Two-Message Authenticated Key Exchange from Public-Key Encryption

Min Liang, Li Yang

Public-key cryptosystems for quantum messages are considered from two aspects: public-key encryption and public-key authentication. Firstly, we propose a general construction of quantum public-key encryption scheme, and then construct an information-theoretic secure instance. Then, we propose a quantum public-key authentication scheme, which can protect the integrity of quantum messages. This scheme can both encrypt and authenticate quantum messages. It is information-theoretic secure with regard to encryption, and the success probability of tampering decreases exponentially with the security parameter with regard to authentication. Compared with classical public-key cryptosystems, one private-key in our schemes corresponds to an exponential number of public-keys, and every quantum public-key used by the sender is an unknown quantum state to the sender.

Jiang Zhang, Zhenfeng Zhang

Tan Sy Ho, Alexander Andreevich Moldovyan, Moldovyan Nikolay Andreevich +5 more

To ensure resistance to attacks with coercion to disclose a secret key by an active adversary, the protocol of deniable encryption includes a procedure for mutual authentication of the sender and receiver of a message with their long-term public keys, which is combined with a hidden exchange of single-use public keys used to generate a single-use shared key, on which the secret message is encrypted. Longterm public keys are used to generate a shared secret key, on which a fake message is encrypted. The produced intermediate ciphertexts are converted into a single ciphertext, which is computationally indistinguishable from the ciphertext obtained by probabilistic encryption of a fake message. This approach allows us to build an encryption protocol that is resistant to bi-sided attacks with coercion, since the disclosure of users' private keys gives access only to the fake message and cannot be used to prove the possibility of alternative decryption of the ciphertext transmitted over a public communication channel. The authentication of the single-use public keys is also used to implement protocols for secure encryption using short shared keys.

Zvi Galil, Stuart Haber, Moti M. Yung

Yuliang Zheng A, Hirotaka Imai

Authenticated session key establishment is a central issue in network security. This paper addresses the question of whether we can design a compact, efficient and authenticated key establishment protocol that has the following two properties: (1) each message exchanged between two participants can be transferred in a short packet such as an ATM cell whose payload has only 384 bits, and (2) messages that carry key materials are unforgeable and nonrepudiatable without the involvement of a trusted key distribution center. We discuss why the answer to this question is negative if one follows the currently standard approach to key establishment, namely employing secret/public key encryption and, possibly, digital signature. We then present a number of protocols that represent a positive answer to the question. Our protocols are all based on a cryptographic primitive called "signcryption" that fulfils both the functions of digital signature and public key encryption with a cost far smaller than that required by "digital signature followed by encryption".

Ik Rae Jeong, Jonathan I. Katz, Dong Hoon Lee