Experimental Metaphysics

Ronnie Hermens

Александр Иванович Панченко, А. И. Панченко

The pretersensual part of physical reality includes not only theories and conceptions, but also the objective reality itself, viz., being as defined not by man alone. As far as conceptions of the physical reality are concerned, they are subject to experimenting. Experimentation, however, serves to verify the metaphysical conceptions as well – consider the theories of Parmenides (integrity and continuity) and Democritus (atomism, the reduction of a whole to its parts) as an example. This paper examines one of the latest examples of theories put to verification: the famous argument between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr, each of whom shared different metaphysical conceptions. Experimental analysis of the metaphysical conceptions of physical reality has shown that future physical theories must be both local (Democritus’ metaphysics) and inseparable (Parmenides’ metaphysics).

Alexandre Koyré

Александр Иванович Панченко

The pretersensual part of physical reality includes not only theories and conceptions, but also the objective reality itself, viz., being as defined not by man alone. As far as conceptions of the physical reality are concerned, they are subject to experimenting. Experimentation, however, serves to verify the metaphysical conceptions as well consider the theories of Parmenides (integrity and continuity) and Democritus (atomism, the reduction of a whole to its parts) as an example. This paper examines one of the latest examples of theories put to verification: the famous argument between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr, each of whom shared different metaphysical conceptions. Experimental analysis of the metaphysical conceptions of physical reality has shown that future physical theories must be both local (Democritus' metaphysics) and inseparable (Parmenides' metaphysics).

Graham P. Smetham

Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.