In this paper, we investigate how data transmissions may be affected by various types of optical interference introduced into the fiber on purpose, via a clip-on coupler. The research proved that transmissions may be jammed completely using inexpensive equipment readily available on the market, provided that the attacker has physical access to the fiber optic cable. The most dangerous attacks rely on a typical, slowly modulated communication laser with a rectangular waveform. This study urges further research aimed at counteracting such attacks.
In this paper, we investigate how data transmissions may be affected by various types of optical interference introduced into the fiber on purpose, via a clip-on coupler. The research proved that transmissions may be jammed completely using inexpensive equipment readily available on the market, provided that the attacker has physical access to the fiber optic cable. The most dangerous attacks rely on a typical, slowly modulated communication laser with a rectangular waveform. This study urges further research aimed at counteracting such attacks.
Fiber optic cables have long been considered a secure medium that prevents eavesdropping due to their complexity. However, there are attack methods that allow eavesdropping or denial of service. These include methods based on bending optical fibers. The danger resides in the possibility of being able to carry out an attack without having to interrupt the path. To facilitate such attacks, it is possible to use a clip-on coupler. This coupler is designed to allow eavesdropping on the link without interruption. In this study, we focus on evaluating the coupling efficiency of a simple but commercially available clip-on coupler. This work investigates the effectiveness of jamming into the optical link, i.e., replicating the jamming attack and measuring it by simulating real traffic conditions. To better understand the complexity of these attacks, we perform additional measurements to investigate the effect of clip-on coupling on changes in the polarization state. Through this research, we highlight the increasing vulnerability of optical fibers to eavesdropping attempts, especially those using macro-based methods. By evaluating the performance of commercially available clip-on coupling, we provide valuable insights into potential risks and mitigation strategies for securing modern optical communication networks.
The physical layer of an optical network is vulnerable to a variety of attacks, including jamming, physical infrastructure attacks, eavesdropping, and interception. As the demand for network capacity grows dramatically, the issue of securing the physical layer of optical network cannot be overlooked. In this survey paper, we discuss the security threats in an optical network as well as present several existing optical techniques to improve the security. In the first part of this paper, we discuss various types of security threats that could appear in the optical layer of an optical network, including jamming, physical infrastructure attacks, eavesdropping, and interception. Intensive research has focused on improving optical network security, in the above specific areas. Real-time processing of the optical signal is essential in order to integrate security functionality at the physical layer while not undermining the true value of optical communications, which is its speed. Optical layer security benefits from the unique properties of optical processing-instantaneous response, broadband operation, electromagnetic immunity, compactness, and low latency. In the second part of this paper, various defenses against the security threats outlined in this paper are discussed, including optical encryption, optical code-division multiple access (CDMA) confidentiality, self-healing survivable optical rings, anti-jamming, and optical steganography.
With the rapid development of the technology of optical communication, the security in it has attracted more and more people's attention and even has become a critical component of national security. Compared with the traditional telecommunication, optical communication is regarded as a kind of secure communication because optical fiber, transmission medium of it, is immune to the typical issues of electromagnetic interference (EMI)/radio-frequency interference (RFI). However, the essential characteristics of the optical fiber make it vulnerable to a variety of attacks, including physical infrastructure attacks, eavesdropping, interception, and jamming. In this paper, we proposed a new model to inject the light into a communication fiber without damaging the cladding or core of it. From numberical calculation, the power of injected optical signal can reach to more than 20% of the input power. This level of injected signal is sufficient to interfere with the signal transported in the communication. So measures to combat this kind of inference and deception should be taken.
Network security concerns have recently been increased due to the vast amount of information that flows in a single fiber. At the application layer, data security relies on end-user encryption algorithms, many of which are known to be vulnerable, and authentication algorithms are not foolproof as the sophistication of eavesdroppers and unauthorized bad actors increases. As a result, the communications link may be attacked by eavesdroppers to access data, to mimic the source, or to cause service denial. To accomplish this however, the transmission link must be compromised. Therefore, if an a priori link and channel signature has been established at the receiver, then an unauthorized intervention is possible to be detected, reported and counteracted. In this paper we provide an analysis of the link and channel parameters that affect the signal performance, which also constitute the identification signature of the optical channel. When the medium is compromised, the channel parameters are affected and thus the channel performance. We also develop a model and we simulate conditions of channel attack
The security issues we address are particularly relevant to all-optical networks, but many are also applicable to the optical portions of electro-optic networks. Optical communication, by virtue of the high rates and low BERs they offer, suffer particularly strenuously from denial of service attacks. A short attack, which might only affect a small number of bits in a slower electronic network, may affect a very large number of bits in optical communications. The very light coding and simple signaling, such as OOK, commonly used on optical transmissions renders them vulnerable to service degradations.
Submarine cable systems, serving as the critical backbone of global communications, face evolving resilience threats. This work proposes a novel sensing attack that utilizes ultra-narrow-linewidth lasers to surveil these infrastructures. First, the Narrowband Jamming Attack (NJA) is introduced as an evolution of conventional physical-layer jamming. NJA is divided into three categories according to the spectral position, and the non-overlapping class represents the proposed sensing attack. Its operational principles and the key parameters determining its efficacy are analyzed, along with its deployment strategy in submarine cable systems. Finally, the sensing capability is validated via OptiSystem simulations. Results demonstrate successful localization of vibrations within the 50–200 Hz range on a 1 km fiber, achieving a spatial resolution of 1 m, and confirm the influence of vibration parameters on sensing performance. This work reveals that the proposed sensing attack has the potential to covertly monitor environmental data, thereby posing a threat to information security in submarine cable systems.