Abstract Metaphysicians and physicists both share the proud desire to understand the world and all the things in it, to fully comprehend the nature of reality. Almost one hundred years after it was proposed, quantum theory has radically transformed the science of physics, inviting a conception of reality that is drastically at odds with our most rooted metaphysical convictions. A scientist and metaphysician extraordinaire, Charles Peirce (1839–1914) was singularly poised to recognize some of the “metaphysical prejudices” about the world that quantum theory, developed years later, has revealed. This chapter proposes to trace how Peirce’s realism, inspired by the thirteenth-century Franciscan monk John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) and adapted for a reconceived scientific metaphysics, parallels some of the familiar enigmas posed by quantum physics in the early twenty-first century.
Abstract Metaphysicians and physicists both share the proud desire to understand the world and all the things in it, to fully comprehend the nature of reality. Almost one hundred years after it was proposed, quantum theory has radically transformed the science of physics, inviting a conception of reality that is drastically at odds with our most rooted metaphysical convictions. A scientist and metaphysician extraordinaire, Charles Peirce (1839–1914) was singularly poised to recognize some of the “metaphysical prejudices” about the world that quantum theory, developed years later, has revealed. This chapter proposes to trace how Peirce’s realism, inspired by the thirteenth-century Franciscan monk John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) and adapted for a reconceived scientific metaphysics, parallels some of the familiar enigmas posed by quantum physics in the early twenty-first century.
The article continues the debate about whether classical “pure” metaphysics can explain scientific theories or science can generate its own metaphysical concepts. Two camps have emerged in modern analytic philosophy. The “metaphysician” camp defends the metaphysics of science by arguing that the fundamental concepts of classical metaphysics can be enriched, illustrated, or justified by examples from scientific theories. The “philosophers of science” camp views this as yet another invasion of metaphysics into their scientific territory. They advocate a scientific or naturalized metaphysics that strictly corresponds to modern scientific theories. Since the concept of possible worlds is a key element of mainstream analytic metaphysics, proponents of the metaphysics of science find it natural to appeal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. In turn, proponents of naturalized metaphysics often use popular metaphysical systems to justify the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will argue that the interpretation originally proposed by H. Everett remains only one of the ontologies of quantum theory, and attempts by philosophers of science to build a metaphysical construct on its basis encounter serious difficulties.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.
Abstract The introduction explains the origin and development of the views expressed in these essays. Fruitful interaction with physicists applying quantum theory provided the kernel for the author’s growing interest in contemporary pragmatism, initially as a source of ideas that could solve conceptual problems blocking an understanding of quantum theory. These pragmatist ideas were later applied to more general issues in the philosophy of science and metaphysics. After briefly sketching the pragmatist view of quantum theory defended in the essays, the introduction explains the implications—for the place of quantum theory in science, for metaphysics, and for the philosophy of science and specifically for the issue of scientific realism. New results in the foundations of physics prompted revision of the original view of the objectivity of quantum event outcomes. Some later essays show how elaborating a pragmatist view of the function of truth helped to acknowledge that the outcome of a quantum measurement is a relative fact that remains objective in the sense that matters for science: others take a neo-pragmatist view of causation, explanation, and laws in science. All these later essays illustrate the neo-pragmatist moral that by focusing on the intellectual function of a concept, one can satisfy a demand for understanding that might otherwise provoke a fruitless metaphysical quest.
The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the main philosophical and metaphysical implications of quantum physics, especially those which concern the issues of epistemic humility and ontological realism. My thesis is that the impossibility of reaching an objective knowledge of nature does not imply the renunciation of ontological realism, but rather encourages scientists to adopt an attitude of epistemic humility. The argument firstly presents the main theories of quantum physics currently discussed, focusing on the measurement problem and its ontological implications. Afterwords, the issues of objectivity and realism are properly addressed. In the end, we discuss statistics as the new form of scientific epistemology, along with the concept of potentiality as the fundamental category of quantum metaphysics. Throughout, we establish some parallelisms between quantum physics theories and theology to show that, when human beings investigate the foundations of reality, some thought patterns, some core problems, and some possible solutions resemble one another, regardless of the specific perspective and language with which they are formulated.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
This chapter provides a moderately precise shape to the idea that physical reality is independent of physicists, an idea deeply rooted in the minds of scientists and laymen alike. This idea is particularized through the introduction of supplementary assumptions that are inspired by common sense. The versions of realism thus obtained are discussed in the light of quantum physics. They are found to be unacceptable. In order for realism to be something more than an arbitrary metaphysical construction, physicists should have some grip on reality through their experience. In conventional quantum mechanics, the hypothesis implies that at any time in its history a microscopic particle always possesses a complete set of compatible observables endowed with definite values. Macro-objectivism, in spite of physicists' reference to experience, is distinctly a realistic philosophy, since it assumes that physical objects would exist and have specific properties even if no human beings existed.