Abstract Accounts of quantum theory that bring to the fore the relationship between the system and the observer, or measuring device, include Everett’s ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation and Rovelli’s ‘Relational Quantum Mechanics’, both of which are considered in Chapter 9. The former understands the state of a system as relative to that of the observer and in Everett’s original formulation, the definite outcomes obtained through measurement were manifested via the observer’s memory sequences. The subjectivist aspect of this interpretation is made even more explicit in the so-called ‘Many Minds’ variant. Relational Quantum Mechanics likewise adopts a relational or perspectival approach to the states of the system under observation. In this chapter both approaches are considered as offering a way of aligning quantum theory with the correlationist feature of phenomenology. Both are then compared with QBism and the pros and cons of all three are considered in terms of possible avenues for developing a phenomenological form of quantum theory.
Abstract Accounts of quantum theory that bring to the fore the relationship between the system and the observer, or measuring device, include Everett’s ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation and Rovelli’s ‘Relational Quantum Mechanics’, both of which are considered in Chapter 9. The former understands the state of a system as relative to that of the observer and in Everett’s original formulation, the definite outcomes obtained through measurement were manifested via the observer’s memory sequences. The subjectivist aspect of this interpretation is made even more explicit in the so-called ‘Many Minds’ variant. Relational Quantum Mechanics likewise adopts a relational or perspectival approach to the states of the system under observation. In this chapter both approaches are considered as offering a way of aligning quantum theory with the correlationist feature of phenomenology. Both are then compared with QBism and the pros and cons of all three are considered in terms of possible avenues for developing a phenomenological form of quantum theory.
Abstract Both the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation and Relational Quantum Mechanics are typically presented as interpretations of quantum theory, whereas QBism is understood as a reconstruction of it. The latter has been suggested as the appropriate approach for phenomenologists to adopt, particularly since this account adopts a first-person perspective. However, in Chapter 10 it is argued that such a dramatic move is not necessary as London and Bauer have already laid down the groundwork for an appropriately phenomenological understanding of the theory. This can then be supplemented with the relationist features emphasized by ‘Many Worlds’ and RQM. Husserl himself insisted that phenomenology does not require any such reshaping of scientific practice itself, theoretical or otherwise; rather it and its foundations need to be understood from the perspective afforded by the epoché. It is precisely this understanding that London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ presents, with the theory taken as not just a piece of physics but a theory of knowledge in itself. The chapter, and book, concludes with the suggestion that as a result, London and Bauer’s account sits somewhere between an interpretation and a reconstruction of the theory and by virtue of that, represents a novel advance in considerations of how we should conceive of our relationship to the world.
Abstract We consider a number of radically different ways that Everett’s pure wave mechanics has been understood. Each of these reconstructions aims to provide a stronger variety of empirical adequacy than Everett’s own formulation of the theory. Among the alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we consider are splitting worlds, decohering worlds, many minds, many threads, and many maps. Each of these differs in its metaphysical commitments and, hence, in how it explains determinate measurement records and probabilities. We focus, in particular, on the problem of accounting for the standard quantum probabilities. To this end, we consider the relationship between typicality and probability and contrast synchronic and forward-looking probabilities. We conclude with a brief discussion of epistemological, pragmatic, and information-theoretic formulations of quantum mechanics. A recurring issue in this chapter concerns what it should mean for a physical theory to be empirically adequate.
Abstract It has been claimed that Massimi’s recent perspectival approach to science sits in tension with a realist stance. I shall argue that this tension can be defused in the quantum context by recasting Massimi’s perspectivalism within a phenomenological framework. I shall begin by indicating how the different but complementary forms of the former are manifested in the distinction between certain so-called ‘-epistemic’ and ‘-ontic’ understandings of quantum mechanics, namely QBism and Relational Quantum Mechanics, respectively. A brief consideration of Dieks’ perspectivism will then lead to a consideration of the much-maligned and typically dismissed role of the observer in the measurement process. This opens the door to London and Bauer’s presentation of a form of ‘phenomenological quantum perspectivalism’ that brings together Massimi’s two forms and explicitly eschews the ‘naïve’ realism that creates the above tension. I shall conclude with some reflections on how intersubjectivity can still be established within this framework, focusing in particular on how Massimi’s idea of ‘interlacing’ scientific perspectives can be accommodated, using the example of a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ that gave rise to Bose-Einstein statistics.
Subjective aspects of quantum mechanics (QM) are most radically expressed in the (EI) of QM which suggests coexisting macroscopically distinct configurations of the world in the form of a superposition of the (quasi-)classical state vectors. The components of such a superposition are often verbally denoted as Everett's worlds, hence the name Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) for EI. Explicit accounting the correlation of each classical configuration of the world with the corresponding state of an observer's mind yields the so-called Many-Minds interpretation (MMI). This is maximum that may be done in the context of EI if the restriction by pure physics is implied. In the author's Extended Everett Concept (EEC) the observer's consciousness is defined in the spirit of psycho-physical parallelism, i.e. as going beyond pure physics. As a consequence, according to EEC, an observer, if he/she weakens or turns off his/her consciousness (perception), obtains the ability of super-intuition (obtaining seemingly unavailable information) and even of controlling the subjective reality (a picture of classical reality as it will be subjectively perceived). This may be interpreted as a realization of the Jung's collective unconscious as well as an explanation of the mystical elements in Oriental philosophies, world religions and deep psychological practices.
NeuroQuantology | March 2013 | Vol 11 | Issue 1 | Suppl 1 | Page 85-96
Abstract This paper examines the role of perspectivism in Relational Quantum Mechanics, situating it within the broader landscape of quantum interpretations and the scientific realism debate. We argue that, while interpretations such as QBism embrace strong forms of perspectivism, Relational Quantum Mechanics adopts a “soft” perspectivism, limiting the observer’s role to selecting experimental contexts without compromising its realist framework. We also explore the historical roots of Relational Quantum Mechanics, showing that relational ideas in the works of Bohr and other pioneers similarly avoided strong perspectivist commitments. By analyzing both contemporary and historical perspectives, we argue that Relational Quantum Mechanics offers a minimalist yet robust relational interpretation, distinct from more subjectivist approaches.
In this paper we investigate the history of relationalism and its present use in some interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the first part of this article we will provide a conceptual analysis of the relation between substantivalism, relationalism and relativism in the history of both physics and philosophy. In the second part, we will address some relational interpretations of quantum mechanics, namely, Bohr's relational approach, the modal interpretation by Kochen, the perspectival modal version by Bene and Dieks and the relational interpretation by Rovelli. We will argue that all these interpretations ground their understanding of relations in epistemological terms. By taking into account the analysis on the first part of our work, we intend to highlight the fact that there is a different possibility for understanding quantum mechanics in relational terms which has not been yet considered within the foundational literature. This possibility is to consider relations in (non-relativist) ontological terms. We will argue that such an understanding might be capable of providing a novel approach to the problem of representing what quantum mechanics is really talking about.