Dialogo

New considerations on a spiritual difficulty for public health, including questions about quantum probabilities and comprehensibility of worlds

Richard Woesler

Published Dec 5, 2022• 1 citation

Abstract

In a previous study a spiritual difficulty for public health was considered, that many people say that there would be definitely no afterlife with Judgment Day, and that some such persons might sometimes try to harm innocent others secretly to obtain advantages, e.g., financial, with negative impact on public health. Considering additional knowledge, new thought experiments are conducted, including arbitrary infinite bitstrings as programs, run, e.g., on theoretical Turing machines, and mathematical structures providing generalized findings, including results for questions of quantum probabilities, e.g., the Born rule - which is experimentally confirmed. In quantum processes, randomness instead of pseudorandomness is more probable than within the less general structures of the previous study. This is achieved designing generalized structures, e.g., programs, which do not function when they are “alone”. Additional structures show that pseudorandomness remains relevant. A paradox of the extreme variety of incomprehensible universes is described. It could be solved here considering further structures, e.g., the extremely large number of, e.g., world part copies simulated by various short programs, providing a large probability for comprehensible worlds. In all these mathematical structures, aliens’ pains emerge naturally.

DOI: 10.51917/dialogo.2022.9.1.14

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