Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Consistent histories through pragmatist lenses

Quentin Ruyant

Published Feb 24, 2023• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

This article adopts a bottom-up approach to theory interpretation, following the slogan "meaning is use", and applies it to quantum mechanics. I argue that it fits very well with the Consistent Histories formulation of quantum mechanics, interpreted in a particular way that is not the interpretation favoured by original proponents of the formulation. I examine the difficulties and advantages of this interpretation.

DOI
10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.01.001

Related papers

Consistent quantum theory as a realistic formulation of quantum mechanics

Pierre C. Hohenberg

The foundations of quantum mechanics have been plagued by controversy throughout the 85 year history of the field. It is argued that lack of clarity in the formulation of basic philosophical questions leads to unnecessary obscurity and controversy and an attempt is made to identify the main forks in the road that separate the most important interpretations of quantum theory. The consistent histories formulation, also known as "consistent quantum theory", is described as one particular way (favored by the author) to answer the essential questions of interpretation. The theory is shown to be a realistic formulation of quantum mechanics, in contrast to the orthodox or Copenhagen formulation which will be referred to as an operationalist theory.

arXiv:1101.2635•Jan 13, 2011•1 citation

Consistent Histories and the Bohm Approach

Basil J. Hiley, O. J. E. Maroney

In a recent paper Griffiths claims that the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics gives rise to results that contradict those obtained from the Bohm interpretation. This is in spite of the fact that both claim to provide a realist interpretation of the formalism without the need to add any new mathematical content and both always produce exactly the same probability predictions of the outcome of experiments. In constrasting the differences Griffiths argues that the consistent histories interpretation provides a more physically reasonable account of quantum phenomena. We examine this claim and show that the consistent histories approach is not without its difficulties.

arXiv:quant-ph/0009056•Sep 13, 2000•10 citations

3 On the Consistency of the Consistent Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics

Elias Okon, Daniel Sudarsky

Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechani-cal framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that different realms can be mutually incom-patible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary ” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational prob-lems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. 1

•Jan 11, 2013•29 citations

Consistent Histories may be strange, but so is standard Quantum Theory

J. Finkelstein

Interpretational questions that arise in the Consistent Histories formulation of quantum mechanics are illustrated by the familiar example of a beam passing through multiple slits.

arXiv:quant-ph/9608007•Aug 7, 1996•0 citations

Remarks on Consistent Histories and Bohmian Mechanics

Adrian Kent

Recent work with Dowker on the scientific status of the consistent histories approach to quantum theory is reviewed and summarised. The approach is compared with formulations of quantum theory, such as Bohmian mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation a la Landau-Lifshitz, in which classical variables are explicitly appended. I try to explain why the consistent histories formulation is scientifically problematic, in that it is a very weak theory, but also scientifically interesting, shedding new light on quantum theory.

arXiv:quant-ph/9511032•Nov 22, 1995•0 citations

Consistent Quantum Histories: Towards a Universal Language of Physics

Wojciech Piotr Grygiel

The consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics is a reformulation of the standard Copenhagen interpretation that aims at incorporating quantum probabilities as part of the axiomatic foundations of the theory. It is not only supposed to equip quantum mechanics with clear criteria of its own experimental verification but, first and foremost, to alleviate one of the stumbling blocks of the theory ‐ the measurement problem. Since the consistent histories interpretation operates with a series of quantum events integrated into one quantum history, the measurement problem is naturally absorbed as one of the events that build up a history. The interpretation rests upon the two following assumptions, proposed already by J. von Neumann: (1) both the microscopic and macroscopic regimes are subject to the same set of quantum laws and (2) a projector operator that is assigned to each event within a history permits to transcribe the history into

Old and New Concepts of Physics•Feb 6, 2007•0 citations
This article adopts a bottom-up approach to theory interpretation, following the slogan "meaning is use", and applies it to quantum mechanics. I argue that it fits very well with the Consistent Histories formulation of quantum mechanics, interpreted in a particular way that is not the interpretation favoured by original proponents of the formulation. I examine the difficulties and advantages of this interpretation.
The foundations of quantum mechanics have been plagued by controversy throughout the 85 year history of the field. It is argued that lack of clarity in the formulation of basic philosophical questions leads to unnecessary obscurity and controversy and an attempt is made to identify the main forks in the road that separate the most important interpretations of quantum theory. The consistent histories formulation, also known as "consistent quantum theory", is described as one particular way (favored by the author) to answer the essential questions of interpretation. The theory is shown to be a realistic formulation of quantum mechanics, in contrast to the orthodox or Copenhagen formulation which will be referred to as an operationalist theory.
In a recent paper Griffiths claims that the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics gives rise to results that contradict those obtained from the Bohm interpretation. This is in spite of the fact that both claim to provide a realist interpretation of the formalism without the need to add any new mathematical content and both always produce exactly the same probability predictions of the outcome of experiments. In constrasting the differences Griffiths argues that the consistent histories interpretation provides a more physically reasonable account of quantum phenomena. We examine this claim and show that the consistent histories approach is not without its difficulties.
Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechani-cal framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that different realms can be mutually incom-patible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary ” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational prob-lems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. 1
Recent work with Dowker on the scientific status of the consistent histories approach to quantum theory is reviewed and summarised. The approach is compared with formulations of quantum theory, such as Bohmian mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation a la Landau-Lifshitz, in which classical variables are explicitly appended. I try to explain why the consistent histories formulation is scientifically problematic, in that it is a very weak theory, but also scientifically interesting, shedding new light on quantum theory.
The consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics is a reformulation of the standard Copenhagen interpretation that aims at incorporating quantum probabilities as part of the axiomatic foundations of the theory. It is not only supposed to equip quantum mechanics with clear criteria of its own experimental verification but, first and foremost, to alleviate one of the stumbling blocks of the theory ‐ the measurement problem. Since the consistent histories interpretation operates with a series of quantum events integrated into one quantum history, the measurement problem is naturally absorbed as one of the events that build up a history. The interpretation rests upon the two following assumptions, proposed already by J. von Neumann: (1) both the microscopic and macroscopic regimes are subject to the same set of quantum laws and (2) a projector operator that is assigned to each event within a history permits to transcribe the history into