Pulse-width mismatch, primarily caused by channel asymmetry, affects the visibility of Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference. We show that a channel asymmetry of 176.5 km reduces HOM visibility to 0.37, rendering a polarization-based MDI-QKD protocol completely insecure.
Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD) enhances security by removing vulnerabilities associated with detector side channels. Real-world implementations of measurement device independent (MDI) QKD face practical challenges such as channel asymmetry and physical imperfections, which degrade the visibility of Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference, an essential factor in determining the secure key rate. In this work, we evaluate the performance of differential phase encoded (DPE) MDI-QKD under realistic, asymmetric conditions. We analyse the effects of polarisation and pulse-width mismatches caused by channel asymmetry and identify tolerable limits for secure key generation. We introduce a plug-and-play DPE-MDI-QKD architecture that mitigates polarisation fluctuations using Faraday mirrors and also compensates for pulse-width mismatches. Furthermore, we propose an improved sifting scheme that raises the sifting efficiency from94to32, improving the secure key generation rates by 50% and making it especially suitable for plug-and-play systems. These results offer practical insights into enhancing the robustness and efficiency of DPE-MDI-QKD, enabling more secure quantum communication over imperfect and asymmetric quantum channels.
Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference is one of the most important experimental phenomena in quantum optics. It has drawn considerable attention with respect to quantum cryptography and quantum communication because of the advent of the measurement device independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. Here, we realize HOM interference, having a visibility of approximately 38.1%, using two independent heralded single-photon sources (HSPSs). The HOM interference between two independent HSPSs is a core technology for realizing the long-distance MDI QKD protocol, the quantum coin-tossing protocol, and other quantum cryptography protocols.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI QKD) is a promising and practical protocol for remote secret sharing, where the Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) type interference in the measurement side provides a simple and economic way to resist malicious attacks on the measurement devices. Because the HOM interference greatly indicates the performance of MDI QKD system, its interferential behavior in practical situations deserve to be studied. In this work, we analyzed HOM visibility with several practical imperfections, such as the deviation of the beam splitting ratio, detection efficiency mismatch of detectors, inconsistent intensities of two incident pulses. In particular, we discussed the afterpulse effect of InGaAs avalanche photodiode detectors with a non-Markovian model, where we take the avalanche history into consideration and provide a new and more accurate perspective for afterpulse analysis. Simulation results indicate that the afterpulse effect in practical situation has a greater impact on the HOM performance than other imperfections. The results exhibit its value in realistic high-speed MDI QKD systems as well as other fiber-based HOM applications.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protects legitimate users from attacks on measurement devices. The decoy method allows for unconditionally secure quantum key generation using lasers. One of the most important issues in MDI-QKD is that photons from two independent lasers must be indistinguishable. Because Alice and Bob send Charlie laser pulses through separate fiber links, the arrival times of the pulses fluctuate independently. According to the Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference at Charlie's relay, the time delay between two photons has the greatest effect on distinguishability. However, to date, these effects have not been analyzed. Our study uses simulations to investigate the effects of two-photon temporal distinguishability in terms of the visibility of the HOM-dip of two photons on the final key rate of finite-size MDI-QKD. Furthermore, an acceptable time delay range was estimated based on photons with Gaussian spectral amplitude functions.
Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) can address vulnerabilities on the detection side of a QKD system. The core of this protocol involves continuous-variable Bell measurements performed by an untrusted third party. However, in high-speed systems, spectrum broadening causes Bell measurements to deviate from the ideal single-mode scenario, resulting in mode mismatches, reduced performance, and compromised security. Here, we introduce temporal modes (TMs) to analyze the performance of CV-MDI QKD under continuous-mode scenarios. The mismatch between Bob's transmitting mode and Bell measurement mode has a more significant effect on system performance compared to that on Alice's side. When the Bell receiver is close to Bob and the mismatch is set to just 5%, the transmission distance drastically decreases from 87.96 km to 18.50 km. In comparison, the same mismatch for Alice reduces the distance to 86.83 km. This greater degradation on Bob's side can be attributed to the asymmetry in the data modification step. Furthermore, the mismatch in TM characteristics leads to a significant reduction in the secret key rate by 83% when the transmission distance is set to 15 km, which severely limits the practical usability of the protocol over specific distances. These results indicate that in scenarios involving continuous-mode interference, such as large-scale MDI network setups, careful consideration of each user's TM characteristics is crucial. Rigorous pre-calibration of these modes is essential to ensure the system's reliability and efficiency.
Recently, the Hong–Ou–Mandel (HOM) interference between two independent weak coherent pulses (WCPs) has been paid much attention due to the measurement-device-independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD). Using classical wave theory, articles reported before show that the visibility of this kind of HOM-type interference is ≤ 50%. In this work, we analyze this kind of interference using quantum optics, which reveals more details compared to the wave theory. Analyses confirm the maximum visibility of 50%. And we conclude that the maximum visibility of 50% comes from the two single-photon states in WCPs, without considering the noise. In the experiment, we successfully approach the visibility of 50% by using WCPs splitting from the single pico-second laser source and phase scanning. Since this kind of HOM interference is immune to slow phase fluctuations, both the realized and proposed experiment designs can provide stable ways of high-resolution optical distance detection.