It is argued that all physical knowledge ultimately stems from observation and that the simplest possible observation is that an event has happened at a certain space-time location . Considering historic experiments, which had been groundbreaking in the evolution of our modern ideas of matter on the atomic, nuclear and elementary particle scales, it is shown that such experiments produce as outputs macroscopically observable events which represent binary decisions with regard to simple alternatives and which accumulate in the course of time into spatio-temporal patterns whose forms allow decisions to be taken concerning conceivable alternatives of explanation. Working towards elucidating the physical and information-theoretic characteristics of those elementary pieces of information we arrive at the conclusion that - unlike the events of relativity which are mere 4-tuples of spacetime coordinates - the events of observation are pieces of information endowed with the properties of physical action, spacetime extension, and Lorentz invariance. Another important aspect is that such events are produced at the expense of irreversibly dissipating energy which can be stated in Landauer diction in the form that more energy needs to be spent in the erasure of events than had previously been invested in their initiation.
In this paper, we are concerned with the process of experimental information gain. Building on previous work, we show that this is a discontinuous process in which the initiating quantum-mechanical matter-instrument interactions are being turned into macroscopically observable events (EOs). In the course of time, such EOs evolve into spatio-temporal patterns of EOs, which allow conceivable alternatives of physical explanation to be distinguished. Focusing on the specific case of photon detection, we show that during their lifetimes, EOs proceed through the four phases of initiation, detection, erasure and reset. Once generated, the observational value of EOs can be measured in units of the Planck quantum of physical action h=4.136×10-15eVs. Once terminated, each unit of entropy of size kB=8.617×10-5eV/K, which had been created in the instrument during the observational phase, needs to be removed from the instrument to ready it for a new round of photon detection. This withdrawal of entropy takes place at an energetic cost of at least two units of the Landauer minimum energy bound of ELa=ln2kBTD for each unit of entropy of size kB.
This paper explores an event-based version of quantum mechanics which differs from the commonly accepted one, even though the usual elements of quantum formalism, e.g., the Hilbert space, are maintained. This version introduces as primary element the occurrence of micro-events induced by usual physical (mechanical, electromagnetic and so on) interactions. These micro-events correspond to state reductions and are identified with quantum jumps, already introduced by Bohr in his atomic model and experimentally well established today. Macroscopic bodies are defined as clusters of jumps; the emergence of classicality thus becomes understandable and time honoured paradoxes can be solved. In particular, we discuss the cat paradox in this context. Quantum jumps are described as temporal localizations of physical quantities; if the information associated with these localizations has to be finite, two time scales spontaneously appear: an upper cosmological scale and a lower scale of elementary "particles''. This allows the interpretation of the Bekenstein limit like a particular informational constraint on the manifestation of a micro-event in the cosmos it belongs. The topic appears relevant in relation to recent discussions on possible spatiotemporal constraints on quantum computing.
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state
S with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state
S is a subset of a state space
S={Z}, such that
S always contains many elements
Z. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of
S cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements
Z, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of
S is described in terms of sequential time
n∈N, which is updated according to
n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time
n can be separated from relational time
t, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each
n, in which
t represents the knowledge at sequential time
n about the temporal relations between present and past events.
Recent investigations concerning foundations of quantum theory require new approaches to the problem of observation of physical events. V. Belavkin showed that standard quantum mechanics describes only the closed microworld in which there is no place for some macroscopically visible events. Though any quantum phenomenon is observable from the macroworld. That situation means non‐equivalence of Heisenberg’s representation to Schrodinger’s one in quantum mechanics. It would seem quantum theory is more general than classical mechanics. It is expressed, in particular, by well‐known Bohr’s principle of correspondence. I think the above‐mentioned Belavkin’s result puts under doubt the opinion concerning universal character of quantum theory. What ontological meaning has the concept of existence of physical event? Is distinction between observable event and non‐observable one anthropological, or not? In that context I discuss the new aspects of the observation problem in the physical theory. In my report I discuss philosophical arguments for the thesis that distinction between observable event and non‐observable one is ontological. In this connection I consider a number of objective ontological criteria of observability / non‐observability such as distinguishableness / indistinguishableness of physical states, symmetricalness and asymmetricalness of observation relations. The ontological sense of observation is analyzed in the context of relations between objects which are into spaces with different dimensions.
We investigate temporal and causal threads in the fabric of contemporary physical theories with an emphasis on empirical and operationalistic aspects. Building on the axiomatization of general relativity proposed by J. Ehlers, F. Pirani and A. Schild and the global space-time structure elaborated by R. Penrose, S.W. Hawking, B. Carter and others, we argue that the current way of doing relativistic physics presupposes treating time and causality as primitive concepts, neither of them being `more primitive' than the other. The decision regarding which concepts to assume as primitive and which statements to regard as axioms depends on the choice of the angle at which we contemplate the whole. This standard approach is based on the presupposition that the concept of a point-like particle is a viable approximation. However, this assumption is not supported by a realistic approach to doing physics and, in particular, by quantum theory. We remove this assumption by analysing the recent works by M. Eckstein and T. Miller. They consider the space
P(M) of probability measures on space-time
M such that, for an element
μ∈P(M), the number
μ(K) specifies the probability of the occurrence of some event associated with the space-time region
K and the measure
μ. In this way,
M is not to be regarded as a collection of space-time events, but rather as a support for corresponding probability measures. As shown by Eckstein and Miller, the space
P(M) inherits the causal order from the underlying space-time and facilitates a rigorous notion of a `causal evolution of probability measures'. We look at the deductive chains creating temporal and causal structures analysed in these works, in order to highlight their operational (or quasi-operational) aspect. This is impossible without taking into account the relative frequencies and correlations observed in relevant experiments.