opposite conclusions. These can be reconciled within an integrationist perspective that interpretes non–Tarskian theories of truth as theories of metalinguistic concepts different from truth.

Sergey B. Kulikov

The paper defends the thesis that analysis of truth problem in the context of interpretations of quantum logic allows to reveal the prospect of elicitation of specifics of the relations between quantum mechanics and quantum logic in a context of modal expansions of quantum logic. It is found the way for solution of the problem of detection of features of creation of quantum-mechanical researches as a single case of semantics of "the possible worlds". Studies in the field of logic foundation of quantum physics receive the status of "possible quantum mechanics". Therefore they can be presented not simply as "truth" and "false" distinction within judgments about the physical phenomena but also as display logically possible and (or) impossible, necessary and (or) casual constructions of physical sciences.