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IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering

Analysis of the Effects of the Two-Photon Temporal Distinguishability on Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

Haobo Ge, Akihisa Tomita, Atsushi Okamoto, Kazuhisa Ogawa

Published Jan 1, 2023• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protects legitimate users from attacks on measurement devices. The decoy method allows for unconditionally secure quantum key generation using lasers. One of the most important issues in MDI-QKD is that photons from two independent lasers must be indistinguishable. Because Alice and Bob send Charlie laser pulses through separate fiber links, the arrival times of the pulses fluctuate independently. According to the Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference at Charlie's relay, the time delay between two photons has the greatest effect on distinguishability. However, to date, these effects have not been analyzed. Our study uses simulations to investigate the effects of two-photon temporal distinguishability in terms of the visibility of the HOM-dip of two photons on the final key rate of finite-size MDI-QKD. Furthermore, an acceptable time delay range was estimated based on photons with Gaussian spectral amplitude functions.

DOI
10.1109/tqe.2023.3259043

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quant-pharXiv:2610.42041•Nov 2, 2026
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protects legitimate users from attacks on measurement devices. The decoy method allows for unconditionally secure quantum key generation using lasers. One of the most important issues in MDI-QKD is that photons from two independent lasers must be indistinguishable. Because Alice and Bob send Charlie laser pulses through separate fiber links, the arrival times of the pulses fluctuate independently. According to the Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference at Charlie's relay, the time delay between two photons has the greatest effect on distinguishability. However, to date, these effects have not been analyzed. Our study uses simulations to investigate the effects of two-photon temporal distinguishability in terms of the visibility of the HOM-dip of two photons on the final key rate of finite-size MDI-QKD. Furthermore, an acceptable time delay range was estimated based on photons with Gaussian spectral amplitude functions.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) has been proven to protect legitimate users from attacks against measurement devices. The MDI-QKD requires that the two photons arriving at the instrument be indistinguishable. Precise time control is required to eliminate the distinguishability due to differences in photon arrival times. In the conventional methods, the time difference between photons is measured at a measuring instrument (Charlie), and a control signal is transmitted to the users (Alice and Bob). However, this method requires a long feedback loop, and the control may become unstable for long-distance transmission. This article proposes a method in which the photon arrival time difference is detected and controlled at Charlie. The reference signal for the time control is generated by an optical frequency comb in synchronization with the quantum signal. Therefore, the quantum signal photons can also be synchronized by synchronizing the reference signal pulses. A proof-of-principle experiment confirmed that the time synchronization accuracy required for protocol execution could be obtained. This proposal simplifies the implementation of the MDI-QKD.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detector loopholes. When it is combined with the decoy-state method, the final key is unconditionally secure, even if Alice and Bob do not have strict single-photon sources. However, active modulation of source intensity, which is used to generate the decoy state, may leave side channels and leak additional information to Eve. In this paper, we consider the MDI-QKD with a passive decoy state, in which both Alice and Bob send pulses to an untrusted third party, Charlie. Then, in order to estimate the key generation rate, we derive two tight formulas to estimate the lower bound of the yield and the upper bound of the error rate that both Alice and Bob send a single-photon pulse to Charlie. Furthermore, the statistical fluctuation due to the finite length of data is also taken into account based on the standard statistical analysis.
The ideal measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), which is immune to all detector side-channel attacks, is built on the Bell state measurement of two single-photon states. However, in practical MDI-QKD where phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (PR-WCPs) are used, the mismatch between states preparation and measurement in X basis leads to the bit error rate of more than 25%, which poses a challenge to the security of QKD. In this paper, we provide a security analysis of practical MDI-QKD based on polarization coding. We analyze the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference of PR-WCPs and Poisson-distributed photon number states (PNs), and find that these two sources are equivalent in MDI-QKD. The security analysis based on entanglement distillation is carried out on PNs, and the measurement results in Z basis and X basis are averaged to overcome the noncorrelation of the error rates in these two bases. Compared with GLLP scheme, a tighter key rate is obtained in this work, and the key rate deviates from the linear key rate bound in a short distance due to the finite proportion of multiphoton terms.
Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD) is a two-photon protocol devised to eliminate eavesdropping attacks that interrogate or control the detector in realized quantum key distribution systems. In MDI-QKD, the measurements are carried out by an untrusted third party, and the measurement results are announced openly. Knowledge or control of the measurement results gives the third party no information about the secret key. Error-free implementation of the MDI-QKD protocol requires the crypto-communicating parties, Alice and Bob, to independently prepare and transmit single photons that are physically indistinguishable, with the possible exception of their polarization states. In this paper, we apply the formalism of quantum optics and Monte Carlo simulations to quantify the impact of small errors in wavelength, bandwidth, polarization and timing between Alice's photons and Bob's photons on the MDI-QKD quantum bit error rate (QBER). Using published single-photon source characteristics from two-photon interference experiments as a test case, our simulations predict that the finite tolerances of these sources contribute (4.04+/-20/Nsifted) to the QBER in an MDI-QKD implementation generating an Nsifted-bit sifted key.
Due to the simplicity of Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interferometer setup, it becomes very important in various quantum-based applications, especially when the photon indistinguishability is required such as measurement device independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD). In the present work, the HOM experiment setup is designed to study the quantum interference between two indistinguishable photons (frequency, time of arrival and polarization should be same for both photons) coming from two independent laser sources (attenuated laser). The aim is to achieve high visibility as it indicates the photon indistinguishability from two independent sources. Theoretically, the visibility is 50%50 \%50% for indistinguishable photons from attenuated laser sources but in the experiment, due to various devices imperfections and other factors it is less than 50%. The HOM visibility achieved from our setup is 40%40 \%40% tested for a distance of 20 km over standard single mode fiber (SMF). The main point to be noticed in this work is that, this experiment is performed using single photon avalanche diode.
Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD) enables secure communication without trusting the measurement devices, but its performance critically depends on the quality of the employed photon sources. We compare MDI-QKD implementations based on Weak Coherent Pulses (WCPs) with those employing Quantum Dot (QD) single-photon sources. WCP-based schemes are fundamentally limited by Poissonian photon-number statistics, imposing a trade-off between single- and multi-photon emissions, whereas QD sources exhibit sub-Poissonian statistics with low antibunching parameter g(2)(0)g^{(2)}(0)g(2)(0). Using a decoy-state analysis for both source types, we find that even at moderate mean photon numbers, QD-based implementations outperform the best-case WCP configuration - where the mean photon number is optimised at each transmission distance - across the full range of transmission distances. We further incorporate the effect of imperfect photon indistinguishability via Hong-Ou-Mandel interference visibilities into the security framework and demonstrate that both source types are highly sensitive to even small deviations from ideal indistinguishability, significantly affecting achievable key rates and maximum transmission distance.