Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in computer science

GeT a CAKE: Generic Transformations from Key Encaspulation Mechanisms to Password Authenticated Key Exchanges

Hugo Beguinet, Céline Chevalier, David Pointcheval, Thomas Ricosset, Mélissa Rossi

Published Jan 1, 2023• 24 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-33491-7_19

Related papers

Efficient Password Authenticated Key Exchange via Oblivious Transfer

Ran Canetti, Dana Dachman-Soled, Vinod Vaikuntanathan +1 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2012•43 citations

The “Quantum Annoying” Property of Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols

Edward Eaton, Douglas Stebila

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2021•15 citations

The Fairy-Ring Dance

Feng Hao, Xun Yi, Liqun Chen +1 more

In this paper, we study Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) in a group. First, we present a generic "fairy-ring dance" construction that transforms any secure two-party PAKE scheme to a group PAKE protocol while preserving the round efficiency in the optimal way. Based on this generic construction, we present two concrete instantiations based on using SPEKE and J-PAKE as the underlying PAKE primitives respectively. The first protocol, called SPEKE+, accomplishes authenticated key exchange in a group with explicit key confirmation in just two rounds. This is more round-efficient than any existing group PAKE protocols in the literature. The second protocol, called J-PAKE+, requires one more round than SPEKE+, but is computationally faster. Finally, we present full implementations of SPEKE+ and J-PAKE+ with detailed performance measurements. Our experiments suggest that both protocols are feasible for practical applications in which the group size may vary from three to several dozen. This makes them useful, as we believe, for a wide range of applications - e.g., to bootstrap secure communication among a group of smart devices in the Internet of Things (IoT).

•Apr 3, 2015•5 citations

Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms and Authenticated Key Exchange

Nina Bindel, Jacqueline Brendel, Marc Fischlin +2 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2019•132 citations

Asymmetric Password Authentication Transport Layer Security Protocol

Yuhao Han, Libin Wang

Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols are essential for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of data communications. Mutual authentication between client and server is crucial in high-security scenarios such as finance and government. However, existing TLS protocols typically rely on certificate-based public key infrastructures (PKI) for client authentication, which increases deployment complexity and introduces risks associated with third-party trust. In contrast, password-authenticated TLS protocols use memorable passwords for client authentication, offering advantages in simplicity and usability. Nonetheless, such protocols remain vulnerable to server compromise and fail to provide sufficient security against quantum adversaries.To address these challenges, we propose a novel TLS protocol based on asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE). The protocol employs an asymmetric PAKE mechanism wherein only password-derived information is stored on the server, while the client derives its private key from the password. This design effectively mitigates the risk of server leakage attacks. The protocol further integrates two types of post-quantum secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs): an OW-ChCCA (One-Way Checkable against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks) secure KEM for server key exchange and authentication, and an OW-PCA (One-Way Plaintext-Checkable Attacks) secure KEM for binding the client’s password-derived private key to enable client authentication. Both KEMs support multi-user, multi-challenge settings and admit tight, post-quantum secure instantiations.Furthermore, this paper provides a formal security analysis of the proposed protocol within an optimized multi-stage key exchange model. By combining the random oracle and ideal cipher models with a game-based proof methodology, we demonstrate that the protocol achieves mutual authentication and forward secrecy, while also providing tight security bounds and post-quantum resilience. This work thus presents a promising solution for constructing post-quantum password-authenticated TLS protocols.

International Conference on Blockchain Technology and Information Security (ICBCTIS)•Dec 5, 2025•0 citations

Security Model for Authenticated Key Exchange, Reconsidered

Xichen Zhang, Keitaro Hashimoto, Wakaha Ogata

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2024•0 citations
In this paper, we study Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) in a group. First, we present a generic "fairy-ring dance" construction that transforms any secure two-party PAKE scheme to a group PAKE protocol while preserving the round efficiency in the optimal way. Based on this generic construction, we present two concrete instantiations based on using SPEKE and J-PAKE as the underlying PAKE primitives respectively. The first protocol, called SPEKE+, accomplishes authenticated key exchange in a group with explicit key confirmation in just two rounds. This is more round-efficient than any existing group PAKE protocols in the literature. The second protocol, called J-PAKE+, requires one more round than SPEKE+, but is computationally faster. Finally, we present full implementations of SPEKE+ and J-PAKE+ with detailed performance measurements. Our experiments suggest that both protocols are feasible for practical applications in which the group size may vary from three to several dozen. This makes them useful, as we believe, for a wide range of applications - e.g., to bootstrap secure communication among a group of smart devices in the Internet of Things (IoT).
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols are essential for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of data communications. Mutual authentication between client and server is crucial in high-security scenarios such as finance and government. However, existing TLS protocols typically rely on certificate-based public key infrastructures (PKI) for client authentication, which increases deployment complexity and introduces risks associated with third-party trust. In contrast, password-authenticated TLS protocols use memorable passwords for client authentication, offering advantages in simplicity and usability. Nonetheless, such protocols remain vulnerable to server compromise and fail to provide sufficient security against quantum adversaries.To address these challenges, we propose a novel TLS protocol based on asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE). The protocol employs an asymmetric PAKE mechanism wherein only password-derived information is stored on the server, while the client derives its private key from the password. This design effectively mitigates the risk of server leakage attacks. The protocol further integrates two types of post-quantum secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs): an OW-ChCCA (One-Way Checkable against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks) secure KEM for server key exchange and authentication, and an OW-PCA (One-Way Plaintext-Checkable Attacks) secure KEM for binding the client’s password-derived private key to enable client authentication. Both KEMs support multi-user, multi-challenge settings and admit tight, post-quantum secure instantiations.Furthermore, this paper provides a formal security analysis of the proposed protocol within an optimized multi-stage key exchange model. By combining the random oracle and ideal cipher models with a game-based proof methodology, we demonstrate that the protocol achieves mutual authentication and forward secrecy, while also providing tight security bounds and post-quantum resilience. This work thus presents a promising solution for constructing post-quantum password-authenticated TLS protocols.