Abstract Wisdom is a very difficult construct to work with in research and practice. One reason for this is that wise people can deal with metaphysical questions and experience spiritual phenomena, both of which are hard to measure meaningfully. Although metaphysical and spiritual matters are not imponderable, they have significant measurement problems that are also part of the shortcomings of standard social science statistical frameworks. A second reason is that for many wisdom theorists, wisdom is context-dependent because wisdom is defined by and responds to what its context presents to it. We can therefore argue that wisdom is essentially context, which in quantum physics is theorised as a superposition of random variables that interact. This chapter, therefore, ponders the ‘immeasurable’ from the perspective of quantum-like social science and quantum theory to render wisdom, including its spirituality component, in formal mathematical models. The mathematical formalism of quantum physics allows for the presence of metaphysical phenomena in its ontological foundations and its mathematical models. This chapter, therefore, also presents an argument for understanding wisdom from the superposition perspective and, in particular, the internal interactions between random variables contained within it. If the challenge of measuring wisdom as a nondeterministic system is met, we may finally have an opportunity to measure wisdom in ways that embrace wisdom's complex ontology. A third reason is that wisdom depends on people making first-person subjective judgements. Subjectivity is central to many interpretations of quantum theory, and we can borrow the analytical formalism used in quantum physics for wisdom research. Finally, the chapter discusses future approaches to empirical wisdom research that adopt quantum-like social science methods.
Abstract Wisdom is a very difficult construct to work with in research and practice. One reason for this is that wise people can deal with metaphysical questions and experience spiritual phenomena, both of which are hard to measure meaningfully. Although metaphysical and spiritual matters are not imponderable, they have significant measurement problems that are also part of the shortcomings of standard social science statistical frameworks. A second reason is that for many wisdom theorists, wisdom is context-dependent because wisdom is defined by and responds to what its context presents to it. We can therefore argue that wisdom is essentially context, which in quantum physics is theorised as a superposition of random variables that interact. This chapter, therefore, ponders the ‘immeasurable’ from the perspective of quantum-like social science and quantum theory to render wisdom, including its spirituality component, in formal mathematical models. The mathematical formalism of quantum physics allows for the presence of metaphysical phenomena in its ontological foundations and its mathematical models. This chapter, therefore, also presents an argument for understanding wisdom from the superposition perspective and, in particular, the internal interactions between random variables contained within it. If the challenge of measuring wisdom as a nondeterministic system is met, we may finally have an opportunity to measure wisdom in ways that embrace wisdom's complex ontology. A third reason is that wisdom depends on people making first-person subjective judgements. Subjectivity is central to many interpretations of quantum theory, and we can borrow the analytical formalism used in quantum physics for wisdom research. Finally, the chapter discusses future approaches to empirical wisdom research that adopt quantum-like social science methods.
Abstract This chapter discusses the measurement problem in the context of modern epistemology of science, setting out an epistemological framework which will be used throughout the book. I suggest that the literature on the measurement problem typically assumes that quantum mechanics is confirmed by the empirical evidence regardless of interpretation, and I argue that this ultimately founders for reasons similar to logical positivism. I then invoke recent work in the epistemology of measurement by van Fraassen, Chang and Tal to argue that we cannot make sense of scientific epistemology without a satisfactory understanding of what is going on during the process of measurement. Finally, I propose an approach to the epistemology of science inspired by Chang’s progressive coherentism, and argue that this is the right way of thinking about epistemic situations in which our understanding of the operation of our measuring devices depends crucially on the very physics we are trying to find out about.
In this paper, we do not try to solve the measurement problem, but rather to properly formulate it. One of the reasons why it still lacks a precise, agreed definition is that the problem may take very different aspects depending on the interpretation of quantum mechanics embraced. Inspired by the methodology of theory-independent results like Bell's theorem, we propose to identify the common root of the puzzle in an interpretation-independent way i.e. as a property of the empirical statistics only, before deriving its philosophical consequences. The key observation is that quantum matter can not be described by a Kolmogorovian probabilistic theory. Arguing that the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory are the postulates of epistemic uncertainty leads us to reformulate the measurement problem as the impossibility to build an ontology independent of epistemology for quantum matter. Said differently, there exists no God's-eye view on quantum systems. Although it is meaningless to solve the measurement problem as defined in this way, insofar as it is a feature of the universe's statistics, such a formulation may on the other hand bring side benefits. In particular, we argue that it allows to: (i) shed a new light on the variety of interpretations; (ii) propose a fundamental reason why quantum mechanics and general relativity are so incompatible, not relying on purely mathematical or technical arguments; (iii) guide the quest for quantum gravity.
Quantum probability theory, originally developed in the context of quantum mechanics, has increasingly been applied to social sciences to explain decision-making, cognition, and collective behavior. Unlike classical probability models, which assume pre-existing and well-defined preferences, quantum models incorporate superposition, interference, and non-commutativity to capture the contextual dependence and measurement effects observed in human decisions. This paper systematically explores the theoretical foundations of quantum probability in social sciences, discusses model construction techniques, and reviews empirical findings supporting its application. By examining case studies in quantum cognition, quantum game theory, and quantum voting, we illustrate how quantum approaches provide alternative explanations for phenomena such as order effects, measurement-induced attitude shifts, and collective polarization. The paper also discusses the methodological challenges and limitations of quantum social science, emphasizing the need for rigorous experimental validation and interdisciplinary collaboration. Finally, we highlight the potential for integrating quantum probability models with emerging technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, opening new avenues for social science research and policy applications.
Purpose This work examines assumptions of positivism and the traditional scientific method. Design/methodology/approach Insights from quantum mechanics are explored especially as they relate to method, measurement and what is knowable. An argument is made that how social scientists, particularly sociologists, understand the nature of “reality out there” and describe the social world may be challenged by quantum ideas. The benefits of utilized mixed methods, considering quantum insights, cannot be overstated. Findings It is the proposition of this work that insights from modern physics alter the understanding of the world “out there.” Wheeler suggested that the most profound implication from modern physics is that “there is no out there” (1982; see also Baggott, 1992). Grappling with how modern physics may alter understanding in the social sciences will be difficult; however, that does not mean the task should not be undertaken (see Goswami, 1993). A starting point for the social sciences may be relinquishing an old mechanistic science that depends on the establishment of an objective, empirically based, verifiable reality. Mechanistic science demands “one true reality – a clear-cut reality on which everyone can agree…. Mechanistic science is by definition reductionistic…it has had to try to reduce complexity to oversimplification and process to statis. This creates an illusionary world…that has little or nothing to do with the complexity of the process of the reality of creation as we know, experience, and participate in it” (Goswami, 1993, pp. 64, 66). Research limitations/implications Many physicists have popularized quantum ideas for others interested in contemplating the implications of modern physics. Because of the difficulty in conceiving of quantum ideas, the meaning of the quantum in popular culture is far removed from the parent discipline. Thus, the culture has been shaped by the rhetoric and ideas surrounding the basic quantum mathematical formulas. And, over time, as quantum ideas have come to be part of the popular culture, even the link to the popularized literature in physics is lost. Rather, quantum ideas may be viewed as cultural formations that take on a life of their own. Practical implications The work allows a critique of positivist method and provides insight on how to frame qualitative methodology in a new way. Social implications The work utilizes popularized ideas in quantum theory: the preeminent theory that describes all matter. Little work in sociology utilizes this perspective in understanding research methods. Originality/value Quantum insights have rarely been explored in highlighting limitations in positivism. The current work aims to build on quantum insights and how these may help us better understand the social world around us.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the main philosophical and metaphysical implications of quantum physics, especially those which concern the issues of epistemic humility and ontological realism. My thesis is that the impossibility of reaching an objective knowledge of nature does not imply the renunciation of ontological realism, but rather encourages scientists to adopt an attitude of epistemic humility. The argument firstly presents the main theories of quantum physics currently discussed, focusing on the measurement problem and its ontological implications. Afterwords, the issues of objectivity and realism are properly addressed. In the end, we discuss statistics as the new form of scientific epistemology, along with the concept of potentiality as the fundamental category of quantum metaphysics. Throughout, we establish some parallelisms between quantum physics theories and theology to show that, when human beings investigate the foundations of reality, some thought patterns, some core problems, and some possible solutions resemble one another, regardless of the specific perspective and language with which they are formulated.