Interpretation or Reconstruction?

Steven French

Published Nov 23, 2023• 0 citations

Abstract

Abstract Both the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation and Relational Quantum Mechanics are typically presented as interpretations of quantum theory, whereas QBism is understood as a reconstruction of it. The latter has been suggested as the appropriate approach for phenomenologists to adopt, particularly since this account adopts a first-person perspective. However, in Chapter 10 it is argued that such a dramatic move is not necessary as London and Bauer have already laid down the groundwork for an appropriately phenomenological understanding of the theory. This can then be supplemented with the relationist features emphasized by ‘Many Worlds’ and RQM. Husserl himself insisted that phenomenology does not require any such reshaping of scientific practice itself, theoretical or otherwise; rather it and its foundations need to be understood from the perspective afforded by the epoché. It is precisely this understanding that London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ presents, with the theory taken as not just a piece of physics but a theory of knowledge in itself. The chapter, and book, concludes with the suggestion that as a result, London and Bauer’s account sits somewhere between an interpretation and a reconstruction of the theory and by virtue of that, represents a novel advance in considerations of how we should conceive of our relationship to the world.

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198897958.003.0010

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