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Lecture notes in computer science

Hybrid Post-quantum Signatures in Hardware Security Keys

Diana Ghinea, Fabian Kaczmarczyck, Jennifer Pullman, Julien Cretin, Stefan Kölbl, Rafael Misoczki, Jean-Michel Picod, Luca Invernizzi, Elie Bursztein

Published Jan 1, 2023• 20 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-41181-6_26

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The impending threat posed by quantum-capable adversaries necessitates a secure and practical transition of Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) to support post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This paper addresses the multifaceted challenges of integrating PQC into existing PKI ecosystems by examining novel cryptographic combiners and hybrid certificate designs that can provide quantum-resistant security. We assess the performance, compatibility, and security of these hybrid certificates across standard communication protocols such as TLS, considering variations in root and intermediate certification paths. In addition, we introduce key management procedures that cover signature generation, validation, and lifecycle considerations under both software and hardware constraints. Beyond X.509, alternative trust models and certificate mechanisms are also analyzed for specialized domains, including IoT, firmware signing, and smart cards.
This paper introduces several hybrid protocols based on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) implemented in the OpenQKD testbed Berlin to improve the security of the QKD nodes. Instead of following the ETSI QKD014 standard of a key management system based on classical security, i.e., RSA authentication and ECC encryption, we implemented a quantum-secure Key Management System based on PQC Key Encapsulation and Signature algorithms. The hardware and the software components of the QKD network authenticate themselves using a PQC trust chain and Pre-Shared Secrets, wherever supported. The communication between QKD nodes, as for the encryption key forwarding process, is hardened by Post-Quantum Cryptography to prevent cryptographic key exposure on intermediate network nodes. Using the two implemented key exchange processes, based on QKD and PQC, applications are able to request any kind of encryption key from the Key Management System and combine them arbitrarily to compute more reliable cryptographic keys.