Abstract Here a ‘blow-by-blow’ account of London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ is presented, beginning with their central claim that quantum mechanics should itself be understood as a theory of knowledge. It counts as such precisely because it sets at its very core the aforementioned relationship between mind and the world. This is revealed through a careful analysis of the measurement situation, presented in detail by London and Bauer. In particular, they insist that the observer is able to know her own state because she has with herself a relationship of a special character, as manifested through the faculty of introspection. By virtue of this immanent knowledge she is then able to separate herself from the quantum superposition and establish her own objectivity. However, this is not to be equated with her consciousness mysteriously ‘causing’ the wave-function to collapse; rather, her ego thereby emerges as one pole of the relationship, with the system, now also in a definite state, as the ‘object-pole’. The terms used in the text are redolent of phenomenological language and with that understanding we can see just how wide of the mark Putnam and Shimony’s criticisms are (and also Margenau and Wigner’s interpretation, to be fair!). It is then suggested that this ‘little book’ may serve as the basis for a novel phenomenological understanding of quantum physics.
Abstract Here a ‘blow-by-blow’ account of London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ is presented, beginning with their central claim that quantum mechanics should itself be understood as a theory of knowledge. It counts as such precisely because it sets at its very core the aforementioned relationship between mind and the world. This is revealed through a careful analysis of the measurement situation, presented in detail by London and Bauer. In particular, they insist that the observer is able to know her own state because she has with herself a relationship of a special character, as manifested through the faculty of introspection. By virtue of this immanent knowledge she is then able to separate herself from the quantum superposition and establish her own objectivity. However, this is not to be equated with her consciousness mysteriously ‘causing’ the wave-function to collapse; rather, her ego thereby emerges as one pole of the relationship, with the system, now also in a definite state, as the ‘object-pole’. The terms used in the text are redolent of phenomenological language and with that understanding we can see just how wide of the mark Putnam and Shimony’s criticisms are (and also Margenau and Wigner’s interpretation, to be fair!). It is then suggested that this ‘little book’ may serve as the basis for a novel phenomenological understanding of quantum physics.
Abstract The measurement problem remains one of the outstanding issues in the foundations of quantum theory: how do we go from the multiple options encoded in the wave-function to the definite outcome that we observe? One of the most well-known solutions to this problem maintained that it is the observer’s consciousness that somehow causes the wave-function to collapse. Now widely dismissed for introducing an irreducible element of subjectivity into science, both advocates and critics cited a ‘little book’, La Théorie de L’Observation en Mécanique Quantique, by Edmund Bauer and Fritz London (1938; English trans. 1983) as giving the clearest presentation of this solution. However, as well as being an extremely accomplished physicist, London was also trained in the phenomenological tradition that was initiated by the philosopher Edmund Husserl. This casts his work with Bauer in an entirely new and different light, and by assigning a very different and more profound role to consciousness in resolving the measurement problem, yields an understanding of quantum theory that has not hitherto been fully explored. The aim of this book is to initiate just such an exploration. It begins by setting London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ in its historical and philosophical context and then draws out the implications for not only quantum physics but our view of science and the world more generally.
Abstract Both the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation and Relational Quantum Mechanics are typically presented as interpretations of quantum theory, whereas QBism is understood as a reconstruction of it. The latter has been suggested as the appropriate approach for phenomenologists to adopt, particularly since this account adopts a first-person perspective. However, in Chapter 10 it is argued that such a dramatic move is not necessary as London and Bauer have already laid down the groundwork for an appropriately phenomenological understanding of the theory. This can then be supplemented with the relationist features emphasized by ‘Many Worlds’ and RQM. Husserl himself insisted that phenomenology does not require any such reshaping of scientific practice itself, theoretical or otherwise; rather it and its foundations need to be understood from the perspective afforded by the epoché. It is precisely this understanding that London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ presents, with the theory taken as not just a piece of physics but a theory of knowledge in itself. The chapter, and book, concludes with the suggestion that as a result, London and Bauer’s account sits somewhere between an interpretation and a reconstruction of the theory and by virtue of that, represents a novel advance in considerations of how we should conceive of our relationship to the world.
In 1939 London and Bauer published a 'little book' that shaped the debate over the role of consciousness in resolving the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. Mistakenly understood as merely summarising von Neumann's account, both sides in the debate failed to appreciate its phenomenological underpinnings. London not only originally studied phenomenology but continued thinking about and discussing this approach in the years leading up to the publication of his work with Bauer, most notably with Gurwitsch, who likewise had a dual background in phenomenological philosophy and physics. In the book, A Phenomenological Approach to Quantum Mechanics: Cutting the Chain of Correlations (French, 2023), the historical background to London and Bauer's work is set out prior to situating it within the context of Husserl's philosophy as a whole. It is concluded that the London and Bauer phenomenological account offers a potentially fruitful way forward through various dichotomies, such as that between psi-ontic and psi-epistemic accounts and between interpretational and reconstructive approaches more generally, as well as with regard to understanding quantum physics more generally. In this paper London and Bauer's insistence that quantum mechanics should be seen as a theory of knowledge in its own right is emphasized, where this must be taken as phenomenologically grounded. Hopefully this work will be viewed as contributing to a revised phenomenological understanding of modern physics, standing alongside Ryckman's The Reign of Relativity (Ryckman, 2005) and Berghofer and Wiltsche's edited collection Phenomenological Approaches to Physics (Berghofer & Wiltsche, 2020).
In his book A Phenomenological Approach to Quantum Mechanics: Cutting the Chain of Correlations Steven French presents an interpretation of Fritz London's and Edmond Bauer's 1939 monograph La théorie de l'observation en mécanique quantique that acknowledges and engages with the phenomenological theorizing underlying their approach to the measurement problem. My aim in the following contribution is twofold. I will first offer some historical and systematic arguments for why it might indeed be worthwhile to explore the link between phenomenology and quantum mechanics. In the second part of the paper, I will then look closer at French's interpretation, especially his understanding of reflection, and express some reservations about a central argument of his.
Abstract Phenomenology has also been brought to bear on QM in the context of recent discussions over the approach known as ‘QBism’. This takes the theoretical formalism to be simply a device for predicting an agent’s future experiences, rather than as representing the world. Such a first-person perspective has been widely taken to mesh with the phenomenological stance, as usually understood. However, although advocates of QBism maintain that any slide into solipsism can be resisted, they struggle to accommodate what has been called the ‘kicks from the world’. Here it is argued that in order do so while remaining within a phenomenological framework, the correlationist feature identified by London and Bauer should be incorporated. Interestingly, one of the phenomenologist philosophers who is often cited in this specific context, Merleau-Ponty, took classes with Gurwitsch and drew on London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ in his own analysis of quantum physics.
Introduction Chapter 1 dealt with one of the deepest mysteries in modern science: how to explain consciousness. This Part deals with another mystery: how to make sense of quantum mechanics. Both involve a problem of reconciliation with the classical worldview, which is one hint that the two mysteries might be related. A second is that, unlike classical physics, which makes no reference to or allowance for consciousness, quantum theory raises the issue of consciousness and its relationship to the physical world in a very direct way. These hints do not necessarily mean there is a connection between the two mysteries, but by the end of this Part I hope to have shown why it would be natural to look for one. My more immediate aim here is to give the social scientific reader an introductory understanding of the experimental findings of quantum theory, its key concepts, and the debates about its interpretation. The discussion assumes no prior knowledge of quantum physics and makes no use of mathematics. Quantum theory without equations might seem like an oxymoron, and certainly reading this Part will not enable anyone to use quantum theory. But to a perhaps surprising degree it is possible to understand quantum theory without being able to use it. Its findings can be communicated in ordinary language, and the same goes for its main concepts and interpretive debates. One consequence of this has been the emergence of a virtual cottage industry of books on quantum theory for a lay audience. Most are written by physicists, and many are quite good. However, it is not just popular treatments that do without equations: much of the professional philosophical literature does as well. (I draw on both kinds of literature below.) Philosophers of physics are trained to understand the math, of course, which is necessary for a full appreciation of the issues.