Quantum era is near and advanced quantum computing will pose a huge threat to the security of the current cryptographic systems in distributed energy resources (DER)rich power grids. It is necessary to prepare now to combat quantum computing attacks with serious real-world consequences in the years ahead. Recently, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is considered as one of the major candidates of quantum attack defense strategies, and the adoption of PQC for DER systems has not been fully studied yet. This paper discusses the adoption of PQC in a standard DER network protocol (i.e., IEEE 2030.5-PQC), and proposes a real-time hardware-in-the-loop co-simulation PQC testbed consisting of a DER physical system simulation and a cyber system simulation such as DER gateways and DER management system (DERMS) server. Universal custom-made PQC client and server software are developed to meet the compliant with IEEE 2030.5-2018 standard and implemented in the DER gateways and the DERMS server, respectively. Finally, the feasibility of the proposed PQC-grade DER network is validated by using the real-time co-simulation testbed.
Quantum era is near and advanced quantum computing will pose a huge threat to the security of the current cryptographic systems in distributed energy resources (DER)rich power grids. It is necessary to prepare now to combat quantum computing attacks with serious real-world consequences in the years ahead. Recently, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is considered as one of the major candidates of quantum attack defense strategies, and the adoption of PQC for DER systems has not been fully studied yet. This paper discusses the adoption of PQC in a standard DER network protocol (i.e., IEEE 2030.5-PQC), and proposes a real-time hardware-in-the-loop co-simulation PQC testbed consisting of a DER physical system simulation and a cyber system simulation such as DER gateways and DER management system (DERMS) server. Universal custom-made PQC client and server software are developed to meet the compliant with IEEE 2030.5-2018 standard and implemented in the DER gateways and the DERMS server, respectively. Finally, the feasibility of the proposed PQC-grade DER network is validated by using the real-time co-simulation testbed.
Quantum computing is a game-changing technology that affects modern cryptography and security systems including distributed energy resources (DERs) systems. Since the new quantum era is coming soon in 5–10 years, it is crucial to prepare and develop quantum-safe DER systems. This paper provides a comprehensive review of vulnerabilities caused by quantum computing attacks, potential defense strategies, and remaining challenges for DER networks. First, new security vulnerabilities and attack models of the cyber-physical DER systems caused by quantum computing attacks are explored. Moreover, this paper introduces potential quantum attack defense strategies including Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), which can be applied to DER networks and evaluates defense strategies. Finally, remaining research opportunities and challenges for next-generation quantum-safe DER are discussed.
The rapid growth of electric vehicles (EVs) and distributed energy resources (DERs) is transforming power systems into cyber-physical environments that depend on secure, low-latency communication. Home Energy Management Systems (HEMS) coordinate interactions between EVs, photovoltaic inverters, battery storage, and utility interfaces using standards such as ISO 15118, IEEE 2030.5, and IEC 61850. However, these protocols rely on classical public-key cryptography, including RSA and elliptic-curve schemes, which are vulnerable to future quantum attacks. Ensuring long-term confidentiality, integrity, and availability across EV-DER communication paths therefore requires a transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This paper presents a reproducible PQC communication testbed tailored to HEMS-mediated EV-DER ecosystems. The framework integrates National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standardised algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) into hybrid TLS 1.3 handshakes and evaluates their performance against classical baselines under realistic operating conditions. Four adversarial scenarios, man-in-the-middle (MITM), replay, downgrade, and fuzz/DoS are executed to assess resilience across critical communication links. Results show that hybrid PQC adds modest latency while maintaining the operational timing requirements needed for grid coordination. The findings demonstrate that quantum-resilient communication can be incorporated into existing EV and DER standards without compromising interoperability or performance. The testbed offers a practical foundation for PQC-enabled migration in future smart-grid environments.
Quantum computing is a game-changing technology that will push the boundaries of cybersecurity and cryptography of power infrastructures including distributed energy resources (DER). This paper explores new security vulnerabilities caused by potential quantum computing attacks and potential defense strategies using quantum key distribution (QKD) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in DER network systems. This paper will be used as a cybersecurity baseline reference toward a quantum-safe DER system.
With the advancement of quantum computing, traditional public-key cryptographic algorithms are increasingly at risk of being broken. This paper investigates the applicability of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) within modernized power grid infrastructures, commonly known as smart grids, that rely heavily on interconnected and sometimes internet-facing devices and distributed control systems. To help safeguard these critical infrastructures against quantum-enabled threats, we benchmark and evaluate the performance of NIST-standardized and finalist PQC Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) in a realistic smart grid testbed. Our evaluation includes both benchmarking of core cryptographic operations, key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation, as well as full TLS 1.3 handshake benchmarking across a real network of embedded devices and smart grid nodes. A key contribution of this work is the development of a smart grid testbed spanning multiple buildings with distributed energy resources (DERs) such as batteries and photovoltaic arrays, enabling an in-depth, system-level evaluation of post-quantum key exchange protocols in this context. We conclude by discussing the trade-offs between algorithmic efficiency and system constraints such as bandwidth, key rotation frequency, and device capability. Our findings offer actionable recommendations for the deployment of PQC algorithms tailored to the smart grid.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a critical threat to classical cryptographic schemes that secure modern distributed systems. As the deployment of distributed infrastructures—including blockchains, cloud-native applications, and edge networks—continues to grow, there is an urgent need to transition towards quantum-resistant security mechanisms. This paper provides a comprehensive examination of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms and their applicability in distributed system architectures. We analyze the impact of quantum threats on key components of distributed systems such as communication protocols, identity management, data integrity, and consensus mechanisms. Furthermore, we evaluate current NIST-standardized PQC algorithms in terms of computational efficiency, scalability, and integration overhead within distributed environments. Challenges in key management, performance trade-offs, and implementation considerations are discussed. Finally, we propose best practices and future directions for secure, quantum-resilient distributed systems.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptographic mechanisms, necessitating the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into security frameworks for IoT-enabled power electronics. Smart grids and industrial automation systems rely on interconnected IoT devices for real-time control, monitoring, and data exchange, making them highly vulnerable to emerging quantum threats. This book chapter explores PQC frameworks tailored for securing power electronics in smart grid and industrial applications, addressing critical challenges such as computational overhead, communication latency, system compatibility, and scalability. The impact of PQC on real-time performance was evaluated, considering its influence on industrial IoT networks, cryptographic handshake efficiency, and data transmission reliability. Hybrid cryptographic solutions that combine classical and post-quantum approaches are assessed for their feasibility in power electronics IoT systems. Security resilience under adverse network conditions, including cyberattacks and network disruptions, was also analyzed to ensure seamless PQC integration without compromising operational stability. Through a comprehensive study of PQC implementation, performance optimization, and interoperability testing, this chapter provides insights into the future of secure and resilient power electronics systems in quantum-era cybersecurity landscapes.