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International Journal of Theoretical Physics

A Logico-Epistemic Investigation of Frauchiger and Renner’s Paradox

Alberto Corti, Vincenzo Fano, Gino Tarozzi

Published Mar 6, 2023• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract The scientific literature on Wigner’s Friend extended paradox rapidly grew in the last years. A sign that Frauchiger and Renner (2018)’s argument caught an important point. Indeed, they conclude that either we must abandon the universal validity of quantum mechanics, or a certain kind of traditional objective knowledge is impossible. We investigate this contradiction through a logico-epistemic toolbox. We show that abandoning the transmissibility of knowledge, as proposed by many kinds of relational approaches to quantum mechanics, is a heavy epistemological renouncement. Perhaps, it is better to bite the bullet and accept Frauchiger and Renner’s contradiction, until a new revolutionary solution will appear.

DOI
10.1007/s10773-023-05313-z

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Abstract The scientific literature on Wigner’s Friend extended paradox rapidly grew in the last years. A sign that Frauchiger and Renner (2018)’s argument caught an important point. Indeed, they conclude that either we must abandon the universal validity of quantum mechanics, or a certain kind of traditional objective knowledge is impossible. We investigate this contradiction through a logico-epistemic toolbox. We show that abandoning the transmissibility of knowledge, as proposed by many kinds of relational approaches to quantum mechanics, is a heavy epistemological renouncement. Perhaps, it is better to bite the bullet and accept Frauchiger and Renner’s contradiction, until a new revolutionary solution will appear.
Abstract We take a fresh look at Wigner’s Friend thought-experiment and some of its more recent variants and extensions, such as the Frauchiger-Renner (FR) Paradox. We discuss various solutions proposed in the literature, focusing on a few questions: What is the correct epistemic interpretation of the multiplicity of state assignments in these scenarios? Under which conditions can one include classical observers into the quantum state descriptions, in a way that is still compatible with traditional Quantum Mechanics? Under which conditions can one system be admitted as an additional ‘observer’ from the perspective of another background observer? When can the standard axioms of multi-agent Epistemic Logic (that allow “knowledge transfer” between agents) be applied to quantum-physical observers? In the last part of the paper, we propose a new answer to these questions, sketch a particular formal implementation of this answer, and apply it to obtain a principled solution to Wigner Friend-type paradoxes.
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the Frauchiger–Renner paradox (2018), a significant thought experiment that demonstrates a logical contradiction arising when standard quantum mechanics is applied to nested observers. Building on Wigner’s friend scenario, it examines the formal setup, derives the contradiction from assumptions of universality, the Born rule, and self-consistency in multi-agent reasoning, and evaluates proposed resolutions across major interpretations of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen, Everettian/many-worlds, relational, QBism, decoherent histories, and objective collapse theories). The work explores historical context, epistemological implications for observation, objectivity, and intersubjectivity, as well as recent experimental probes and theoretical refinements. It argues that the paradox reveals deep tensions in applying quantum theory to complex, self-referential scenarios involving observers (2026).
Abstract The paper constructs a semi-formal language suited to the analysis of Wigner’s Friend scenarios: it represents an epistemic notion of rational beliefs and perspectives, to accommodate the insights of perspectival interpretations of quantum mechanics. The language is then used to analyze a paradox put forward by Frauchiger and Renner (Nat Commun, 9(1):3711, 2018). Their argument is presented as a semi-formal derivation with specified rules of reasoning. These rules bear an affinity to some of the cherished tenets of epistemology and we argue that they are valid (one universally, and the other in experimental contexts). Since our proof is a reductio , it leaves a choice which premises are responsible for a contradiction. Our first choice is a step that appears incorrect from the point of view of the universal unitary evolution as well as the view that every measurement induces a collapse of a measured system’s state. Our second choice, brought to view by the paper’s attention to perspectives and epistemology, points to a step reporting the transmission of beliefs (testimony) about measurement results. We argue that testimony is not licensed by quantum mechanical formalism; we discuss some recent attempts to save the cogency of testimony in the context of quantum measurements.
We present a discussion of the extended Wigner's friend thought experiment proposed by Frauchiger and Renner in [1]. We show by using various arguments, including textbook quantum mechanics and the ontological approach of Contexts, Systems, Modalities (CSM), that no contradiction arises if one admits that agents must agree on what is considered as a system and what is not. In such a contextually objective approach of quantum mechanics, the apparent contradiction is automatically removed. We also discuss why this mutual agreement between agents is already implicit in the standard formulations of quantum mechanics, and why removing it leads to inconsistencies.
The Frauchiger–Renner paradox derives an inconsistency when quantum theory is used to describe the use of itself, by means of a scenario where agents model other agents quantumly and reason about each other's knowledge. We observe that logical contextuality (à la Hardy) is the key ingredient of the FR paradox, and we provide a stronger paradox based on the strongly contextual GHZ–Mermin scenario. In contrast to the FR paradox, this GHZ–FR paradox neither requires post-selection nor any reasoning by observers who are modelled quantumly. If one accepts the universality of quantum theory including superobservers, we propose a natural extension of Peres's dictum to resolve these extended Wigner's friend paradoxes.
Quantum mechanics has been subject to logical scrutiny since its inception. The behavior of quantum systems, which are fundamentally dissimilar from classical systems, often appears to point to a logical inconsistency in quantum mechanics, allegedly leading to contradictions in the prediction of experimental measurements--though such contradictions have never materialized. A recent example of this type of inquiry into the logical well-posedness of quantum mechanics is the Frauchiger-Renner Gedankenexperiment, which purports to demonstrate that quantum mechanics is logically inconsistent. In this article, we show that by considering the property of contextuality in quantum systems--as predicted by the Kochen-Specker theorem--the supposed contradiction proposed by Frauchiger and Renner becomes logically inaccessible.