Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
Quantum Mechanics (QM) has faced deep controversies and debates since its origin when Werner Heisenberg proposed the first mathematical formalism capable to operationally account for what had been recently discovered as the new field of quantum phenomena. Today, even though we have reached a standardized version of QM which is taught in Universities all around the world, there is still no consensus regarding the conceptual reference of the theory and, if or if not, it can refer to something beyond measurement outcomes. In this work we will argue that the reason behind the impossibility to reach a meaningful answer to this question is strictly related to the 20th Century Bohrian-positivist re-foundation of physics which is responsible for having introduced within the theory of quanta a harmful combination of metaphysical dogmatism and naive empiricism. We will also argue that the possibility of understanding QM is at plain sight, given we return to the original framework of physics in which the meaning of understanding has always been clear.
While there is general agreement that quantum theory poses a fundamental challenge to the classical worldview, there is none on what worldview should replace it. This lack of clear positive implications is the heart of the interpretation problem in quantum theory, or understanding what the world must be like assuming the theory is true. The difficulty is twofold. First, if the theory is correct and complete then there seems to be no way to adjudicate empirically among its interpretations, forcing us to rely on metaphysics instead. Second, the classical metaphysics upon which human beings have relied in the past to interpret new theories is now itself problematic, leaving us without an interpretive backstop to anchor our thinking. Bell is surely right in expecting whatever picture of reality eventually emerges from quantum theory to “astonish us,” but by the same token it is very hard to see what that picture should be. In this chapter I address the debate about the positive worldview implications of quantum theory. Of all the chapters in this book it is the farthest removed from the concerns of social scientists. However, it plays an important dialectical function in my argument, which is to introduce and help justify the panpsychist interpretation of quantum theory that I will embrace and discuss at more length in Chapter 6. By ‘justify’ I do not mean that I will defend this interpretation as superior to others. My purpose is more modest, which is simply to show why, despite what might seem to be its bizarre and counter-intuitive nature, panpsychism is taken quite seriously by philosophers of physics as a way to interpret quantum theory. That's because (a) there are strong analogies between quantum systems and the human mind, and (b) the alternatives are equally bizarre and counter-intuitive. If readers are prepared to accept that panpsychism is a valid approach to the mind–body problem, then this chapter may be skipped – which I have made less costly by deferring until Chapter 6 a discussion of time-symmetric approaches like the Transactional Interpretation, which will play an important role later in the book.
Although the title of this focus issue is ‘The Possibility of Metaphysics’ the first part has as its focus not only metaphysics in general but Buddhist metaphysics in particular. This is because the motivation for this focus issue was sparked by an email from a colleague who asked for my opinion of a book written by Robert Ellis. The aspect of the ‘experimental metaphysics’ of quantum theory is examined in detail in the first article "The Matter of Mindnature" The Buddhist metaphysical viewpoint tells as the nature of ultimate reality is best understood as a fundamentally interrelated and interpenetrating field of Mind-like energy, or Mindnature, and such a view is clearly supported by the quantum violation of Bell’s inequalities. In this article I examine Ellis’s notion of the impossibility of metaphysics in the light of both philosophical considerations and the implications of the quantum evidence. The next article "Taking the‘Meta’ Out of Physics" is Ellis’s response to my criticisms of his work. I leave it to readers to come to conclusions without further comment from me. It is my hope that there will be feedback concerning the issues raised as I am personally convinced that Ellis’s position is untenable but am curious to know whether my viewpoint is widely held. Certainly the last two articles from James Kowall, ‘What is Reality in a Holographic World?’, and Brian Whitworth, ‘Introducing The Virtual Reality Conjecture’, seem to support my position.
Despite scholarly consensus on the empirical facts, ever since its inception in the 1920s there has been deep disagreement about how to interpret quantum theory. “To interpret a physical theory is to say what the world would be like, if the theory were true.” All scientific theories require interpretation, since strictly speaking what they describe are our experiences of the world rather than the world itself. Thus, whether we are trying to explain or merely describe the world, we are always engaged in inference. To make inferences we need a context for interpretation. For any given claim this context is provided locally by related theories, more broadly by disciplinary paradigms, and ultimately by worldview claims about the nature of reality. The challenge in interpreting scientific theories is to integrate them into this hierarchy of knowledge. Usually this is not too difficult. New theories often require adjustments to nearby theories, but in doing so we can rely on paradigms to make them cohere. More rarely paradigmatic assumptions are themselves challenged, but in that case scientists can fall back on their worldview to make sense of the needed changes. By implication, the most difficult interpretive problems arise when our worldview is called into question, which leaves us without any frame of reference on which to fall back. Quantum theory poses a worldview problem. Prior to the quantum revolution the classical worldview could not be tested scientifically and so it was essentially metaphysical. Even though it corresponded to our experience of material objects, we lacked proof that it adequately represented the deep structure of reality. By giving us access to that deep structure for the first time, quantum mechanics made it possible to do such a test, or “experimental metaphysics.” Unfortunately, the results seemed to contradict classical assumptions, at least on the sub-atomic level.