Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Technical Physics Letters

Studying Vulnerability in Quantum-Key-Distribution Systems to Attacks with Laser Damage to Optical Components Based on a Collapsing Mirror Device

S. V. Alferov, Kirill E. Bugai, Паргачёв Иван Андреевич, Yu. V. Іvanova

Published Feb 1, 2023• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract An attack on devices with laser damage to optical components referred to as “laser-damage attack” in the literature can allow an intruder to reduce the attenuation of optical elements and lead to the distributed key compromise. A method for protection against this attack using a device with a collapsing mirror is discussed. The efficiency of the protection method proposed has been confirmed by the experimental data.

DOI
10.1134/s1063785023010017

Related papers

Study of the vulnerability of device based on collapsing mirror used in quantum key distribution systems

S. V. Alferov, Kirill E. Bugai, Паргачёв Иван Андреевич +1 more

An attack on equipment with laser damage of optical components called " laser damage attack", can allow the eavesdropper to reduce the attenuation of optical elements and compromise distributed keys. A method of protection against this attack based on a device with a collapsing mirror has been considered. The conclusion based on experimental data about the effectiveness of the proposed method of protection has been made.. Keywords: quantum key distribution, laser damage attack, eavesdropper, symmetric cryptography.

Письма в журнал технической физики•Jan 1, 2023•1 citation

Исследование уязвимости систем квантового распределения ключей от атак с лазерным повреждением оптических компонентов на основе устройства с разрушающимся зеркалом

S. V. Alferov, Kirill E. Bugai, И.А. Паргачёв +1 more

An attack on equipment with laser damage of optical components called "laser damage attack", can allow the eavesdropper to reduce the attenuation of optical elements and compromise distributed keys. A method of protection against this attack based on a device with a collapsing mirror has been considered. The conclusion based on experimental data about the effectiveness of the proposed method of protection has been made.

Письма в журнал технической физики•Jan 1, 2023•0 citations

Study of the Vulnerability of Neutral Optical Filters Used in Quantum Key Distribution Systems against Laser Damage Attack

S. V. Alferov, Kirill E. Bugai, Паргачёв Иван Андреевич

Quantum key distribution systems are accessible to an eavesdropper; i.e., the eavesdropper can attack not only quantum states but also the equipment. In the former case, vulnerabilities are removed by fundamental constraints (e.g., no-cloning theorem) or theoretical foundations for their removal exist. In the latter case, vulnerability is determined by the practical implementation of equipment. An attack with laser damage of optical components called laser damage attack can allow the eavesdropper to reduce the attenuation of optical elements and compromise distributed keys. In this work, a method based on neutral optical filters has been described for protection from laser damage attack against optical components. A scheme imitating actions of the eavesdropper in the process of laser damage attack has been presented. An approach has been proposed to calculate the parameters of optical elements after the attack. Processes occurring in samples exposed to intense laser radiation have been analyzed. The analysis of experimental data has indicated the stability and constraints of neutral optical filters used in quantum key distribution systems for protection from laser damage attack.

Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics Letters•Jul 1, 2022•8 citations

Laser-Damage Attack Against Optical Attenuators in Quantum Key Distribution

Anqi Huang, Ruoping Li, Vladimir Egorov +3 more

Many quantum key distribution systems employ a laser followed by an optical attenuator to prepare weak coherent states in the source. Their mean photon number must be precalibrated to guarantee the security of key distribution. Here we experimentally show that this calibration can be broken with a high-power laser attack. We test four fiber-optic attenuator types used in quantum key distribution systems, and find that two of them exhibit a permanent decrease in attenuation after laser damage. This results in higher mean photon numbers in the prepared states and may allow an eavesdropper to compromise the key.

arXiv:1905.10795•Physical Review Applied•Mar 5, 2020•94 citations

Protecting Fiber-Optic Quantum Key Distribution Sources against Light-Injection Attacks

Anastasiya Ponosova, D. D. Ruzhitskaya, Poompong Chaiwongkhot +3 more

A well-protected and characterized source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security.Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit.The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laserdamage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks.Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source.This component should either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent high-attenuation state that breaks up the line.We demonstrate experimentally that off-the-shelf fiberoptic isolators and circulators have these desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.

arXiv:2201.06114•PRX Quantum•Oct 14, 2022•53 citations

Nonclassical Attack on a Quantum Key Distribution System

Anton Pljonkin, Dmitry Petrov, Lilia Sabantina +1 more

The article is focused on research of an attack on the quantum key distribution system and proposes a countermeasure method. Particularly noteworthy is that this is not a classic attack on a quantum protocol. We describe an attack on the process of calibration. Results of the research show that quantum key distribution systems have vulnerabilities not only in the protocols, but also in other vital system components. The described type of attack does not affect the cryptographic strength of the received keys and does not point to the vulnerability of the quantum key distribution protocol. We also propose a method for autocompensating optical communication system development, which protects synchronization from unauthorized access. The proposed method is based on the use of sync pulses attenuated to a photon level in the process of detecting a time interval with a signal. The paper presents the results of experimental studies that show the discrepancies between the theoretical and real parameters of the system. The obtained data allow the length of the quantum channel to be calculated with high accuracy.

arXiv:2104.13720•Entropy•Apr 23, 2021•18 citations
Abstract An attack on devices with laser damage to optical components referred to as “laser-damage attack” in the literature can allow an intruder to reduce the attenuation of optical elements and lead to the distributed key compromise. A method for protection against this attack using a device with a collapsing mirror is discussed. The efficiency of the protection method proposed has been confirmed by the experimental data.
An attack on equipment with laser damage of optical components called " laser damage attack", can allow the eavesdropper to reduce the attenuation of optical elements and compromise distributed keys. A method of protection against this attack based on a device with a collapsing mirror has been considered. The conclusion based on experimental data about the effectiveness of the proposed method of protection has been made.. Keywords: quantum key distribution, laser damage attack, eavesdropper, symmetric cryptography.
Quantum key distribution systems are accessible to an eavesdropper; i.e., the eavesdropper can attack not only quantum states but also the equipment. In the former case, vulnerabilities are removed by fundamental constraints (e.g., no-cloning theorem) or theoretical foundations for their removal exist. In the latter case, vulnerability is determined by the practical implementation of equipment. An attack with laser damage of optical components called laser damage attack can allow the eavesdropper to reduce the attenuation of optical elements and compromise distributed keys. In this work, a method based on neutral optical filters has been described for protection from laser damage attack against optical components. A scheme imitating actions of the eavesdropper in the process of laser damage attack has been presented. An approach has been proposed to calculate the parameters of optical elements after the attack. Processes occurring in samples exposed to intense laser radiation have been analyzed. The analysis of experimental data has indicated the stability and constraints of neutral optical filters used in quantum key distribution systems for protection from laser damage attack.
Many quantum key distribution systems employ a laser followed by an optical attenuator to prepare weak coherent states in the source. Their mean photon number must be precalibrated to guarantee the security of key distribution. Here we experimentally show that this calibration can be broken with a high-power laser attack. We test four fiber-optic attenuator types used in quantum key distribution systems, and find that two of them exhibit a permanent decrease in attenuation after laser damage. This results in higher mean photon numbers in the prepared states and may allow an eavesdropper to compromise the key.
A well-protected and characterized source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security.Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit.The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laserdamage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks.Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source.This component should either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent high-attenuation state that breaks up the line.We demonstrate experimentally that off-the-shelf fiberoptic isolators and circulators have these desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.
The article is focused on research of an attack on the quantum key distribution system and proposes a countermeasure method. Particularly noteworthy is that this is not a classic attack on a quantum protocol. We describe an attack on the process of calibration. Results of the research show that quantum key distribution systems have vulnerabilities not only in the protocols, but also in other vital system components. The described type of attack does not affect the cryptographic strength of the received keys and does not point to the vulnerability of the quantum key distribution protocol. We also propose a method for autocompensating optical communication system development, which protects synchronization from unauthorized access. The proposed method is based on the use of sync pulses attenuated to a photon level in the process of detecting a time interval with a signal. The paper presents the results of experimental studies that show the discrepancies between the theoretical and real parameters of the system. The obtained data allow the length of the quantum channel to be calculated with high accuracy.