Internet of Things-enabled smart grid (SG) technology provides ample advantages to traditional power grids. In an SG system, the smart meter (SM) is the critical component that collects the power usage information related to users and delivers the accumulated vital information to the central service provider (CSP) via the Internet, imperiled to numerous pernicious security threats. Consequently, it is crucial to preserve the integrity of the communication between SMs and CSP for the smooth running of the SG system. Authentication protocol effectively enables SM and CSP to communicate securely by establishing a secure channel. This paper presents an anonymous and reliable authentication protocol for SG (ARAP-SG) to enable secure and reliable information exchange. The proposed ARAP-SG uses the hash function, elliptic curve cryptography, and symmetric encryption to complete the authentication phase. ARAP-SG guarantees reliable information exchange during the authentication phase while conserving the anonymity of both SP and SM. Additionally, ARAP-SG authorizes CSP and SM to construct a session key (SK) after accomplishing the authentication phase for undecipherable information exchange in the future. We utilized the random oracle model to corroborate the security of constructed SK. Moreover, we demonstrate that ARAP-SG is proficient in thwarting covert security attacks by effectuating informal security analysis. Furthermore, Scyther-based corroboration manifests that ARAP-SG is secure. Finally, we explain through a comparative analysis with relevant authentication protocols that ARAP-SG entails 25.5-56.76% and 7.69-49.47% low computational and communication overheads, respectively, with improved security properties.
Internet of Things-enabled smart grid (SG) technology provides ample advantages to traditional power grids. In an SG system, the smart meter (SM) is the critical component that collects the power usage information related to users and delivers the accumulated vital information to the central service provider (CSP) via the Internet, imperiled to numerous pernicious security threats. Consequently, it is crucial to preserve the integrity of the communication between SMs and CSP for the smooth running of the SG system. Authentication protocol effectively enables SM and CSP to communicate securely by establishing a secure channel. This paper presents an anonymous and reliable authentication protocol for SG (ARAP-SG) to enable secure and reliable information exchange. The proposed ARAP-SG uses the hash function, elliptic curve cryptography, and symmetric encryption to complete the authentication phase. ARAP-SG guarantees reliable information exchange during the authentication phase while conserving the anonymity of both SP and SM. Additionally, ARAP-SG authorizes CSP and SM to construct a session key (SK) after accomplishing the authentication phase for undecipherable information exchange in the future. We utilized the random oracle model to corroborate the security of constructed SK. Moreover, we demonstrate that ARAP-SG is proficient in thwarting covert security attacks by effectuating informal security analysis. Furthermore, Scyther-based corroboration manifests that ARAP-SG is secure. Finally, we explain through a comparative analysis with relevant authentication protocols that ARAP-SG entails 25.5-56.76% and 7.69-49.47% low computational and communication overheads, respectively, with improved security properties.
Smart grid (SG) recently acquired considerable attention due to their utilization in sustaining demand response management in power systems. Smart meters (SMs) deployed in SG systems collect and transmit data to the server. Since all communications between SM and the server occur through a public communication channel, the transmitted data are exposed to adversary attacks. Therefore, security and privacy are essential requirements in the SG system for ensuring reliable communication. Additionally, an AuthentiCation (AC) protocol designed for secure communication should be lightweight so it can be applied in a resource-constrained environment. In this article, we devise a lightweight AC protocol for SG named LACP-SG. LACP-SG employs the hash function, "Esch256", and "authenticated encryption" to accomplish the AC phase. The proposed LACP-SG assures secure data exchange between SM and server by validating the authenticity of SM. For encrypted communication, LACP-SG enables SM and the server to establish a session key (SEK). We use the random oracle model to substantiate the security of the established SEK. Moreover, we ascertain that LACP-SG is guarded against different security vulnerabilities through Scyther-based security validation and informal security analysis. Furthermore, comparing LACP-SG with other related AC protocols demonstrates that LACP-SG is less resource-intensive while rendering better security characteristics.
Abstract Smart grid (SG) facilitates our lives by providing more reliable electricity and enabling better integration of renewable energy sources. Currently, numerous authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols have been proposed to secure SG communication. However, these solutions often result in considerable cost, making them inappropriate for resource-constrained SG environment. In this paper, we propose a secure and resource-efficient AKA protocol by employing lightweight cryptography primitives including authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) primitive ASCON, hash function and XOR operation. The ASCON primitive simultaneously provides data confidentiality, integrity and authenticity with low computation cost, making it suitable for employing in resource-constrained SG environment. The secret intermediate values in the protocol are designed as hash values that incorporate both long-term and short-term secrets, thereby providing enhanced security while further reducing cost. Moreover, a dynamic indexing method is deployed in the protocol to resist de-synchronization attack. The designed protocol performs secure mutual authentication and session key establishment between entities without relying on a central trusted authority. The proposed protocol is proven secure through rigorous security proof under the real-or-random model and formally verified by AVISPA tool. Theoretical performance analysis and simulation results indicate that the proposed protocol outperforms other related protocols due to its lightweight nature and adherence to all fundamental security attributes, making it suitable for deployment in smart grid environment.
With the enablement of Internet of Things technology, the electrical grid is currently undergoing a drastic revolution, which is known as smart grid. Since massive sensitive data and control commands transmitted via public channels, the smart grid is challenged by various cyber threats. Authenticated key agreement protocols in smart grid effectively ensure the confidentiality and authentication of communication through mutual authentication and establishing session keys. In this article, we review the existing elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based authentication and key agreement protocols in smart gird and perform a security analysis of Hu et al.’s protocol. We exhibit that the protocol fails to resist key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack and cannot provide untraceability. Furthermore, we propose a security-enhanced authentication and key agreement protocol based on ECC, which performs registration, authentication, and key agreement phases over public channels to enable mutual authentication and to establish session keys. The protocol is also proved to be security-enhanced by formal proof and informal analysis. The performance analysis results demonstrate that the proposed protocol is comparable to other existing protocols while achieving enhanced security. Therefore, the protocol satisfies the deployment requirements for resource-constrained smart grid.
In recent days, the most important concern in the Internet of Things (IoT) is to experience distinct technologies in the communication systems. Smart grid is a pertinent common application under a single umbrella of the IoT and it can accomplish the communication via the Internet Protocol to sustain the information exchange between the service provider and the smart meter in the system. However, IP-based communication systems make this task susceptible to several serious security attacks. To prevent these attacks, many security protocols between the service provider and smart meter have been proposed in the literature. Existing security mechanisms allow the smart meters to establish a connection with the service provider, but it is essential to design a security system by which the service provider can communicate with multiple smart meters and establish a connection with them. To establish such connection, all the smart meters need be authenticated with the service provider and agree on an individual session key. In this article, we propose a novel mutually authenticated key establishment protocol between the service provider and the smart meter by which the service provider can initiate the communication. The proposed protocol is proven to be correct using the formal method Gong, Needham, and Yahalom logic. The protocol is also simulated in the automated tool ProVerif and the results are detailed. The proposed protocol and the existing pertinent protocols are compared in several aspects. Comparison results show that our protocol outperforms the others.
Unlike traditional power networks, the smart grid power system has the ability to arrange the power supply in real time to the customer for active power consumption. Therefore, it can avoid excess electricity generation. In addition, based on the current power consumption, the power service providers can measure the expected power generation amount to stabilize the power system. Compared with traditional power networks, the characteristics of the smart grid power system make it easier to suffer from several types of security threats and attacks such as impersonation, eavesdropping and message modification etc. In order to strength the security of smart grid networks, a robust and efficient authentication protocol should provide to mutual authentication and session key agreement. Since the communications between the control center and the substation is protected by the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system, we focus on the secure communication between the substation and the smart appliances. In this paper, a robust and efficient authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography is proposed to achieve mutual authentication and key agreement between the substation and the smart appliances. In addition, the proposed protocol not only resists replay attacks, impersonation attacks, and man-in-middle attacks, but also provides the session key security and the known-key security.
Smart grids, steering an energy revolution through smart metering infrastructure, face cybersecurity threats and unauthorized access risks. Within these systems, classical authentication protocols validate identities, fostering trust and enabling access to authorized resources, while preventing unauthorized access. However, classical authentication protocols are predominantly dependent on public-key cryptography, rooted in computational hard problems such as integer factorization and discrete logs to uphold security. Nevertheless, these computational hard problems can be easily compromised by quantum adversaries. Furthermore, quantum-resistant smart meter authentication protocols are either deemed impractical or reliant on quantum hard problems, potentially lacking future-proof security. Moreover, maintaining SG entity privacy holds equal significance. Consequently, this article introduces the Quantum-Secure Privacy-Preserving Smart Meter Authentication (Q-Secure-P2-SMA) protocol. It utilizes semi-quantum key distribution and a hash function to facilitate quantum-resistant metering data communication, with a focus on privacy and practicality. The security analysis and performance evaluation conducted for Q-Secure-P2-SMA confirm its resilience against well-known security threats, showcasing improved efficiency compared to existing state-of-art-protocols across computation, communication, and energy overhead. Notably, the Q-Secure-P2-SMA doesn’t necessitate quantum capability among all SG entities, making it more practical and relevant in real-world scenarios.