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Lecture notes in computer science

Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms and Authenticated Key Exchange

Nina Bindel, Jacqueline Brendel, Marc Fischlin, Brian Goncalves, Douglas Stebila

Published Jan 1, 2019• 132 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_12

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AKE (HAKE) protocol dubbed Muckle+, which is particularly useful in large quantum-safe networks consisting of a large number of nodes. The Muckle+ protocol is of a hybrid nature, in that it facilitates the incorporation of key material from conventional, post-quantum, and quantum cryptography primitives into a unified authenticated shared key. To achieve the desired authentication properties, Muckle+ utilizes post-quantum digital signatures. However, the efficiency of available instantiations of such signature schemes is not yet comparable to that of their post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) counterparts, particularly in large networks with potentially several connections in a short period of time. In order to address this discrepancy, the present work proposes Muckle#, a protocol that aims to expand the existing boundaries of efficiency within the HAKE framework. Muckle# utilizes post-quantum KEMs for implicit authentication, drawing inspiration from recent advancements in the domain of Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols, particularly in KEMTLS (CCS'20). Our KEM-based approach results in a slightly different message flow compared to prior work and we developed novel proof techniques in the process. Moreover, we implemented a proof of concept, thereby demonstrating practicality of this alternative approach to authentication within HAKE.
Abstract Authenticated key exchange protocol is widely applied in the Internet services. Lattice‐based key exchange protocols turn out to be quantum‐resistant and hence have attracted tremendous attention. A lattice‐based explicit authenticated key exchange protocol is constructed by combining an IND‐CPA key encapsulation mechanism with a strong EUF‐CMA digital signature under the message‐recovery mode. Concrete parameter specifications are suggested under the 102 and 218 bits post‐quantum security, respectively. Compared with the implicit authenticated key exchange derived directly from the key encapsulation mechanism, our proposals reduce the communication costs by 21.7% and 25.7%, respectively, under the same post‐quantum security level. Rough analysis shows that the proposals also obtain some advantages over previous constructions in term of computational efficiency. Moreover, our scheme achieves perfect forward secrecy while the original scheme only satisfies weak forward secrecy.