Physics Today

The future has arrived for securing confidential data

David Kramer

Published Oct 19, 2023• 3 citations

Abstract

Though quantum computers are still a decade or more away, NIST is finalizing new encryption standards now to replace current vulnerable protections.

DOI: 10.1063/pt.3.5340

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