Abstract Measurement lies at the core of the quantum formalism. This may seem a statement of the intuitively obvious for any theoretical structure with a pretension to predict the outcomes of observations made or experiments performed on objects in the real world. But classical mechanics is a theorys of the physical properties of objects and their behaviour when exposed to different kinds of forces, and there is no particularly significant role for measurement other than a passive role involving the recording of those properties or behaviour. In contrast, measurement in quantum theory takes on a far deeper, almost ominous, significance
Abstract Measurement lies at the core of the quantum formalism. This may seem a statement of the intuitively obvious for any theoretical structure with a pretension to predict the outcomes of observations made or experiments performed on objects in the real world. But classical mechanics is a theorys of the physical properties of objects and their behaviour when exposed to different kinds of forces, and there is no particularly significant role for measurement other than a passive role involving the recording of those properties or behaviour. In contrast, measurement in quantum theory takes on a far deeper, almost ominous, significance
Measurement is an important scientific activity. In most of science, including classical physics, is may be understood as a way of finding out about the physical world and representing the results numerically. No-go theorems show that measurement of quantum observables is not like that: the recorded outcome is typically created rather than revealed in a quantum measurement, in which case there is no objective fact about the observable's prior value. Other no-go theorems show that unitary quantum theory can generally neither explain nor even represent a unique recorded outcome, thereby threatening that outcome's objectivity. Methodological norms inherent in quantum physical practice nevertheless institute the objectivity, not only of unique recorded outcomes of quantum measurements, but also of non-quantum features of the world that physicists and other scientists take their models to represent.
I take a pragmatist perspective on quantum theory. This is not a view of the world described by quantum theory. In this view quantum theory itself does not describe the physical world, nor our observatons, experiences or opinions of it. Instead, the theory offers reliable advice on when to expect an event of one kind or another, and on how strongly to expect each possible outcome of that event. The actual outcome is a perspectival fact: a fact relative to a physical context of assessment. Measurement outcomes and quantum states are both perspectival. By noticing that each must be relativized to an appropriate physical context one can resolve the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocal action. But if the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an absolute fact, then why shoud the statistics of such outcomes give us any objective reason to accept quantum theory? One can describe extensions of the scenario of Wigner's friend in which a statement expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement would be true relative to one such context but not relative to another. However, physical conditions in our world prevent us from realizing such scenarios. Since the outcome of every actual quantum measurement is certified at what is essentially a single context of assessment, the outcome relative to that context is an objective fact in the only sense that matters for science. We should accept quantum theory because the statistics these outcomes display are just those it leads us to expect.
Measurement in classical physics Measurements in classical physics are the means by which we come to know the current state of a mechanical system without appreciably disturbing it. The laws of classical mechanics imply that we may interact with the system in such a way that this ideal may be approached arbitrarily closely, at least in principle (i.e., in theory, ignoring practical problems). The aim of this chapter is to examine how far we must revise this programme in the quantum theory of measurement. Did the classical physicist believe in the objective existence of material systems with well-defined position and momentum just because these quantities could be empirically determined with arbitrary precision at the same time? It seems she made a stronger assumption than this; that two successive observations of an apple, first in a tree and then on the ground, are connected to one another by virtue of the fact that the apple actually has a definite position and momentum at each instant, whether it is observed or not. Thus, the programme of classical physics was not merely to predict the results of future experiments by inserting data from previous ones into the laws of motion, but to show how the observations are a function of a causally connected sequence of unique processes undergone by the system of interest, which possesses properties independently of measurements. Measurement was then something of a secondary affair and indeed, prior to quantum mechanics, the theory of measurement as a distinct branch of theoretical physics did not exist.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
A recent paper "Single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent" [arXiv:1604.07422] by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner has attracted a considerable interest of a broader physics audience and shortly elicited a number of replies. In spite of the objections that ensued, we find that significant part of the controversial initial claim has not been refuted - on the contrary, arguments presented both in the initial paper and in the replies seem to leave no longer room for the basic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. We revisit the controversy trying to pinpoint the exact phenomenon that lies in its core, pointing out to some aspects of the problem that seem to have been mostly overlooked. Taking all conclusions into account, we here propose novel ways to approach the ostensible paradox, in which the Copenhagen interpretation is naturally preserved. Whereas arguments presented in Frauchiger and Renner paper and the replies that followed revolve over whether Wigner's friend would perceive only one or both of the possible outcomes, we offer the third, pretty obvious solution - namely, that Wigner's friend, in the well known setup, would subjectively perceive {\it none} of the potentially conflicting outcomes. As a side note, we also argue that, contrary to the often stated beliefs, hypothetical real experimental realization of Wigner's friend thought experiment actually would not provide us with any new insight into the quantum mechanics.