Smart grid (SG) recently acquired considerable attention due to their utilization in sustaining demand response management in power systems. Smart meters (SMs) deployed in SG systems collect and transmit data to the server. Since all communications between SM and the server occur through a public communication channel, the transmitted data are exposed to adversary attacks. Therefore, security and privacy are essential requirements in the SG system for ensuring reliable communication. Additionally, an AuthentiCation (AC) protocol designed for secure communication should be lightweight so it can be applied in a resource-constrained environment. In this article, we devise a lightweight AC protocol for SG named LACP-SG. LACP-SG employs the hash function, "Esch256", and "authenticated encryption" to accomplish the AC phase. The proposed LACP-SG assures secure data exchange between SM and server by validating the authenticity of SM. For encrypted communication, LACP-SG enables SM and the server to establish a session key (SEK). We use the random oracle model to substantiate the security of the established SEK. Moreover, we ascertain that LACP-SG is guarded against different security vulnerabilities through Scyther-based security validation and informal security analysis. Furthermore, comparing LACP-SG with other related AC protocols demonstrates that LACP-SG is less resource-intensive while rendering better security characteristics.
Smart grid (SG) recently acquired considerable attention due to their utilization in sustaining demand response management in power systems. Smart meters (SMs) deployed in SG systems collect and transmit data to the server. Since all communications between SM and the server occur through a public communication channel, the transmitted data are exposed to adversary attacks. Therefore, security and privacy are essential requirements in the SG system for ensuring reliable communication. Additionally, an AuthentiCation (AC) protocol designed for secure communication should be lightweight so it can be applied in a resource-constrained environment. In this article, we devise a lightweight AC protocol for SG named LACP-SG. LACP-SG employs the hash function, "Esch256", and "authenticated encryption" to accomplish the AC phase. The proposed LACP-SG assures secure data exchange between SM and server by validating the authenticity of SM. For encrypted communication, LACP-SG enables SM and the server to establish a session key (SEK). We use the random oracle model to substantiate the security of the established SEK. Moreover, we ascertain that LACP-SG is guarded against different security vulnerabilities through Scyther-based security validation and informal security analysis. Furthermore, comparing LACP-SG with other related AC protocols demonstrates that LACP-SG is less resource-intensive while rendering better security characteristics.
Internet of Things-enabled smart grid (SG) technology provides ample advantages to traditional power grids. In an SG system, the smart meter (SM) is the critical component that collects the power usage information related to users and delivers the accumulated vital information to the central service provider (CSP) via the Internet, imperiled to numerous pernicious security threats. Consequently, it is crucial to preserve the integrity of the communication between SMs and CSP for the smooth running of the SG system. Authentication protocol effectively enables SM and CSP to communicate securely by establishing a secure channel. This paper presents an anonymous and reliable authentication protocol for SG (ARAP-SG) to enable secure and reliable information exchange. The proposed ARAP-SG uses the hash function, elliptic curve cryptography, and symmetric encryption to complete the authentication phase. ARAP-SG guarantees reliable information exchange during the authentication phase while conserving the anonymity of both SP and SM. Additionally, ARAP-SG authorizes CSP and SM to construct a session key (SK) after accomplishing the authentication phase for undecipherable information exchange in the future. We utilized the random oracle model to corroborate the security of constructed SK. Moreover, we demonstrate that ARAP-SG is proficient in thwarting covert security attacks by effectuating informal security analysis. Furthermore, Scyther-based corroboration manifests that ARAP-SG is secure. Finally, we explain through a comparative analysis with relevant authentication protocols that ARAP-SG entails 25.5-56.76% and 7.69-49.47% low computational and communication overheads, respectively, with improved security properties.
Abstract Smart grid (SG) facilitates our lives by providing more reliable electricity and enabling better integration of renewable energy sources. Currently, numerous authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols have been proposed to secure SG communication. However, these solutions often result in considerable cost, making them inappropriate for resource-constrained SG environment. In this paper, we propose a secure and resource-efficient AKA protocol by employing lightweight cryptography primitives including authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) primitive ASCON, hash function and XOR operation. The ASCON primitive simultaneously provides data confidentiality, integrity and authenticity with low computation cost, making it suitable for employing in resource-constrained SG environment. The secret intermediate values in the protocol are designed as hash values that incorporate both long-term and short-term secrets, thereby providing enhanced security while further reducing cost. Moreover, a dynamic indexing method is deployed in the protocol to resist de-synchronization attack. The designed protocol performs secure mutual authentication and session key establishment between entities without relying on a central trusted authority. The proposed protocol is proven secure through rigorous security proof under the real-or-random model and formally verified by AVISPA tool. Theoretical performance analysis and simulation results indicate that the proposed protocol outperforms other related protocols due to its lightweight nature and adherence to all fundamental security attributes, making it suitable for deployment in smart grid environment.
The rapid development of 6G makes Smart Grid (SG) in urgent need of more lightweight authentication protocols. SG is a revolutionary solution for the future energy industry. However, the SM typically has limited computing resources that makes it difficult to implement traditional security measures directly. In this paper, we propose a lightweight authenticated key agreement protocol that has the notable performance advantage while maintaining a security level comparable to the currently existing SG authentication protocols. Our authentication protocol improves the efficiency over existing protocols by at least 50%. Meanwhile, we reduce the use of at least one cryptographic primitive compared to previous protocols, which makes it more suitable for resource-constrained environments.
The IoT-enabled Smart Grid uses IoT smart devices to collect the private electricity data of consumers and send it to service providers over the public network, which leads to some new security problems. To ensure the communication security in a smart grid, many researches are focusing on using authentication and key agreement protocols to protect against cyber attacks. Unfortunately, most of them are vulnerable to various attacks. In this paper, we analyze the security of an existent protocol by introducing an insider attacker, and show that their scheme cannot guarantee the claimed security requirements under their adversary model. Then, we present an improved lightweight authentication and key agreement protocol, which aims to enhance the security of IoT-enabled smart grid systems. Furthermore, we proved the security of the scheme under the real-or-random oracle model. The result shown that the improved scheme is secure in the presence of both internal attackers and external attackers. Compared with the original protocol, the new protocol is more secure, while keeping the same computation efficiency. Both of them are 0.0552 ms. The communication of the new protocol is 236 bytes, which is acceptable in smart grids. In other words, with similar communication and computation cost, we proposed a more secure protocol for smart grids.
With the widespread utilization of Internet-enabled smart devices (SDs), the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) has become prevalent in recent years. SDs exchange information through the open Internet, which creates security and privacy concerns for the exchanged information. To address these concerns, various solutions exist in the literature which, because of high computational and communication overheads, are not appropriate for the resource-constricted IIoT environment. This article proposes a resource-efficient authentication protocol for the IIoT, called REAP-IIoT, which employs a lightweight cryptography (LWC)-based authenticated encryption with associative data (AEAD) primitive AEGIS along with hash function. LWC-based AEAD primitives are suitable for resource constraint SDs because they require fewer computational resources. Moreover, REAP-IIoT renders the privacy-preserving user authentication functionality and establishes a session key (SK) between SDs deployed in the IIoT environment and users. Both user and SD utilize the established SK for encrypted communication. The security of SK, established during the authentication and key exchange (AKE) process of REAP-IIoT, is validated through the broadly accepted random or real model. Besides, Scyther-based security verification is conducted to illustrate that REAP-IIoT is secure and can protect the man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. Additionally, the informal security analysis is carried out to show that REAP-IIoT is protected against various covert security risks. A thorough comparison reveals that REAP-IIoT renders enhanced security characteristics apart from its low communication, storage, and computational overheads than the relevant AKE protocols.
With the enablement of Internet of Things technology, the electrical grid is currently undergoing a drastic revolution, which is known as smart grid. Since massive sensitive data and control commands transmitted via public channels, the smart grid is challenged by various cyber threats. Authenticated key agreement protocols in smart grid effectively ensure the confidentiality and authentication of communication through mutual authentication and establishing session keys. In this article, we review the existing elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based authentication and key agreement protocols in smart gird and perform a security analysis of Hu et al.’s protocol. We exhibit that the protocol fails to resist key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack and cannot provide untraceability. Furthermore, we propose a security-enhanced authentication and key agreement protocol based on ECC, which performs registration, authentication, and key agreement phases over public channels to enable mutual authentication and to establish session keys. The protocol is also proved to be security-enhanced by formal proof and informal analysis. The performance analysis results demonstrate that the proposed protocol is comparable to other existing protocols while achieving enhanced security. Therefore, the protocol satisfies the deployment requirements for resource-constrained smart grid.