Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
In recent years there has developed a movement in the West which seeks to convince people that the original teachings of the Buddha were far more mundane than his later followers would have us believe. An extreme recent example of this is the book The Trouble with Buddhism in which Dr. Robert Ellis claims that every Buddhist who has ever lived has been ‘scandalously” confused about the central doctrines of Buddhism, especially the ‘Middle Way’ philosophy, which is a central teaching of all Buddhist schools. He also claims that if one takes Humean scepticism ‘seriously’, as he thinks one should do, it follows that it is impossible to know anything with any certainty. Metaphysics therefore become a ‘foolish’ dream. In fact according to Ellis it is “foolish” to think that quantum physics supplies “evidence about the universe itself.” This article considers Ellis’s claims regarding metaphysics and physics in detail, particularly focusing on the implications of the quantum violation of Bell’s theorem, in order to show that we must be sceptical of extreme scepticism.
Although the title of this focus issue is ‘The Possibility of Metaphysics’ the first part has as its focus not only metaphysics in general but Buddhist metaphysics in particular. This is because the motivation for this focus issue was sparked by an email from a colleague who asked for my opinion of a book written by Robert Ellis. The aspect of the ‘experimental metaphysics’ of quantum theory is examined in detail in the first article "The Matter of Mindnature" The Buddhist metaphysical viewpoint tells as the nature of ultimate reality is best understood as a fundamentally interrelated and interpenetrating field of Mind-like energy, or Mindnature, and such a view is clearly supported by the quantum violation of Bell’s inequalities. In this article I examine Ellis’s notion of the impossibility of metaphysics in the light of both philosophical considerations and the implications of the quantum evidence. The next article "Taking the‘Meta’ Out of Physics" is Ellis’s response to my criticisms of his work. I leave it to readers to come to conclusions without further comment from me. It is my hope that there will be feedback concerning the issues raised as I am personally convinced that Ellis’s position is untenable but am curious to know whether my viewpoint is widely held. Certainly the last two articles from James Kowall, ‘What is Reality in a Holographic World?’, and Brian Whitworth, ‘Introducing The Virtual Reality Conjecture’, seem to support my position.
Great revolutions in the study of nature in the past century have brought forth an onslaught of philosophical complications to the clarity of the classical perspective to which natural science was espoused prior to the twentieth century. The objective, intuitive principles by which we determined the reality of the world were beset by the ontological implications that flowed out of quantum mechanics and relativistic law. Wary of philosophical problems, a great number of the physical sciences lodge themselves in the comfort of empirical dogmatism as its only means of progression. But in light of the success of quantum systems, the ambiguity that buds must be taken into greater consideration. This paper discusses the background, development, objections, and interpretations of quantum mechanics and concurrent ontological premises to argue that such a philosophical tenet is inherent to nature, and, as such, is capable of producing results and predictions consistent with its physical and mathematical counterparts. To do so, the properties of measurement and the premises of causality are treated in terms of their physical terminology and foundations. The frameworks of Carroll, Everett, Heisenberg, Popper, and others analyze established interpretations and abstractions of quantum mechanics; its ties to the metaphysical and ontological descriptions of an existing entity are explored by means of the contrived spacetime allegory, which in principle determines the parameters that bound real systems. It is evident that ontological accounts for physical phenomena are not only viable and admissible but are necessary as our ability to describe the universe surpasses our ability to test and quantify these descriptions. These realizations allow us to better understand our world and move beyond empirical data when it is technologically unattainable, enabling us to build on statistical bases and approach the structure of realism through its essence of ambiguity.
While there is general agreement that quantum theory poses a fundamental challenge to the classical worldview, there is none on what worldview should replace it. This lack of clear positive implications is the heart of the interpretation problem in quantum theory, or understanding what the world must be like assuming the theory is true. The difficulty is twofold. First, if the theory is correct and complete then there seems to be no way to adjudicate empirically among its interpretations, forcing us to rely on metaphysics instead. Second, the classical metaphysics upon which human beings have relied in the past to interpret new theories is now itself problematic, leaving us without an interpretive backstop to anchor our thinking. Bell is surely right in expecting whatever picture of reality eventually emerges from quantum theory to “astonish us,” but by the same token it is very hard to see what that picture should be. In this chapter I address the debate about the positive worldview implications of quantum theory. Of all the chapters in this book it is the farthest removed from the concerns of social scientists. However, it plays an important dialectical function in my argument, which is to introduce and help justify the panpsychist interpretation of quantum theory that I will embrace and discuss at more length in Chapter 6. By ‘justify’ I do not mean that I will defend this interpretation as superior to others. My purpose is more modest, which is simply to show why, despite what might seem to be its bizarre and counter-intuitive nature, panpsychism is taken quite seriously by philosophers of physics as a way to interpret quantum theory. That's because (a) there are strong analogies between quantum systems and the human mind, and (b) the alternatives are equally bizarre and counter-intuitive. If readers are prepared to accept that panpsychism is a valid approach to the mind–body problem, then this chapter may be skipped – which I have made less costly by deferring until Chapter 6 a discussion of time-symmetric approaches like the Transactional Interpretation, which will play an important role later in the book.